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Two causes, above all others, sometimes working separately, sometimes in conjunction, have gradually
modified the character of economic science. These two causes are the growing importance of historical
studies, and the application to society of the idea of evolution. The first to make itself felt was history: in the
hands of Savigny it became the foundation of a new method of jurisprudence, the value of which has been
signally illustrated in our own time by Maine; and from the lawyers the historical method passed to the
economists. Yet the lessons of Roscher, of Hildebrand, and of Knies, remained for over a quarter of a century
unheeded; nor did they begin to carry their due weight until the practical needs of modern life had shown the
deficiencies of older economic methods. But, meanwhile, the idea of an orderly evolution of society had
been slowly making itself felt,—an idea which, whether conceived, as by Hegel, as the progressive revela-
tion of spirit, or, as by Comte, as the growth of humanity, or, as by Spencer, as the adaptation of the social
organism to its environment, had equally the effect of opening to the economist undreamt-of perspectives of
the past and the future.
The nature of the change will be perceived if we examine the principles by which investigation is now
guided. They may be thus stated—
(1) Political Economy is not a body of absolutely true doctrines, revealed to the world at the end of the
last and the beginning of the present century, but a number of more or less valuable theories and generaliza-
tions.
(2) No age, since men began to speculate, has been without its economic ideas. Political Economy was
not born fully armed from the brain of Adam Smith or any other thinker: its appearance as an independent
science meant only the disentanglement of economic from philosophical and political speculation.
(3) Just as the history of society, in spite of apparent retrogressions, reveals an orderly development, so
there has been an orderly development in the history of what men have thought, and therefore in what they
have thought concerning the economic side of life.
(4) As modern economists have taken for their assumptions conditions which only in modern times
have begun to exist, so earlier economic theories were based, consciously or unconsciously, on conditions
then present. Hence the theories of the past must be judged in relation to the facts of the past, and not in8 / William J. Ashley
relation to those of the present.
(5) History seems to be proving that no great institution has been without its use for a time, and its
relative justification. Similarly, it is beginning to appear that no great conception, no great body of doctrines
which really influenced society for a long period, was without a certain truth and value, having regard to
contemporary circumstances.
(6) Modern economic theories, therefore, are not universally true; they are true neither for the past,
when the conditions they postulate did not exist, nor for the future, when, unless society becomes stationary,
the conditions will have changed.
So much all economists would allow; and it need hardly be pointed out how considerable must be the
effect of conceptions such as these, even with those who believe that the Political Economy of thirty or forty
years ago is still the best clue to the questions of to-day. If no more is done, at any rate the belief in the
perpetual validity of modern doctrines is destroyed; and while that remained, no real understanding was
possible of the economic life of the past.
But the same two influences have produced still further effects, and, in particular, a divergence of
opinion as to the proper method to pursue in the investigation of present phenomena. There are many
intermediate shades of opinion, many interesting attempts at eclectic compromise, but, in the main, econo-
mists tend in one of two opposite directions. Either they use the method of deduction, practised by Ricardo
and defended by John Stuart Mill and Cairnes; or they proceed by way of historical inquiry, and the observa-
tion of actual facts. The former start from certain assumptions, such as that man is governed by self-interest,
that there is freedom of competition, that capital and labour are transferable: from these they deduce certain
hypothetical conclusions —conclusions, that is to say, only true so far as the assumptions are true; and then
they hope, by introducing this and that limitation, to arrive at an explanation of particular problems. The
latter try to free their minds at the outset of all a priori theories, and to see things as they actually are and have
been, using deductive reasoning only as an occasional help in interpreting the results of their investigation.
Among these, again, there is considerable divergence of opinion as to the kind of results to be aimed at, and
the shape Political Economy should assume. An increasing number,—“the historical school” in the strict
sense of the word,—hold that it is no longer worth while framing general formulas as to the relations
between individuals in a given society, like the old “laws” of rent, wages, profits; and that what they must
attempt to discover are the laws of social development—that is to say, generalizations as to the stages
through which the economic life of society has actually moved. They believe that knowledge like this will
not only give them an insight into the past, but will enable them the better to understand the difficulties of the
present.
[Bibliography.—For the recent history of economic discussion, see J. S. Mill, Essays on Some Unsettled
Questions of Political Economy, (1844), esplly. Essay V.; Cairnes, Logical Method of Political Economy,
(2nd ed., 1875), esplly. Lectures II., IV.; Cliffe Leslie, Essays in Political and Moral Philosophy, (1879),
esplly. Essays X, XI, XIV; Bagehot, Economic Studies, (1880); Ingram, Article on Political Economy (in
Ency. Brit., 9th ed.), about to be published separately; H. Sidgwick, Principles of Political Economy, (1883),
Introduction. For the present position of thought in Germany, see Nasse, in The Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics, (Boston, U.S.A.), for July, 1887; in France, Gide, Chronique in Revue d’Economie Politique, No. 1,
1887. The best, easily accessible presentment of the “historical” point of view will be found in Knies, Die
Politische Oeconomie vom Gesehichtlichen Standpuncte, (2nd ed., 1883), especially the Introduction; and
Schmoller, Ueber einige Grundfragen det Reckts und der Volkswirthschaft, (1875), esplly. part 2.]
Oxford, April, 1868.
[Since the above bibliographical note was written, important developments have taken place in eco-
nomic discussion. The most complete account of these is given in the collection of monographs pre-
sented to Professor Schmoller on his 70th birthday, entitled Die Entwicklung der deutschenAn Introduction to English Economic History and Theory, volume one / 9
Wirthschaftslehre im neunzehnten Jahrhundert (1908). This contains an article by the present writer on
The Present Position of Political Economy in England (also in the Econ. Journal, xvii. 467); and by
Gide on L’École Française. See also Marshall, Principles (5th ed., 1908), I. App. B.; Schmoller,
Grundriss (ed., 1908) Einleitung III.; and Gide and Rist, Histoire des doctrines Economiques (1909).]
Edgbaston, June, 1909.
Preface to the Third Edition
In the present edition the opportunity has been taken so to modify a few passages as to remove certain
inconsistencies between the first and second Parts, and also to make a number of verbal changes in the
direction of greater accuracy. But the reader will remember that, although no very considerable discoveries
have been made in the six years that have elapsed since the appearance of the first edition, the literature of the
subject has been enriched in several directions. Professor Maitland in the Introduction to the Placita in
Curiis Magnatum Angliae (Selden Society, 1889), and Mr. Blakesley in the Law Quarterly Review (April,
1889), have more than confirmed the suspicions here expressed (p. 61, n. 99) as to the legal doctrine of
manorial courts, and, in particular, have shown good reason for believing that the “court baron” was not of
“primitive” origin, but the comparatively late result of the growth of free tenure. Professor Paul Vinogradoff’s
Villainage in England (Oxford, 1892) has cast a flood of light on the agrarian usages and the legal theories
of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. And Professor Gross’s Gild Merchant (Oxford, 1890) has pre-
sented the conclusions of his earlier Gilda Mercatoria in a far more complete form, and, in its second
volume (Proofs and Illustrations), has given us a mass of previously unprinted material. Meanwhile, abroad,
the second volume of Dr. Inama-Sternegg’s Deutsche Wirtschaftsgeschichte (1891) has brought to our aid
many suggestive parallels and contrasts; while the writings of Professors Karl Hegel (Städte und Gilden der
germanischen Volker, 1891) and Georg von Below (Entstehung der deutschen Stadtgemeinde, 1889; Ursprung
der deutschen Stadtverfassung, 1892), with the critical and controversial literature to which they have given
rise, have added a new interest to early town history. For much of this recent literature, English and German,
the student may be referred provisionally to a series of reviews by the present writer in the (New York)
Political Science Quarterly, and the (London) Economic Journal since 1890.
It should be added that, in regard to the two important subjects of craft organization and the canonist
doctrine, further consideration has led the author to a somewhat different judgment, and, he believes, a more
adequate statement in the second Part. The accounts, therefore, given in this first Part of the earlier history of
these matters, while, it is hoped, not incorrect so far as they go, need to be supplemented by the discussion of
their subsequent history in later chapters.
Cambridge, Mass., May 19, 1894.
Note to the Sixth Impression
The reviews referred to in the Preface to the Third Edition, together with accounts of certain subsequent
works of importance, such as those of Professor Meitzen, of Mr. Seebohm on Wales, and of Professor
Maitland, will now be found in a collected form in the author’s volume of Surveys, Historic and Economic
(1900). Students who are interested in the questions as to the nature and methods of Economics which are
touched upon in the Preface to the First Edition may be referred to the two lectures On the Study of Economic
History in the same volume, and to the article Historical School of Economists in Palgrave’s Dictionary. The
spirit and purpose of the German historical economists are now exhibited for our admiration in the great
work of Professor Schmoller, Grundriss der Allgemeinen Volkswirtschaftslehre (part 1, 1900; part 2, 1904).
Edgbaston, March, 1908.Book 1: From the Eleventh to the Fourteenth Century.Chapter 1: The Manor and Village Community
[Authorities.—The most important evidence earlier than the Norman Conquest is the A.-S. document,
Rectitudines Singularum Personarum, printed with an old Latin version, probably of the twelfth cen-
tury, in Thorpe, Ancient Laws and Institutes (1840), and with a German version in Schmid, Gesetze der
Angelsachsen (1858). It records the duties of thegn, geneat (in the Latin version, villanus), cotsetla,
and gebur, and seems to have been drawn up in the tenth century for the guidance of those who had to
manage estates. The Domesday Book, 1086 (printed 1783; two supplementary volumes, 1816), states
the value, extent, and number of tenants on every manor at three periods,—in the time of the Confes-
sor, immediately after the Conquest, and at the date of the survey; but only exceptionally, e.g., in
Middlesex, gives information as to the size of the villein holdings. Then comes a series of surveys or
rentals of the manors of several great ecclesiastical corporations: of these the most important are the
Burton Chartulary, between 1100 and 1113, in Collections for the History of Staffordshire, v. (1884);
the Liber Niger of Peterborough, between 1125 and 1128, in Appendix to Chronicon Petroburgense,
ed. Camden Soc. (1849); the Boldon Book, 1183, for the estates of the Bishop of Durham, in Domesday
Book, iv. (1816), also ed. Greenwell, Surtees Soc. (1852); for the estates of S. Paul’s, a fragment of the
Domesday of Ralph de Diceto, 1181, an Inquest of 1222, a Rental of 1240, and a Compotus Maneriorum
et Firmorum of 1300, in the Domesday of S. Paul’s, ed. Hale, Camden Soc. (1858); the Register of
Worcester Priory, 1240, ed. Hale, Camden Soc. (1865); many manorial Extents in the Chartulary of
Ramsey Monastery, 1251–52, i., Rolls’ Series (1886), and in the Chartulary of Gloucester Monastery,
1265–66, iii., Rolls’ Series (1867); the Custumals of Battle Abbey, 1282–1312, ed. Scargill-Bird, Camden
Soc. (1887); the Rotulus Reditaum, 1290, in Registrum Cartarum de Kelso, ii., ed. Bannatyne Club
(1846); a Rental of 1298 in Coldingham Correspondence, ed. Surtees Soc. (1841); the Magnus Rotulut
of Bp. Bec of Durham, 1307, in Greenwell’s Boldon Book, App.; and an excerpt for the single manor of
Bleadon from the Custumal of S. Swithun, Winchester, in Proc. Archael. Instil. (1849).
It might, however, be thought that ecclesiastical estates differed from lay, or large estates from
small, in the character and occupations of their inhabitants. This is disproved by the Rotuli Hundredorum
of 1279 (printed 1818), much the most important authority for social history after Domesday. TheyAn Introduction to English Economic History and Theory, volume one / 13
give detailed accounts of every manor and every tenant over a large part of Mid-England. The Extenta
Manerii, of uncertain date but usually ascribed to 4 Edward I. (Statutes of Realm, i. 242), is a list of
instructions, of general applicability, for drawing up a survey of a manor. The treatise of the lawyer
Bracton, of the reign of Henry III, furnishes definitions of the status of different classes: but the ordi-
nary text contains interpolations inconsistent with its general sense, and until the work has been criti-
cally edited it cannot be trusted as an authority. (See Vinogradoff on “The Text of Bracton,” in Law
Quart. Rev., April, 1885). Fleta, a contemporary legal handbook, adds colour to the picture by its
description of the duties of steward, bailiff, reeve, and other manorial servants. It was printed by Selden
in 1647, and by Houard in Coutumes Anglo-normandes, iii., in 1776. A Rental of 1298 and a Bailiff’s
Account for 1316–17, are printed in Rogers, Hist. of Agriculture, ii. (1866); and a most valuable Rental
and Custumal of 1340 in Scrope, Hist. of Castle Combe (1852). The close resemblance of Normandy to
England in respect of the relations of classes will be seen on reference to Leopold Delisle, Études sur
la Condition de la Classe Agricole, etc., en Normandie (1852); see especially the Rental of the Abbey
of Mont S. Michel, p. 673, seq.
Of modern writers, the first that needs to be mentioned is John Mitchell Kemble (Saxons in Eng-
land; 1848). He describes the mark as “a voluntary association of freemen,” and asserts that “this is the
original basis upon which all Teutonic society rests.” This theory was worked out, with special regard
to Germany, by Georg von Maurer, in a series of writings, of which the most important were the
Einleitung sur Geschichte der Mark-, Hof-, Dorf-, und Stadt-Verfatsung (1854), and Geschichte der
Fronhöfe, der Bauernhöfe u. Her Hof-Verfassung in Deutschland, (1862–63). Strictly agricultural his-
tory has been investigated with great success by Georg Hanssen, whose papers are collected in
Agrarhistorische Abhandlungen (i. 1880; see especially his review of Nasse, p. 484, seq.). The first to
apply with any detail the theory of the mark to England was Nasse, in The Agricultural Community of
the Middle Ages and the Inclosures of the Sixteenth Century in England, transl. for the Cobden Club
(1871). Sir Henry Maine, accepting the general conclusions of Maurer and Nasse, commented upon
their results, and tried to confirm them by Indian parallels in Village Communities in East and West
(1871).
For some time the theory that the manor grew out of a free mark community reigned supreme in
England. Bp. Stubbs was indeed careful, in his Constitutional History (1873), not to commit himself to
it unreservedly; but his general argument as to the growth of relations of dependence led to the conclu-
sion that the power of the lord of the manor was, generally speaking, of late and gradual development.
Meanwhile, in the apparent success of German research, another line of investigation, represented
especially by French scholars, had been singularly neglected. Guerard, in his Prolegomena (1844) to
the Polyptique of the Abbot Irminon, a register of the lands of the Abbey of St. Germain under Charles
the Great, attempted to trace all the main characteristics of the manor to the legislation of the later
Roman Empire. Since the Franco-German war, his work has been resumed by a school of French
critics, who have called in question many of the positions as to mediaeval history which seemed to be
won by German industry. Its leader is M. Fustel de Coulanges, who declares (Recherches sur quelques
Problèmes d’Histoire, 1885) that the primitive free mark community is a figment of the Teutonic brain.
(See criticism by Elton, “Early Forms of Landholding,” in Eng. Hist. Rev., July, 1886.) But the work of
most interest for us is Seebohm’s English Village Community (1883), which aims at proving that “Eng-
lish economic history begins with the serfdom of the masses of the rural population under Saxon
rule,—a serfdom from which it has taken a thousand years to set them free.” His book has reopened for
England the whole question of the origin of the manor; and whatever may be the ultimate conclusion
on that subject, he certainly has been the first to make it clearly understood what the system of cultiva-
tion and landholding really was. On the internal life of the manor from the fourteenth to the sixteenth
century much information is given in Rogers, Hist. of Agriculture, and Six Centuries of Work and14 / William J. Ashley
Wages. An Elizabethan lawyer’s view of the matter, with interesting particulars, will be found in the
popular text-book, Le Court Leete et Court Baron, “collect per John Kytchen,” in French, 1580, and
frequently printed; published in English as Jurisdictions, or the Lawful Authority of Courts Leet, 1653.]
§1. Till nearly the end of the fourteenth century, England was a purely agricultural country. Such manu-
factures as it possessed were entirely for consumption within the land; and for goods of the finer
qualities it was dependent on importation from abroad. The only articles of export were the raw prod-
ucts of the country, and of these by far the most important was the agricultural product, wool. To
understand, therefore, the life of rural England during this period, is to understand nine-tenths of its
economic activity.
In the eleventh century, and long afterwards, the whole country, outside the larger towns, was
divided into manors— into districts, that is to say, in each of which one person, called the lord, pos-
sessed certain important and valuable rights over all the other inhabitants. Sometimes one village was
divided between two manors; sometimes part of a village formed a manor dependent on that from
which it had been broken off; but such conditions were always exceptional, and are less frequent the
further we go back. The vast majority of manors consisted of but one village and the lands surrounding
it cultivated by its inhabitants; and we may regard that as the normal state of things.
Let us picture to ourselves an eleventh-century manor in Middle or Southern England. There was
a village street, and along each side of it the houses of the cultivators of the soil, with little yards around
them: as yet there were no scattered farmhouses, such as were to appear later. Stretching away from the
village was the arable land, divided usually into three fields, sown one with wheat or rye, one with oats
or barley, while one was left fallow. The fields were again subdivided into what were usually called
“furlongs;” and each furlong into acre or half-acre strips, separated, not by hedges, but by “balks” of
unploughed turf; and these strips were distributed among the cultivators in such a way that each man’s
holding was made up of strips scattered up and down the three fields, and no man held two adjoining
pieces. Each individual holder was bound to cultivate his strips in accordance with the rotation of crops
observed by his neighbours. Besides the arable fields there were also meadows, enclosed for hay-
harvest, and divided into portions by lot or rotation or custom, and after hay-harvest thrown open again
for the cattle to pasture upon.1 In most cases there was also some permanent pasture or wood, into
which the cattle were turned, either “without stint” or in numbers proportioned to the extent of each
man’s holding.
In modern times arable lands thus divided have been known as “common,” “commonable,” “open,”
or “intermixed” fields; and the meadows are often called “Lammas lands,” from the day on which the
enclosures are removed.2
Supposing such fields and meadows were owned in common by a group of freemen, the condition
of things would be what is called the mark system. But the manorial system was something very differ-
ent; for in a manor the land was regarded as the property, not of the cultivators, but of a lord. It was
divided into that part cultivated for the immediate benefit of the lord, the demesne or inland,3 and that
held of him by tenants, the land in villenage; the latter being usually three-fifths or two-thirds of the
whole. The demesne consisted partly of separate closes, partly of acres scattered among those of the
tenants in the common fields;4 and we may, later, see reason to believe that originally the lord’s portion
had consisted entirely of such scattered acres, with possibly a rather larger farmyard around his house
than those of the rest of the villagers. Of the land held in villenage, far the greater part was held in
whole or half virgates or yardlands, known in the north as husbandlands,5 in some parts of the south as
wistas.6 The virgate was a holding made up of scattered acre or half-acre strips in the three fields, with
appurtenant and proportionate rights to meadow and pasture; and its extent, there can be no doubt, was
usually thirty acres, although in some manors it was as few as sixteen, in others as many as forty-eight,7An Introduction to English Economic History and Theory, volume one / 15
The holders of such virgates or half virgatcs formed a class socially equal among themselves, and all of
them, in any particular manor, with the same obligations of service to the lord. They were known as
villani, i.e., the “villagers” par excellence, and in the thirteenth century as virgarii, in English yardlings,
while in the north they often bore the title husbands.
Below these was the class of bordars and cotters, most of them holding only a cottage and one or
two acres, though sometimes as many as five, eight, or ten acres—of course in the common fields.
They seem to have been marked off from the villeins proper by not possessing oxen or plough; and
probably in many cases they were employed by the villeins. During the couple of centuries which
followed the Conquest the name bordarius, which was perhaps a Norman importation, was replaced by
the older English name cotman or cotter.8 In some cases between the yardlings and the cotters there was
an intermediate class of holders of half virgates; half-villeins and half-yardlings, as they were called.9
The whole of the land of the manor, both demesne and villenage, was cultivated on an elaborate
system of joint labour. The only permanent labourers upon the demesne itself were a few slaves;10 all or
almost all the labour there necessary was furnished by the villeins and cotters, as the condition on
which they held their holdings, and under the supervision of the lord’s bailiff. Domesday Book does not
itself record the services due from the villeins; but the Liber Niger of Peterborough, less than forty
years later, gives for each manor of that monastery a detailed account of the tenants’ labour-dues—an
account in striking agreement with the lists of services in the Rectitudines Singularum Personarum, a
century and a half earlier in data.11 Of all the later surveys, inquests, or rentals for three centuries, such
lists of services form the most important and characteristic part. At first sight bewildering in their
complexity, the duties they register may readily be distinguished as falling under two main heads: (1) a
man’s labour for two or three days a week throughout the year, known as week work or daily work;12
and (2) additional labour for a few days at spring and autumn ploughing and at harvest time. On such
occasions the lord frequently demanded the labour of the whole family, with the exception of the
housewife.13 These additional services were known as precariae or precationes (i.e., at the request of
the lord, ad precem), for which the commonest English expressions were boondays, loveboons, and
bedrips (reaping specially bidden).14 Besides these, there were usually small quarterly payments to be
made in money, and miscellaneous dues in kind, differing from manor to manor,—so many hens and
eggs, or so many bushels of oats at various seasons; as well as miscellaneous services, also differing in
the different manors, of which the one most frequently mentioned is “carting” (averagium, summagium).
During the boondays it was usual for the lord to feed the labourers; and, in the later custumals, the
precise definition of the days upon which they were and were not to be fed at the lord’s expense, or,
even more minutely, when they were to have drink and nothing else, when bread and no drink— a “dry
repast,” when black bread, when white, when even meat, broth, and cheese, often enlivens the dull
record with a gleam of humour. In one place, indeed, we are told that on the last two days of harvesting
each labourer could bring a comrade to supper.15
How the lands were actually cultivated we have little information; but Fleta’s statements as to the
duties of bailiff and reeve afford some glimpses into a system of common cultivation, which had
probably not varied in its main features for centuries. The chief defect of the account there given is that
it is written to meet the needs of the lords of manors and their stewards, and that therefore it speaks only
of the cultivation of the demesne, and tells nothing of the way in which the land in villenage was tilled;
although, considering that the demesne and villenage were often, if not always, in intermixed acres, it
is clear that the cultivation of the demesne and of the villenage could not have been carried on apart
from one another.
The most laborious work was that of ploughing. The demesne and the villenage seem to have had
each their own ploughs; those of the demesne being usually heavier, and needing more cattle to draw
them. For the ploughing of the demesne the lord’s ploughs were assisted by those of the villeins, to16 / William J. Ashley
which they were bound to furnish oxen and men in due rotation and proportion. The invariable rule in
the surveys was either to state generally the services due from every villein, and then those from every
cotter (in the latter case usually fewer days’ work a week—one or two instead of two or three—and
never ploughing, since cotters did not possess oxen16), or else to give in detail the services of the first
virgate holder, half-virgate holder or cotter mentioned, and add after each following name that he
performs the same work as A. B., the case detailed.17
The writer of Fleta describes each manor belonging to a great lord or corporation as managed by
three officers—a steward, a bailiff, and a reeve.18 The steward, or seneschal, was not strictly a manorial
officer, but the lord’s representative over a number of manors; and his chief duty, besides a general
control of the bailiffs, was to hold the manorial courts. But in order to perform these administrative
duties properly he must be acquainted with the condition of each manor. He should ascertain, says
Fleta, the customary services due from each tenant, find out if any has sold his holding without permis-
sion, and, if so, who was bailiff at the time and responsible. He should know the number of acres to be
ploughed, and the amount of seed necessary for sowing, lest his master should be defrauded by “cheat-
ing reeves;” he should know also how many tenants’ ploughs should help in tilling the demesne, and
how often they were to be furnished. Above all, he must watch the conduct of the bailiffs, to see that
they do not abuse their power or injure their master’s interests: “he shall inquire how the bailiff be-
haves towards the neighbours and tenants of the lord; whether he mixes in quarrels or spends his nights
in taverns. If the bailiff cause loss to the lord by his misconduct he must make it good; if his offences
are frequent the steward shall remove him.” It was doubtless only great proprietors who had stewards;
the lord of a single manor, living in the village, could himself hold the courts and keep the bailiff in
check.
The bailiff was the resident representative of the lord in the manor, and was especially charged
with the cultivation of the demesne. “The bailiff should rise early in the morning, and see that the
plough-teams are yoked; and then he should walk round and inspect the tilled fields, woods, meadows,
and pastures. Then he should visit the ploughs at their work, and take care that the oxen are not unyoked
till a full day’s work has been done.” He is to direct the reaping, mowing, carting, and other work; to
see that the land is properly marled and manured; to prevent the horses being overworked; and to watch
the threshers in the barn.
The reeve, on the other hand, is represented as a sort of foreman19 of the villagers. He was, accord-
ing to Fleta, to be chosen by the villata, or body of villeins, as the man best skilled in agriculture, and
to be presented to the lord or his steward for his acceptance. Eesponsible to the lord for the due per-
formance of the villein services, he was yet regarded as the representative of the villeins, and on their
behalf he “kept a tally of the day-works, and reckoned them up with the bailiff at the end of the week.”20
He was to see that the demesne and villein ploughs were set to work early; that the land was properly
sown, and not too lightly; and that it was well manured. Mr. Wallace tells us that in the Eussian villages
of to-day there is usually the greatest reluctance to accept the office of village elder, and thereby be-
come responsible to the government for the village taxes; so that a peasant who, for some slight of-
fence, was informed by an official that he was no longer capable of filling any communal office,
“bowed very low, and respectfully expressed his thanks for the new privilege which he had acquired.”21
Doubtless the office of reeve was regarded with similar feelings in England; else it would not have
been necessary to insert the note which we sometimes find on a custom-roll, that every holder of a
virgate or half-virgate could be compelled to accept the office.22 It was usual, however, to reward the
reeve by exempting him partially or wholly from labour-dues during his term of office, or even by
giving him an additional piece of land.23 It may, indeed, be doubted whether the description in Fleta
actually corresponded with the general practice—whether there were in fact both a bailiff and a reeve
on every manor. It is more likely that this was a lawyer’s generalization, never really true, or that, if itAn Introduction to English Economic History and Theory, volume one / 17
ever had been true, it was already, by the time that book was written, ceasing to be so. For certainly, at
the beginning of the fourteenth century there seems to have been usually only one person superintend-
ing the cultivation of the manor, and called indifferently reeve or bailiff.24 But this person clearly
performed much the same duties as are ascribed to the bailiff in Fleta, so that we need not doubt the
general correctness of the picture of co-operative agriculture there given to us.
Of the other side of village life—the labour of the tenants upon their own virgates—we have no
knowledge; we can only conjecture that it also was carried on by a system of joint labour, each holder
contributing oxen and men to the common ploughs in proportion to his holding, probably also joining
his fellows in mowing hay and reaping corn on some common plan.
§2. It has been necessary to begin with this outline of the manorial system in order that the nature
of the problem of early social history in England should be understood. It is now possible to turn back
and explain why it is hero deemed advisable to begin at the eleventh century and not earlier, and why
the description given above is guarded by the limitation to the midland and southern counties.
It is well to begin with the eleventh century, because there can be no reasonable doubt that at that
time the whole of central England was covered with manors of substantially the same character; and
we cannot begin earlier because it is by no means agreed how that condition of things came about. The
most vital of all the questions in the early social history of England is still in dispute, namely whether
it began with a population of freemen or a population of serfs. From the nature of the case this must for
the present remain a subject for research. But it is impossible altogether to avoid the controversy, and
a statement of the points at issue will bring out more clearly the character of the manorial system itself.
A lecturer, dealing with this subject ten years ago, would probably have set out with the confident
assertion that the greater part of the English population were at first grouped together in free self-
governing village communities. He would indeed have granted that some of the great nobles, having
many dependents, possibly from the very first in a few isolated districts created settlements something
like the later manors; and also that a similar shape was possibly taken by the settlements of cultivators
on the King’s land. But these he would have considered as comparatively exceptional, and, speaking
generally, the manorial organization would have been regarded as something superimposed on the old
free community. The power of the lord he would have described as of very slow growth; as due to royal
grants of jurisdiction, to the dangers which forced the freeman to commend himself to some more
powerful neighbour, and to the assimilation of the free community under a lord’s jurisdiction to a
dependent community living on a lord’s land. He would have argued that this process was hastened by
the Norman Conquest; and that the Norman lawyers, with their rigid terminology of villanus and
bordarius, gave a seeming uniformity to a condition of things in which there were still very consider-
able differences of status.
Such was the form into which the caution of the Bishop of Chester threw the main proposition of
modern German hibtorians—the proposition, namely, that Teutonic history begins with groups of free-
men. But of late years this construction has been assailed from two directions. M. Fustel de Coulanges
and a knot of French scholars have shown how scanty and ambiguous is the evidence on which the
German theories were built; and, in especial, that all the essential features of the manor, as an agricul-
tural group subject to a lord, with the exception of the lord’s jurisdiction, may reasonably be traced to
the later Roman law. Still more important is the recent work of Mr. Seebohm, which aims at establish-
ing the proposition that the mass of the people, in what is now England, were from the first in a servile
condition, and that their history, up to the Norman Conquest and beyond, has been one of progressive
amelioration. The strength of his argument does not lie in the actual examples adduced by him earlier
than the eleventh century, which may all be made out to be exceptional because taken from the royal
demesne; but in that he really makes us understand what the internal organization of the manor was,
and shows how uniform were its main characteristics. It is the uniform agricultural system, the system18 / William J. Ashley
of joint compulsory labour, that is so difficult to explain on the old hypothesis. For, even granting, as
perhaps the adherents of the old theory would, that a fourth of the manors may have existed from the
first, it is hard to believe that the other three-fourths arose out of free communities, which had gradu-
ally become subject to such extremely onerous burdens. We should at any rate expect to find many
intermediate stages,—cases in which the lord, by his own servants, cultivated the demesne, receiving
from the tenants only suit at his court; cases, again, in which he received suit and rent without labour,
and others in which the labour services were only occasional. we should not expect, on the theory of
the gradual fall of free communities, that the services of the tenants would be so burdensome, and so
uniformly the same. But it must be acknowledged that the hypothesis of the original serfdom of the
bulk of the population (whether English or Romanized Celt) is not without its difficulties. The districts
from which Angles, Saxons, and Jutes came are districts in which is now found neither a three-field
system, as was most usual in England, nor a two-field system, which also frequently occurs, but a one-
field system, which has existed for centuries,—the plan, of raising the same crops on the same land
without fallow.25 It must be supposed, therefore, that the English invaders found the three-field system
already in Britain. Mr. Seebohm seems to believe that the mass of the Provincials or Romanized Celts
were spared by the conquerors;26 that the greater men among the invaders became lords of manors;
while the rank and file received free allotments, or even settled in free village communities, but were
so few in number as not substantially to influence the late development.27 Mr. Freeman has argued that
in that case the language of the conquerors would have been overcome, as in Gaul and Spain, and that
Christianity would not so completely have disappeared as at Augustine’s landing.
These arguments would be unanswerable could we suppose that Britain had been either so thor-
oughly Romanized or so thoroughly Christianized as the other Roman provinces. But that was cer-
tainly not the case. Whatever supposition may be adopted as to the origin of the manor, whether it rose
out of freedom or servitude, there is little difficulty in explaining the origin of the curious dispersal of
each man’s tenancy in divided acres. In the Welsh laws we find regulations, applicable to an earlier
social stage than any of which we have documentary evidence among the English, which regulate the
common ploughing of the agricultural group. These lay down that every year the first strip that is
ploughed shall be allotted to the ploughman, the next to the irons (i.e., to him who had furnished the
ploughshare, etc.), the next to the first ox, i.e., its owner, and so for the seven other oxen, the driver and
the plough (i.e., the carpenter who made and repaired it). Thus he who furnished one ox would have
one strip out of every ten or so; those furnishing two, twice as many.28 There are many indications that
the ordinary contribution of a “full villein” to the communal team was two oxen;29 if the later state of
things, with the permanent individual tenancy of particular acres, had arisen out of an earlier system of
annual division, we can readily understand that there would be uniformity in the amount of holding of
all those who furnished two oxen (the virgarii, or pleni villani), and of those who furnished only one
(the semi-vit garii, dimidii villani), and that those who had contributed no oxen at all would have
scanty shares or no more than cottages, unless they had acted as ploughmen or carpenters. In the later
surveys we constantly find that one man’s strips adjoin those of the same fellow-tenant,30 which strength-
ens the hypothesis that “intermixed” fields were due to the distribution of acres in order of oxen, so that
each man might have his share both of good land and of bad, in proportion to the number of his oxen.
The description of the manor in the last section was limited to central and southern England, and
this because two other classes besides villeins and cotters appear in the east and south-west. Of the
population recorded in Domesday, villeins and bordars are scattered pretty evenly over the country, the
average percentage of the former being 38, of the latter 32, making up between them seven-tenths of
the whole.31 But the servi, or slaves, whose average percentage for the whole land is 9, and who in
some of the eastern and midland shires do not appear at all, or fall to a percentage of 4 or 5, rise in the
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this by the supposition that in the later stages of the English conquest a greater number of the British
cultivators were spared, so that in these districts slaves came to form a considerable part of the rural
population. Absolute slavery, however, disappeared in less than a century after the Conquest, and the
term became customary holders of email plots, like the cotters elsewheie but on more onerous condi-
tions.32
In the eastern and east-central counties, on the other hand, the socmen and liberi homines, who do
not form more than 4 per cent, of the whole population, and in the south and the greater part of the
midlands are entirely absent, rise to as much as 27, 28, 32, 40 and 45 per cent of the whole.33 As surely
as the slaves in the west are connected with the Britons, so surely are the socmen and freemen of the
east connected with the Danish settlements. And there can be little doubt that the names socman (i.e.,
one subject to the soc, or jurisdiction, of a lord) and freeman (i.e., one free from what were regarded as
servile conditions of tenure, whatever these may have been), had very much the same meaning.
The fact that Domesday records in Suffolk 35 per cent of the population as freemen and only 5 per
cent as socmen, in Norfolk 16 per cent of each, in Lincoln 45 per cent as socmen and no freemen at all,
can only be explained by the supposition that the “barones regis” who drew up the survey often de-
scribed as socmen, in one shire, persons whom their fellows in the neighbouring shire called freemen.
It may be gathered from the scanty evidence of Domesday, compared with that furnished in the Liber
Niger of Peterborough for the manors of that monastery, that the word socmen covered two widely
differing classes; namely, men holding very considerable portions of manors with villeins dependent
upon them, and men holding only virgates or portions of virgates and forming part of the labouring
village community. The former, however, were but few in number. They may be regarded as landown-
ers who, until the Norman Conquest, had not been considered as tenants at all of the more powerful
neighbours to whose soc they were subject; although, like the commended freemen, who are also occa-
sionally described as holding large estates with villeins and bordars upon them, the result of the Nor-
man Conquest must have been to tuin them into sub-tenants, holding what may afterwards have be-
come sub-manors.34
But the great body of socmen were clearly enough in much the same position as villeins, with two
important differences. They were not bound to week-work,35 the most distinctive mark of villein ten-
ure; and they were, frequently at any rate, bound to military service.36 But they were obliged to take part
in the precariae—to join in harrowing and harvesting, and to assist the lord for a few days with their
ploughs in autumn and spring.37 Their holdings—though not always whole virgates—are often esti-
mated in virgates, from which it follows that they were made up of scattered strips in the common
fields. Like the villeins, they could not sell their lands,38 nor leave the manor without their lord’s
consent.39 The great body of socmen, then, were members of the village groups, joining in the system
of common agriculture, but with less burdensome services and more honourable duties. We may rea-
sonably conjecture that this state of things was due to Danish chiefs seizing the manor houses and
putting their followers in the place of some of the Saxons villeins; and that the new comers, while
willing to assist their lords at busy times, would not submit to labour for them so many days a week,
like those whose places they had taken.
§3. Keeping before our minds the typical manor with its division into demesne and villenage, and
its sharply distinguished classes of villeins and cotters, let us attempt to trace the changes which gradu-
ally took place during the three centuries which followed the Norman Conquest. In so doing it will be
well to restrict our view to the evidence furnished by custumals and rentals, and to pay no regard to the
definitions of the lawyers; and this because definitions throw a fallacious veil of uniformity over widely
differing circumstances; because, moreover, the lawyers of the thirteenth century saw English facts
through the spectacles of the Roman law;40 and further, with especial regard to Bracton, because the
work which passes under his name is full of interpolations, inconsistent with the general argument.20 / William J. Ashley
When we compare the comparative simplicity of Domesday Book, in which, over the greater part
of England, villeins, cotters or bordars, and slaves make up the whole of the population, with the
elaborate division into six, eight, or even ten classes in the custumals of the later part of the thirteenth
century,41 the changes seem bewildering in their complexity and variety. But it will be found that most
of them may be grouped under four heads: (1) the growth of of a large class of free tenants; (2) the
commutation of the week-work for pecuniary payments; (3) the commutation of the boon-days and
other special services; and (4) the appearance of a class of men dependent wholly or in part on the
wages they received for agricultural labour.
i. (a) The rapid increase in the number of free tenants after the Conquest is one of the most certain
and important of facts. Now, the term libere tenentes is elastic enough to cover men in very different
positions, from the military tenant who had obtained a considerable holding in return for service in the
field, down to the man who had received at a money rent one or two acres of the demesne, or of newly
cleared ground. But the larger number of those known, by that name were, clearly, virgate-holding
villeins or the descendants of such, who had commuted their more onerous labour services of two or
three days a week for a fixed sum of money, and had been freed from what were regarded as the more
servile “incidents” of their position.42 What these exactly were, or, indeed, what was understood by free
tenure, it is difficult now to determine, precisely because the lawyers and landlords of the time did not
themselves know. The most widely spread idea was that inability to give a daughter in marriage or to
sell an ox or a horse without the lord’s consent, for which a fine had to be paid, was the certain mark of
servile tenure.43 These disabilities were, possibly, survivals from the time when such marriage or sale
lessened the working power of the manor.44 The distinction between free and servile tenure which they
involved was confirmed by judicial decision; for, when, in the fifteenth year of John, the question arose
as to whether a certain man held freely or no, and the jurors of the neighbourhood reported that he was
bound to plough three acres of his lord’s land, to mow and carry home a certain quantity of hay, and to
assist his lord in autumn, but that “they never heard tell that he paid a fine to the lord on marrying a
daughter, or selling an ox,” the judges decided that services such as these did not make the holding a
villein one.45 Yet we find cases in which men, not bound to week-work and undoubtedly regarded as
free tenants, were still subject to these annoying restrictions.46 The same uncertainty as to what consti-
tuted a free holding is illustrated by the fact that those tenants known as molmen or malmen, from
having gained exemption from the “greater services” in return for a rent, mol or mail, though they were
usually registered as servile, were yet sometimes counted among free tenants.47
Indeed, all that can be said is that permanence of tenure, which in the case of servile holdings was
guaranteed only by custom and the morality of the time, could, in the case of a tenant able to satisfy the
judges that his holding was not servile, be maintained by action in the royal courts. But this does not
show how the fact of free tenure was determined. Such cases can have occurred but seldom, and
probably the legal interpretations were not always consistent. In the thirteenth century, if not earlier,
free tenants often obtained charters from their lords conferring possession “for ever,” or, “to them-
selves and their heirs,” so that the holding by charter came itself to be popularly regarded as a sign of
freedom.48 But there were free tenants who never had charters.49
The process of commutation had probably begun before the Conquest, and, if so, this will help us
to explain the entries in the Domesday Survey relative to some few hundred persons described as
censores or censarii,50 and coliberti.51 The itinerant barons who drew up the survey must have come
across men whose position was the same as that of the villeins, save that they paid rent instead of daily
service, and for these men they would naturally make use of terms in general use on the continent to
describe tenants intermediate in position between the altogether free and the altogether servile. The
Norman Conquest would not hinder, would rather hasten the process of commutation. There are indeed
isolated cases of men being unjustly degraded by the new lords from the position of free tenants to thatAn Introduction to English Economic History and Theory, volume one / 21
of villeins,52 but acts of oppression like these had no special connection with the Conquest, and might
easily have happened long before, as we know they happened long after,53 that event. Indeed, when we
begin to understand the character of the agricultural system, we can see that with the lords it was not at
all a question of sentiment either for or against free tenure, but merely a question of relative advantage.
The man who became a free tenant continued to provide his lord with labour at those seasons when it
was most needed; and the money, which he paid in exchange for his week-work, might be much more
useful to the lord than the work itself. Accordingly we should expect, with the greater security which
the Norman rule brought, and the increased population and cheaper labour consequent upon it, that
commutation would take place with increasing frequency. This is, in fact, exactly what we find.54 For
example, in the reign of Henry I all the manors of the Abbot of Burton were already divided between
demesne, land at work, and land at rent (ad opus and ad malam55); the holders of the latter (who are
also described by the Domesday term censarii56), were quite free from week-work, but were still bound
to lend their ploughs twice a year, and three times to assist in reaping.
The general development, however, and the use of the term “free tenants” for men in the position
of censarii, will be best illustrated from a particular manor, which we have excellent means of studying
during two centuries. The manor of Beauchamp, in Essex, belonging to the Chapter of S. Paul’s, ap-
pears in the survey of 1086, in a fragmentary Domesday, which the Dean and historian Ralph de Diceto
caused to be drawn up in 1181, and in the Domesday of S. Paul’s of 1222: we have also a rent-roll for
certain of its lands in 1240; and there is in existence a survey of 1279, from which, however, only a few
particulars have been printed.57 Now, in the Domesday Book the tenants are stated to be twenty-four
villeins, ten bordarii, five servi; there are no free tenants or socmen of any sort. But in 1181 there are
not only thirty-five tenants-in-demesne (of whom many have very small pieces, and may reasonably be
regarded as the descendants of servi, to whom small holdings have been given), but there are eighteen
liberi tenentes, all of whose holdings are reckoned in virgates or fractions of virgates, and all of whom,
though they pay considerable sums annually for their land, are still bound to precariae, so that they are
evidently the descendants of the villeins of Domesday.58 Besides these there are ten holders of terrae
operariae corresponding to the “workland” of other documents;59 and at this point the record breaks
off, and we do not know how many more holders of half virgates there may have been, or how many
cotters with still smaller portions. In the lists of 1222 the number of tenants-in-demesne has increased;
but so has also that of free tenants—in the latter case from eighteen to thirty-four; though, as the area
held by them has only increased from 667 to 744 acres, this greater number must be due chiefly to
subdivision. But the last two names there given seem to be those, in the one case, of a man who had
himself held work-land in 1181, and in the other of the son of a man in that position; so that we may
regard these as having risen to free tenure in the forty years that had elapsed.
After the free tenants follow the names of sixteen holders of work-lands, each with half a virgate.
This last entry is significant; for we find, in some districts at least, a very marked increase, in the
century after the Conquest, in the number of dimidii virgarii, holders of half virgates,60 owing, perhaps,
to more land being put under the plough, or to the division of virgates between two persons. And, as we
might expect, while the jardlings were often able to commute their services and become free tenants,
the half-yardlings, as in the Beauchamp case just cited, and in many others, long remained bound to
week-work.61
The Beauchamp rental illustrates another very important point. It is that while servile holdings
retain their uniformity of size in each manor—continue, that is to say, to consist of yardlands or half
yardlands,—the free holdings on an estate differ very considerably in size from one another. But it is
noticeable that, whatever the holdings may be—and some of them are very small,—they are all multi-
ples or fractions of thirty acres, i.e., of virgates. Some of the holdings, indeed, are of sizes that are only
explicable as fractions of the virgate, e.g., 22½ acres as three-quarters, and 7½ acres as a quarter of22 / William J. Ashley
such a unit. In a few cases they are larger: one tenant holds fifty acres, i.e., a virgate and two-thirds,
together with two whole virgates, two half virgates, and a third; and two other tenants have two virgates
each. Cases in which a similar difference of size appears are frequently to be met with.62 The curiously
fractional holdings can scarcely be due to any other cause but division between children; and the
aggregation of holdings may have been caused by inheritance or purchase. However this may be ex-
plained, even if we do not accept Mr. Seebohm’s theory, that equality of holding is itself a mark of the
servile origin of the tenure,63 it is clear that free tenure tended to cause holdings to become subdivided
or aggregated either by succession or otherwise; that increasing personal freedom, in this as in many
other things, brought greater economic inequality. This tendency would be checked as soon as primo-
geniture, instead of division, became the rule of succession to free non-military holdings—a change
which seems to have taken place pretty generally before the fourteenth century.64 We know nothing of
the cause, and can only conjecture that it was due to the contagious example of the rule of primogeni-
ture in holdings in chivalry.
(b) There was an increase also of another class of men freed from the more servile burdens of
villenage, viz., the class of socmen;65 and this increase was so marked that socage became the lawyer’s
term for free non-military tenure. It has been seen that in many cases a holding was spoken of as free
though the tenant was still bound to precariae, to assist at ploughing, harvesting, etc. But this seems to
be in districts where there were no socmen; where both classes are found, and their positions can be
compared, the distinction seems to be that in such districts the term free tenants is employed exclu-
sively for those who were free from labour altogether, while the term socmen was used for those who
were still bound to precariae, though released from other services. Hence an inquisition at the end of
the thirteenth century distinguishes between the two classes, which it puts at the head of the tenants, as
“freeholders by charter,” and “freeholders who are called free socmeu.”66
(c) In some manors it was possible for the number of free-holdings to be raised by an increase in
the extent of cultivated land. Near most villages was a stretch of “waste” land, covered with trees and
bushes and used for common pasturage. As the increase of population strengthened the labour forces of
the manor, it became the lord’s interest to enclose portions of the waste, and either add them to his
demesne or let them to the villagers. By the statute of Merton, indeed, in 1235, the lord’s right of
“approver,” or improvement, was limited by the condition that he should leave sufficient pasture for
“knights and freeholders... infeoffed of small tenements” in the manor;67 and a custom which grew up
in many places made the consent of the “homage,” i.e., the body of free tenants, necessary before any
grant from the waste could be made.68 But as the freeholders were few in number, the action of mano-
rial lords would be but little hampered by this restriction. The grants seem almost invariably to have
been small; cases in which they are as large as ten or twelve acres are very rare, and usually they are
only five, four, three, or two acres, very frequently one acre or even one rood: and they were always let
at money rents, and never subject to labour obligations. Among the names of the tenants of the essart,
or clearance, we find many who hold at the same time either virgates in free tenure or land in villenage;
but probably in most cases the new holdings were given to the younger sons of tenants—especially
cotters—who otherwise would have held no land at all.69 It was here, and on the demesne, that cottages
and plots of land were found far the artisans, mostly weavers,70 who first show themselves in the
villages in the thirteenth century. This is itself a sign of an increasing division of employments; for
before this time the housewives had woven the cloth which their families needed.71
(d) Hitherto all the free holdings described were such as were created on the land held in villenage,
or on land which the villeins had previously used in common. Allusion, however, has already been
made to tenants holding demesne land. The letting of portions of the demesne for money rents had in
many instances taken place quite as early as any of the other changes which have been described;72 but
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tion between the two parts into which the lands of every manor were divided, the lands in villenage and
the lands in demesne. It has been seen that the whole organization of the manor was directed towards
providing labour for the cultivation of that part which the lord kept in his own hands. It is therefore
evident that if the lord found it his interest to let portions of the demesne instead of cultivating it
through his bailiff or reeve, his need for the services of the villeins would be pro tanto diminished, and
he would be readier to accept commutation. The letting of the demesne would do more, then, than any
other cause to change the relations between the lord and the villagers. Not, indeed, that it would to
anything like the same extent disturb the system of joint agriculture pursued by the villagers. For the
demesne, as has been seen, was itself usually partly made up of virgates, i.e., of scattered acres in the
intermixed fields. The new tenant, if the land he received was made up of such scattered strips, would
be bound by the rotation of crops observed by his neighbours; and if there was a co-operative system of
ploughing, as is probable, would take his share in it. Moreover the labour obligation of each villein had
often been defined as the ploughing, harrowing, and reaping of a certain number of acres. In an age
when the tendency towards definition was so strong, it is likely enough that custom had fixed which
particular acres of demesne a man was bound to cultivate. And if, as may naturally be supposed, the
renting of demesne land often meant only that a man who had previously been bound to cultivate
certain acres, the lord taking the produce, now promised to pay a certain fixed amount in return for
whatever the produce might chance to be, there would be absolutely no disturbance at all in the actual
method of cultivation.
In most cases apparently the bulk, if not the whole, of the demesne was retained in the hands of the
lord. But frequently as much as a fourth was let to free tenants—one person occasionally receiving a
half virgate or a virgate, though usually the holdings are very small, from four acres to half an acre, and
it is sometimes added after the names of the holders that it is “in addition to land” they held otherwise,
i.e., in the common fields by free or villein tenure.73 Occasionally, however, the whole demesne was
divided in this way; in one instance into thirty holdings each of one noke (a quarter of a virgate), with
three of two nokes each, and four of only half a noke.” And in this and similar cases it followed, almost
of necessity, that all the labour-dues of all the tenants were commuted.75 Such grants might be either
tenancies at will, or might be in perpetual freehold; and tenants in the former position were sometimes
able to gain a perpetual holding by promising to pay a higher quit rent.76
Thus, then, a body of free tenants had been created in three ways: by the elevation of villeins on
the commutation of their services for money payment; by the enclosure and letting out of portions of
the waste; and by the letting out of portions of the lord’s own demesne.
§4. ii. In all the cases previously noticed the commutation of labour-dues for money had been
accompanied by a rise from servile to free tenure. But from the beginning of the thirteenth century we
notice a much more general and far-reaching change—the commutation of week-work, or even of all
labour services, without the tenant being thereby raised to a free tenure. We find in many of the custumals
of the thirteenth century that, even where the labour is not generally commuted, each item of it—a
day’s work of each sort—is precisely valued, at a halfpenny, a penny, or the like.77 At first, probably,
this was in order to assess the fines to be paid by a villein who neglected his due task. But very often the
money would be more welcome than the labour; and in Fleta the reeve is directed to look carefully
after arrears of labour, and to try to get money for them. This would naturally lead to the total money
value of all the services being added up, and to commutation being effected by the more prosperous
and ambitious villeins. The change can be most clearly traced in the manors belonging to S. Paul’s,
where, in 1222, the alteration had only recently been made, and the name of the canon who had brought
about the commutation when he had “farmed” the manor could still be remembered.78 In some manors
no labour-dues had been commuted; in others, some had and some had not.” There is even an instance
where land held “for rent” had been unjustly given to another to hold “for labour.”80 Yet the lords were24 / William J. Ashley
not equally indifferent with regard to all services, as to whether they received money or labour. The
extra labourers needed at the busy seasons could not so easily be obtained for hire; and consequently
we find that in most cases the lords retain the precariae and exceptional services long after the week-
work has disappeared.81 The jurors who furnished the evidence upon which the Domesday of S. Paul’s
was drawn up in 1222, marked this by describing some tenants as holding “for both rent and labour.”82
Twenty years later, on the estates of Worcester Priory, we find that the change has taken place in
regard to every tenant, with the same exception as to precariae and other occasional services. The new
arrangement is there frequently described as “the new assize,” as opposed to “the old assize.”83 But,
with noticeable caution, the register contains in all cases a list of the old services as well as of the new
payments;84 and it may be that this practice of preserving a record of the labour-dues—a practice,
doubtless, common— was afterwards of some practical importance. As we might expect, the cotters
with their small holdings are still in some cases not sufficiently prosperous to commute their services.85
Commutation was carried out very gradually over the country. In the middle of the thirteenth century it
does not seem to have been effected in any case on the estates of Ramsey Abbey; nor was it, apparently,
often the practice on the estates of Gloucester Abbey twenty years later, or of Battle Abbey even at the
end of the century, though the value of the services is given in money. Yet, even where it had not taken
place, we notice a very marked difference of tone. The tenants are said to be bound to find a man, or
two men, or a woman, as the case might be,86 implying that they do not usually perform the service
themselves, but are able to hire men to do it for them; and they are frequently registered in the later part
of the thirteenth century as customary tenants (consuetudinarii, custumarii) rather than as villeins.
iii. The more prosperous the free tenants and customary tenants became, the more eager they
would be to get rid of the obligation of furnishing labour, even if only at certain seasons. This would be
especially irksome for the smaller customary tenants and cotters, who might in many cases have to
leave their own acres at the time when they were most anxious to attend to them; and the first English
writer on agriculture, Walter of Henley, whose Dite de Hosbondereye has been assigned to the middle
of the thirteenth century, especially urges the bailiff and the lord’s reaper to keep careful watch over the
customary tenants, to see that they do not shirk their work.87 There would be a tendency, therefore, for
all services to be commuted for money payments, with which the bailiff could hire labourers more
easily controlled.
Instances of the commutation of the whole of the services —week-work and boon-work—occur
occasionally as early as 1240, in manors where the demesne was wholly left to tenants.88 The service
with which the lord could least easily dispense seems to have been that of carting, and so in one case we
find the entry as to the villeins, “Whether they pay rent or no, they shall cart.”89 But with the reign of
Edward II complete commutation became very common.90
iv. Now, it is evident that the lord would not have consented, first to partial and then to complete
commutation, had he not been able to hire labourers either for regular service during the whole or part
of the year, or at specially busy seasons. These changes, then, imply that a class of labourers had come
into existence; a class of men, that is to say, who, although they undoubtedly often held pieces of
land—even two or three acres,—yet had not enough land to occupy their whole attention, and were
partially dependent upon wages. The same conclusion is suggested, even where commutation had not
taken place, by the phrase already mentioned, stating the obligation of customary tenants as the “find-
ing” so many labourers for so many days.
But this body of labourers must as yet have been comparatively small. There are several lists
extant of the permanent servants on a manor. They seem to have been few in number—a reaper, two or
three ploughmen, a carter, a woodward or swineherd, one or two shepherds, one or two oxherds or
cowherds, and a dairy woman.91 Some of these, such as the shepherds and oxherds, were probably
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reapers), seems to have been an officer little inferior to the reeve, with certain duties in connection with
the manor courts, besides the supervision of the ploughing and sowing. It does not appear that commu-
tation had the effect of greatly increasing the number of permanent hired servants on the demesne.
Additional labour was hired when it was needed, for threshing and winnowing, for hoeing and mow-
ing;93 and, later on, in cases where all the occasional services and precariae were commuted, for ploughing
also.94
It has not hitherto, I believe, been noticed that the appearance, about the middle of the thirteenth
century, of bailiffs’ account-rolls, containing a list of all the receipts and expences on the demesne,95
was the result of the changes which substituted money payments for labour. When none but inconsid-
erable money payments, or no payments at all, were made by the tenants; when payments in kind were
consumed by the lord, his family, and servants; when all the labour needed on the manor was furnished
by the tenants; there was no need for anything more than a list of services. But when rents were re-
ceived from free and customary tenants (whether all their labour or only week-work was commuted);
when it was necessary to pay considerable sums in wages to labourers hired in varying numbers and for
varying periods; still more when the lords were non-resident and required that the proceeds of each
manor should be sent to them in money, not in kind, so that corn and cattle, butter and cheese had to be
sold as best the bailiff could,—then a systematic keeping of accounts became necessary.96 Not that the
bailiff himself put them into the shape in which they were forwarded to the lord: this was the work of
itinerant “clerks,” who were paid for each piece of work.97 But the change gave him new opportunities
for dishonesty; and therefore, almost as soon as such accounts appear at all, we find an enactment for
dealing with defalcating bailiffs.98 But the new system of accounts was part of a wider development,
which must be dealt with later.
§5. The fundamental characteristic of the manorial group, regarded from the economic point of
view, was its self-sufficiency, its social independence. The introduction of new tenants from outside
was indeed always possible, either to take the place of villeins who had died without children, or to
occupy portions of the demesne or waste. But it was probably very rare; the same families tilled the
village fields from father to son. Each manor had its own law courts for the maintenance of order.
Every three weeks the Court Baron was held in the Manor House, attended by all the villagers who
cared to come, for the punishment of petty offences, and to witness the transfer of holdings.99 At longer
intervals came together the Court Leet, if the lord had a grant of criminal jurisdiction, for the punish-
ment of graver crimes;100 and punishment may be supposed to have exerted all its deterrent influence
when thieves were hanged at the places where they had sinned. Then, as now, every village had its
church; with this advantage, or disadvantage, whichever it may be reckoned, as compared with modern
times, that the priest did not belong to a different social class from his parishioners. Indeed, in perhaps
one-half of the villages, he was as poor as most of them: for when the advowson belonged to an
ecclesiastical body, the patrons took to themselves the tithes, and appointed a vicar who had often to be
contented with the altar-dues for his subsistence,101 so that he was glad enough to get a few acres and
add to his income by joining in the common agriculture.
The village included men who carried on all the occupations and crafts necessary for every-day
life. There was always a water or wind mill, which the tenants of the manor were bound to use, paying
dues which formed a considerable fraction of the lord’s income.102 Again and again we find the lord’s
servants seizing the handmills of which the tenants had dared to make use in detriment of his rights.103
For a long time the lords kept the mills in their own hands, under the care of bailiffs, making what
profit they could thereby;104 but in the twelfth century it began to be the practice to let the mill to one of
the villeins, at an annual rent, or ferm.105 Many villages, though not all, had their own blacksmith and
carpenter, who probably were at first communal officers, holding land on condition of repairing the
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centuries, this service also came to be commuted for money, and the craftsmen received pay for each
piece of work. Another village officer, who sometimes appears as holding land in virtue of his office,
was the pounder.107
The village “general shop” had not yet come into existence; in many places it did not appear until
the present century: partly because many of the wants which it meets were not yet felt, partly because
such wants as were felt were supplied either by journeys at long intervals to some distant fair or market,
or by the labour of the family itself. The women wove rough woollen and linen cloth for clothing; the
men tanned their own leather.
Thus the inhabitants of an average English village went on—year in, year out—with the same custom-
ary methods of cultivation, living on what they produced, and scarcely coming in contact with the outside
world. The very existence of towns, indeed, implied that the purely agricultural districts produced more than
they required for their own consumption; and corn and cattle were regularly sent, even to distant markets, by
lords of manors and their bailiffs, in increasing quantities as the great lords or corporations came to desire
money payments instead of payments in kind.108 But the other dealings of the villagers with the outside
world were very few. First, there was the purchase of salt, an absolute necessity in the mediaeval world,
when people lived on salted meat for five months in the year. The salt most commonly used came from the
southern coast, especially the Cinque Ports,109 where it was made by the evaporation of sea-water. The west
of England drew large supplies from the salt-works at Droitwich, belonging to Worcester Priory. There was
a large importation also of salt of a better quality from Guienne.110 Secondly, iron was continually needed for
the ploughs and other farm implements. It was to be had both of home manufacture, especially from the
weald of Sussex, and of foreign importation, chiefly from Spain;111 and it was bought at fairs and markets. It
was the general practice for the bailiff to make large purchases of iron and keep it in stock, handing over to
the blacksmith the necessary quantities as they were needed for the repair of the lord’s ploughs.112 A very dry
summer caused much wear and tear of implements, and consequently an increased demand and a higher
price; so that the bailiffs’ accounts frequently mention the “dearness of iron on account of drought.”113 A
further need was felt when, at the end of the thirteenth century, a fresh disease, the scab, appeared among the
sheep, and tar became of great importance as a remedy. It was produced in Norway, and exported by the
Hanse merchants from Bergen to the Norfolk ports. In years of murrain the cost incurred under this head was
a considerable item in the bailiffs expenses.114 Perhaps the only other regular recurring need, which the
village could not itself supply, was that of millstones. Of these the better qualities came from the neighbour-
hood of Paris, and were brought to the ports on the eastern and southern coast, whither we often find the
bailiff or miller journeying to purchase them.115 The duty of assisting the bailiff in conveying the millstone
from the neighbouring town was sometimes an obligation weighing on all the tenants of a manor, free and
villein alike.116
Not only was the village group thus self-contained and complete within itself; the sense of unity was so
strong that it was able to act as a corporate body. From early times great lords, possessing manors at a
distance which they could not easily inspect themselves or by their stewards, had let them for fourteen,
twenty-one, or thirty-five years at a ferm, or fixed annual payment, to men who would take the place of the
lord and try to make a profit.117 Now, we find many cases, even as early as 1183, in which the whole body of
villeins, the villata of particular manors, made contracts with their lords identical with those which an
individual firmar might have made, promising an annual sum, and taking the management of the land into
their own hands.118 It is even sometimes expressly said that they hold at farm “the court (i.e., the fines of the
court), with the meadows and the heriots (succession dues), and the villenage,” i.e., the villein services.119 It
will be seen that this is precisely analogous to “the purchase of the firma burgi,” i.e., the commutation of all
duos for a fixed annual payment by the town communities, and throws some light on the transference of
seigneurial or royal jurisdiction to the town magistrates.
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ciency and corporate unity. Now let us look at the position of the individual members of the group.
Some had risen to the position of free tenants, but the great majority (holding an even larger proportion
of the land,—for the free tenancies, as we have seen, were often very small,) had continued to hold by
servile tenure, as villeins or customary tenants, even when they had commuted all or most of their
services and had greatly gained in comfort and general well-being. Of the position of this great major-
ity the characteristic was permanence, with its disadvantages and also with its advantages. Though it is
seldom distinctly expressed,120 there can be no doubt that,—as is implied in the common description of
villeins in the law books, “ascriptitii terrae,”—they were bound to the soil; in the sense, at any rate, that
the lord would demand a heavy fine before he would give one of them permission to leave the manor.121
A father might buy permission for his son to become a clerk or monk, and younger sons might go off to
the towns to seek their fortunes in one of the craft guilds: but a yardling would not be likely to leave his
manor unless he could get a virgate elsewhere. This he could not gain if he went empty-handed; and
that he should go empty-handed was secured by the universal rule of all manors that villeins should not
sell ox or horse without license.122
On the other hand, the villeins had permanence of tenure, and their holdings usually passed from
father to son: it would appear, also, that they were often permitted to transfer their holdings to other
persons on paying a fine to the lord.123 The legal doctrine, indeed, from the time of Glanvill to that of
Edward IV, was that the villein could have absolutely no property at all, and that the king’s courts
would not protect him against any arbitrary injiistice on the part of his lord. And we do occasionally
come across cases of violent dispossession. But it would seldom be to a lord’s interest to lessen, the
working outfit of his estate by getting rid of a tenant; and custom constantly tended to become law. Yet
the legal claims of the lords were never definitely abandoned; and their survival down to the fifteenth
century would help to explain some of the obscurer features of the period of Enclosures.
The collision between the legal theory and the plain matter of fact that, until the fifteenth century,
the villeins were regarded as having a customary hereditary right to their holdings, has created so many
difficulties, that it is worth while telling at length a case which has only recently been published, and
which occurred in 1280.124 A quarrel had arisen between the Abbot of Burton and his tenants on a
manor called Mickleover, in Derbyshire, concerning certain services, to escape which the tenants claimed
that they were on ancient demesne of the crown. This was disproved by appeal to Domesday, and the
villeins were ordered to pay the costs of the action “on account of their false claim.” Thereupon the
abbot, to show that he was not to be trifled with, resorted to extreme measures and sent a large body of
servants, commanded by six monks and five knights, who drove off from the village 27 boars, 140
oxen, 50 cows and heifers, 506 sheep, and 77 pigs—doubtless all the cattle the tenants possessed. They
appealed to the king, and Edward I, ready to seize every opportunity for limiting baronial power, issued
a writ ordering that the cattle should be restored. Nothing daunted, the abbot ejected ten of the villeins
from their holdings, though he permitted their wives and children to remain; and then, as there seemed
some likelihood that the villeins would bring an action of novel disseisin, which would raise the whole
question of their status, and it was technically necessary for this that the ejectment should be complete,
he proceeded to turn out the wives and children also. Such an action, however, the villeins did not
bring: they preferred to follow the king about for several days, and get another writ ordering the sheriff
to see that the cattle were restored. But the sheriff, though energetic enough to make the monks com-
plain of his malevolence, had no force to carry out the writ; some of the bailiffs of the manors to which
the cattle had been sent obeyed his summons, while others flatly refused. The villeins got a third writ;
but it was useless,—their cattle were still in the abbot’s hands, and they felt themselves beaten. Some
of them came to the abbot’s court and craved forgiveness; they were made to appear at the county court,
and there solemnly acknowledge that they were “serfs at the will of their lord.” But others would not
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villeins they possessed nothing but their own bodies (extra ventrem). They, on the contrary, claimed to
be freemen, and demanded a jury. After this the proceedings are difficult to follow; apparently no
inquest by jury ever really took place as to whether they were free or no. Gradually they all submitted
and acknowledged that they held at the will of the abbot. Those who came readily were replaced in
their holdings, their cattle restored, and only a small fine exacted. But two were obstinate to the last,
and would not yield till they had been carried off to Burton and put in the stocks. A few hours in the
stocks so broke their spirit, that next day they came and, as a sign of humility, voluntarily submitted to
be put in the stocks again. And then they were pardoned, but made to pay a heavier fine than their
neighbours,—to wit, half of all the corn then growing on their land.
It is clear, in this instance, that the abbot, though ready to use a legal doctrine to overawe the
villeins, did not intend to dispossess them, and did not dispossess even the ringleaders of the opposi-
tion. And when, in the fifteenth century, the profits of sheep-farming did induce lords of manors here
and there arbitrarily to evict customary tenants, it was laid down by the chief justice (in 7 Ed. IV) that
“the tenant by the custom is as well inheritor to have his land according to the custom as he which hath
a freehold.”125 The yardling and the cotter were thus tied to the soil, but the soil was also tied to them.
No very great accession of wealth was possible to them, but, on the other hand, they always had land
upon which they could live,—and live, except in very occasional seasons of famine, in rude plenty.126
It is instructive to compare the village, as we have seen it, with the village of to-day.
i. In one respect there might seem to be a close resemblance. Then, as usually now, the village was
made up of one street, with a row of houses on each side. But the inhabitants of the village street now
are the labourers, the one or two village artisans,—such as a tailor, blacksmith, saddler, cobbler,—and
one or two small shopkeepers. The farmers live in separate homesteads among the fields they rent, and
not in the village street. Then, all the cultivators of the soil lived side by side.
ii. Secondly, notice the difference as to the agricultural operations themselves. Now each farmer
follows his own judgment in what he does. He sows each field with what he thinks fit, and when he
sees fit, and chooses his own time for each of the agricultural operations. But the peasant-farmer of the
period we have been considering, and for long afterwards, was bound to take his share in a common
system of cultivation, in which the time at which everything should be done and the way in which
everything should be done were regulated by custom enforced by the manor courts.
iii. A further difference is seen in the relations of lord and tenant as to the cultivation. Nowadays,
either the landlord does not himself farm any land in the parish, or, if he does, his management of it is
as independent of the cultivation of any other land by any tenants he may have as that of his tenants is
of his own farming. But, then, almost all the labour upon the demesne was furnished by the villein
tenants, who contributed ploughs, oxen, and men for the bailiff’s disposal. Long after commutation of
services had largely taken place, the lords retained the right to assistance in all the more important
processes,—ploughing, reaping, threshing, carting. And the demesne itself was often made up in great
part of virgates in the common fields, so that the lord himself was bound to submit, so far as these were
concerned, to the same rigid system of joint cultivation as was maintained by the rest of the members
of the village community.
iv. Compare, finally, the classes in a manor with those in a village to-day. In a modern parish there
will usually be a squire, some three or four farmers,—all of them large farmers when compared with
peasant holders,—and beneath them a comparatively large number of agricultural labourers. Even
when the agricultural labourer has a good garden or an allotment, there is still a social gap between him
and the farmer of a couple of hundred acres. But in the mediaeval manor, as we have seen, much the
greater part of the land was cultivated by small holders. Between the lord of the manor and the villein
tenants there was, indeed, a great gulf fixed,—a gulf wider far than that between the farmer and the
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lord on one side, there was nothing like that social separation between the various classes of actual
cultivators that there is to-day. The yardling and cotter worked in the same way; their manner of life
was the same; and in the system of joint cultivation and the life of the village street they were made to
feel their common interests.
It may be well to notice the non-existence in the village group of certain elements which modern
abstract Economics is apt to take for granted. Individual liberty, in the sense in which we understand it,
did not exist; consequently, there could be no such complete competition as we are wont to postulate.
The payments made by the villeins are not rents in the abstract economist’s sense: for the economist
assumes competition,—assumes that landlord and farmer are guided only by commercial principles;
that there is an average rate of profit, which the farmer knows; that he will not take less and cannot get
more.127 However the labour services came to be fixed, they were fixed in the eleventh century; they
remained unchanged till they were commuted for money; and, once commuted, no increase took place
in the money-rent. The chief thought of lord and tenant was, not what the tenant could possibly afford,
but what was customary. And, finally, there was as yet no capital in the modern sense. Of course there
was capital in the sense in which the word is defined by the orthodox economists—“wealth appropri-
ated to reproductive employment;” for the villeins had ploughs, harrows, oxen, horses. But this is one
of the most unreal of economic definitions. As has been well said, “by capital we habitually mean more
than this; we mean a store of wealth which can be directed into new and more profitable channels as
occasion arises.”128 In this sense the villeins certainly had no capital, and it was only gradually, as
commutation began, that the landlord was getting to have something that he could “capitalize,” i.e.,
that he could save with the intention of gaining a profit from it by-and-by.129
§6. Little as the mere substitution of money payments for labour dues may seem to have affected
the relations of classes, it marked the beginning of a change of supreme importance. The German
economist Hildebrand was the first to point out that whatever difference there may have been between
the economic development of the different European nations, there is one characteristic common to all,
the transition, namely, from payment in kind to payment in money. Such a way of phrasing it, indeed,
but very inadequately represents what Hildebrand meant by the transition from Natural-wirthschaft to
Geld-wirthschaft,—the development of a society in which exchange, and the distribution of wealth
generally, are effected by means of, or expressed in terms of a metallic currency, from one in which
land was given for service, service given for land, goods exchanged for goods, without the intervention
of a currency at all.130 This change is what we see in all directions during these three centuries.
In examining the character of the village group, wo saw that in the eleventh century, and in most
cases long afterwards, the lord and his family lived upon the produce of his demesne, cultivated by the
customary labour services of his tenants, and the tenants upon the produce of the lands which they held
in return for such services; and we have noticed how very gradually these services were exchanged for
money, so that the lord should receive a rent with which he might hire wage-labourers. What is true of
the several manorial groups was true also of the relations between the tenants and the seigneurial
household in those cases where a lord held a great number of manors. The lords received from their
bailiffs, not sums of money, but certain amounts of agricultural produce, for the maintenance of their
households.
No detailed accounts are extant of the management of great lay estates, but several such exist for
ecclesiastical possessions, which were managed precisely in the same way; with this difference only,
that the natural conservatism of corporate bodies caused old methods of management to be retained
long after they had been abandoned elsewhere.
The domestic economy of the Chapter of S. Paul’s is set forth at length in certain documents of the
later part of the thirteenth century, which have been sympathetically commented upon by a modern
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hands of a firmarius, who held a lease of it, usually for life. He occupied, in regard to the manor,
exactly the position of a lord, holding the courts, supervising the bailiff, and making agreements with
the tenants. He was bound to make certain payments in kind and in money at regular intervals to the
Chapter: but any surplus produce or rent he had the right of retaining; and so considerable a source of
profit was this, that the office of firmar was monopolized by the residentiary canons, who, upon any
vacancy, had the right in order of seniority of taking up the lease. The unit of payment was a firma,
which, in the case of S. Paul’s, besides its ordinary meaning of a definite or regular payment instead of
arbitrary or fluctuating payments, had the further meaning of the food for a single week. It consisted of
sixteen quarters of wheat, sixteen quarters of oats, and three quarters of barley. The thirteen manors
furnished in the course of the year forty-five such “firms,”—of which ten came from one manor, six
from another, four each from two, three each from four, two each from four, and one from the remain-
ing manor; the total quantity in the year being seven hundred and twenty quarters of wheat, seven
hundred and twenty of oats, and a hundred and thirty-five of barley.
Adjoining the cathedral were a horse-mill, a bakehouse, and a brewery, where the grain was ground,
bread baked five times a fortnight, and beer brewed twice a week, under the supervision of a warden of
the brewhouse, himself usually a canon. He was bound to provide each of the thirty canons with three
loaves a day, and thirty gallons of beer a week;—doubtless they had separate households, and the
greater part of the beer and bread went to their servants; to five other persons went two loaves a day and
six gallons of inferior beer a week; to the rest of the minor canons one loaf and three gallons, and a
certain number of loaves and gallons to the other clergy and servants; making in all some 40,400 loaves
a year, and 67,800 gallons of beer.
This primitive system continued far into the fourteenth century. But from a date certainly as early
as the middle of the twelfth century, certain money payments had been made. Of these the unit was a
dizena, each dizena being three marks and sevenpence, thus allotted,—two marks and a half for the
weekly wages of the cathedral vicars, minor canons, sacristan, and other officials, half a mark to pur-
chase wood for the brewery and bakehouse, and sevenpence for alms. Thus money payments for both
rent and wages had already commenced. Moreover, as we cannot suppose that the canons lived exclu-
sively on bread and beer, it is clear that they must have purchased meat, as well as cloth for their robes,
in the London market, with the money which they received as tithes and offerings. Still, the larger part
of the food of the cathedral body was for several centuries derived from the manors of which it was
lord; how close the dependence was is illustrated by the statute of Ralph de Diceto at the end of the
twelfth century, that in case of dearth or pestilence upon the estates, the non-resident members of the
body should have one loaf and one gallon of beer less a day. Early in the fifteenth century, we find the
system breaking down; money payments to the canons are substituted for the supply of beer, the supply
of bread falls into arrears, and finally considerable money rents took the place of the firms.
The transition from payments in kind to payments in money, which, on the manors of the S. Paul’s
Chapter, and doubtless on those of many other ecclesiastical corporations, was delayed until the fif-
teenth century, had upon the royal demesne taken place early in the twelfth. It is described by the author
of the Dialogue de Scaccario, writing in 1178, in language which deserves quotation. “In the early state
of the kingdom after the Conquest, the kings used to receive from their manors certain quantities, not
of gold or silver, but of provisions, from which were supplied the daily necessities of the royal house-
hold. Those who were charged with the matter knew what quantity each manor was accustomed to
supply. Coined money, however, was provided for the pay of soldiers and other needs, from the pleas of
the crown, and from those towns and fortified places where agriculture was not practised. This system
lasted during the whole reign of William I, down, indeed, to the days of Henry I; I myself have met men
who had seen provisions brought to the court at appointed times from the manors. The royal officials
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for horses, or other necessaries. And when these had been paid in the proper quantity, the officials
reckoned it all up with the sheriff at fixed rates in money,—thus, for a measure of wheat that would
make bread for a hundred men, a shilling; for the carcase of a fatted ox, a shilling; for a ram or an ewe,
fourpence; the provender for twenty horses, fourpence likewise. But as time went on, and Henry was
obliged to cross the sea to suppress distant insurrections, he had need of coined money to meet these
expenses. About the same time, crowds of complaining villeins began to flock to the court, or, what
distressed him more, met him as he journeyed, and held up their ploughshares to show that agriculture
was failing; for they suffered many hardships from this carrying of provisions away from their own
homes. Accordingly the king inclined his ear to their complaints, and, after taking counsel with the
magnates, appointed the best men he could find for the work, and sent them all over the kingdom to
visit every manor, and there estimate in money the value of the payments in kind; and they made the
sheriff of each county responsible at the Exchequer for the total amount due from all the manors in the
county.”132
There are many points of interest in this account; such as the primitive character of those condi-
tions in which the natural unit of reckoning was food for a hundred men, or provender for twenty
horses; or the description of the king’s need for money as chiefly due to the employment of paid troops.
But what is especially important to observe is that it shows that a currency can be used as a common
measure of value, long before it is actually employed in everyday transactions as a medium of ex-
change.
These two examples are sufficient to illustrate the character of the change. But it is to be noticed
that it was not confined to the relations between individuals: so intimately was the system of govern-
ment bound up with the condition of society that the same transition was sure also to take place in the
relations between the sovereign and his subjects. Thus in the reign of Ethelred is found the beginning
of regular taxation in the shape of the Danegeld; by the time of Canute, the heriot, originally a gift of
horses and armour, had come to be a money payment; Henry II. obtained the payment called scutage, in
lieu of military service, from the great body of the knights; and under Edward I regular money pay-
ments by the merchants finally took the place of gifts or seizures of wares.
Such a change implies two conditions: first, the existence of an adequate currency; and secondly,
the existence of markets, where men might be confident of obtaining money for their wares, or of
obtaining wares for their money. To take the first of these. There was no considerable coinage in
England until the second half of the eighth century under Offa.133 With Athelstan began the long series
of laws for the regulation of the coinage; he ordained that only one kind of money should be used
throughout the realm, and that none should coin save in a town: from this time begins the practice of
stamping upon the coins the name of the town where they were struck.134 For centuries the local au-
thorities in centres of trade were allowed to have their own moneyers: there were several in every
considerable town; and the increase in the bulk of the currency may be roughly estimated by the number
of names of towns found on the coins. Under Canute the mints were more numerous than ever be-
fore.135 Under Henry I there were ninety-four moneyers, all of them punished by mutilation in 1125 for
debasing the currency.136 To remedy the evils of clipping, there were new coinages in 1125, 1158, 1180,
1248, and 1300.137 In 1220, round halfpennies and farthings were for the first time issued: that the
practice of breaking the coin into halves and quarters should have remained so late as this proves how
little retail trade there could have been.138 On the other hand, the ill success of Henry III in his attempt,
in 1257, to imitate his contemporaries in France and Italy in issuing a gold currency, proves how far
England was behind other countries in commercial development;139 for with the increase of trade, coins
of higher denominations become more and more convenient. The remonstrances of the city of London
forced him to issue a proclamation that no one should be compelled to accept the new gold pennies.
The coinage was small, and soon discontinued; and no similar attempt was made until 1343, when32 / William J. Ashley
Edward procured the assistance of certain Florentine moneyers in the issue of his gold nobles.140 Dur-
ing the intervening century, as we shall see in the next chapter, a considerable commerce had grown up;
so that the king was now able to ordain that no one should refuse to take his nobles in payment of debts
of twenty shillings or above. It was with Flanders that this trade was most considerable, and therefore
it was that in 1345–46 Edward negotiated with the magistrates of the Flemish towns for the establish-
ment of a uniform coinage to be current in both countries.141
How the second condition was fulfilled, and markets grew up, will be shown in the next chapter.
Notes.
1. Seebohm, 1–4, 7–13, 21–29.
2. Maine, Village Communities, 85–87; but it is incorrect to speak of “common fields... divided into
three long strips.” There were three great fields, or three large ones and three smaller ones, as in
Hitchen (see the map at the beginning of Seebohm, and p. 450); and each field was divided into
several score of acre strips.
3. Dominium, or dominicum, and villenagium are the usual terms. Inland is more rare: it appears as
early as 956, Seeb. 149; occurs sometimes in Domesday, e.g., in Yorkshire, three cases on p. 317,
col. 1; is the usual term for the demesne in the Burton Chartulary, e.g., pp. 18, 19, 20; and occurs as
late as 1240, “terrae de dominico quas vocant Inlandes,” Domesday of S. Paul’s, lxxii.
4. In a map, dated 1624, in the possession of Lincoln College, Oxford, representing the manor of
Pollicot, co. Bucks, the college, which has stepped into the position of lord of the manor, is marked
as holding alternate strips in the common fields. Cf. Seebohm, 38.
5. Seebohm, 61.
6. Cust. Battle, ziii.
7. Dugdale, writing of Stoneleigh in Warwickshire, describes each tenant as holding one yardland, and
“paying 30d., viz. 1d. an acre, in regard every yardland contained 30 acres and no more;” Antiq. of
Warwicksh., 254, qu. Gomme, Primitive Folk-Moots, 128. For virgates consisting of 16 acres, see
Ramsay Chart., 284; of 18 acres, it. 295; see also Worcester Reg., lxxv. lxxx.
8. The persons to whom the term bordarii was applied seem usually to have been in a somewhat better
position than the cotseti and cotmanni. But the terms are used interchangeably: e.g., the Liber Niger
of Peterborough, 161, where, after dividing the tenants on a certain manor into pleni villani, dimidii
villani and cotsetes, the services of the full-villeins and half-villeins are given and then those of the
bordarii. In Domesday, according to the lists in Ellis, Introd. to Domesday (1833), ii. 511, there are
recorded 108,456 villani and dimidii villani, 82,624 bordarii, and only 6819 cotarii, coteri, and
coscets; yet the division of the servile population in the so-called Leges Henrici primi is into “villani,
vel cotseti, vel ferdingi;” Stubbs, Sel. Charters, 106, xxix.
9. Besides the above examples of dimidii villani, cf. “Isti subscripti vocantur Halferdlings,” Cust.
Battle, 77.
10. Of eight manors in Northamptonshire belonging in 1086 to the monastery of Peterborough, in four
there was only one slave, in one an ancilla, in one three slaves, and in two four; Domesday, I. 221,
2216. In the western counties, indeed, there was a much larger proportion; but to this reference will
be made later.
11. The Rectitudines give first the law of the thegn, then the duty of the geneat,—a term which is best
explained as including all the servile cultivators,—and then the duty of the cotsetla and the duty of
the gebur, which may be regarded as “subsections” of the clause concerning the geneat. Seebohm,
129, seq. Compare the services of the gebur,—“in some places heavy, in others lighter or moderate.An Introduction to English Economic History and Theory, volume one / 33
On some land he must work at week-work two days at such work as he is required through the year
eveiy week, and at harvest three days for week-work, and from Candlemas to Easter three,”—with
such entries as, “quaeque virga operator iii diebus in ebdomada,” in Chron. Petrob., 158.
12. “On sumen lande is paet he sceal wyrcan to wic-weorce, ii dagas;” in the Latin version, “operatur
opus septimane;” Rectitudines, 375, Schmid. Three centuries later occurs the phrase “opera diurna;”
Cust. Battle, viii.
13. E.g., “Omnes firmarii fac’ iiii p’cac’ (i.e., precationes) in antumpn’ cu’ tota familia exta husewiva;”
Boldon Book, in Domesday, iv. 570, 571. Cf. the custom of Bright Walton, 12 Ed. I.: “Nec licebit
alicui metere in eadem villa eodem die quo dominus habet magnam precariam nisi in campo do-
mini;” Cust. Battle, 59; and an instance in the Hundred Rolls, qu. Seebohm, 43.
14. In drawing this distinction between week-work and boon-days I am following Seebohm, 41, 78,
and it seems to be justified by such phrases as “facit aruras, lovebones, averagia” (carting), in Chart.
Ramsey, 314. But in some cases the term precariae, or precationes, is given to only one or two
additional days in the year, as distinguished even from the heavier services at harvesting.
15. Cust. Battle, xxxix. There is a charming piece of Latinity in another case, “Percipiet per diem in
dicto prato ii panes nigros et dimidium, potagium, et potum, (i. galonem communiter) et medietatem
unius ferculi et caseum,” ib., 5. Sometimes the days were distinguished according to whether meat
was given or only ale, as mete-bedrip and ale-bedrip. Hale, Domesday of S. Paul’s, cxxxv. In one
case, hunger-bedripe, a day on which no food was given, is distinguished from lovebone; “metct
etiam unum sellionem ad hunger-bedripe, et unum sellionem pro lovebone;” Chartulary of Ramsey,
i. 470.
16. This is abundantly illustrated in the Liber Niger and the Boldon Book, from which translations are
given in Seebohm, 73, 68.
17. The latter is the later plan; and it is illustrated, e.g., in the Domesday of S. Paul’s, 3, where, of those
who hold per vilenagium, Robert the smith is mentioned first as holding half a virgate, and bis
services are recorded, and then the names are registered of five other persons holding half virgates,
with the addition in each case per idem servicium. In the Chartulary of Ramsey the model list of
services often occupies three pages, e.g., 298–301, and to the following names is added, “et facit in
omnibus sieut dictus N.” In the Chartulary of Gloucester the phrase is eadem faciet, 29, 38.
18. The sections on the bailiff and reeve will be found printed in the Appendix to Cunningham, Growth
of Eng. Industry and Commerce (1 ed.)
19. In a manor belonging to S. Paul’s there is an instance in which it is not clear whether “forman” is
the name of an office or a surname; probably it was passing from one to the other: “Johannes forman
v. acras pro i. operatione qualibet septimana et averat Lond’ ad eibum domini quum Dominus jubet....
et furem captum in curia custodiet et judicatum suspendet; Domesday of S. Paul’s, 38.
20. See the account in Hale’s Introduction to Domesday of S. Paul’s, xxxvi.
21. Russia, ch. viii.
22. “From the survey of 1279 (not yet printed) we learn that certain of the tenants (on the manors of S.
Paul’s) were compellable to accept this office: that it was an annual one; and that whilst performing
its duties the tenant was exonerated from other services;” Hale, Introduction to S. Paul’s D., xxxvi.
For other examples of compulsory reevedom, see Custumal of Bleadon, 209; Cust, of Battle, 66
(“Memorandum quod dominus potest pro voluntate sua quem voluerit de custumariis eligere in
Prepositurn et qui tenet integram virgatam terrae relaxabitur ei de redditu suo quinque solidorum
xld.); and Castle Combe, 146, where, in a Rental of 1340, after the names of four of the tenants each
holding a virgate, and after that of a miller, is added, “Et erit prepositus,” while after the name of
another miller is, “Et non debet esse prepositus;” and of twelve holders of virgates “in bondagio” it
is said, “Et erit prepositus vel messor si domino placuerit et tunc erit quietus de v. solidis et de34 / William J. Ashley
omnibus operibus suis in autumno.”
23. For exemption from services, see previous note. For laud attached to the office, see Cust. of Bleadon:
“Habebit unum ferdellum terrae sine messuagio quod vocatur revelond.”
24. Thus the Compotus of 1316, in Rogers, Hist. of Agric., ii. 617, is presented by “Robertus Oldman
prepositus de Cuxham;” and the same documents give examples of election of reeve in 1286
(“Clemenes Henewy electus ad officium praepositi de Stockton de communi atsensu totius villae”),
609, and in 1331 (per totum homagium electus), 613; and of his being fined or removed for unsatis-
factory accounts (“pro pluribus celamentis et transgressionibug in computo suo inventis,” 610, and
“amotus est super hunc compotum,” 613).
25. See Hanssen, as quoted in Seebohm, 372, 373.
26. Ib., 418.
27. Ib., 422–423.
28. See Seebohm, 117–125.
29. Ib., 61, 62.
30. Ib, 24–26, 113.
31. The percentages I have taken from Mr. Seebohm’s maps, p. 86. The total recorded population, as
given by Ellis, Introd. to Domesday, ii. 511, is 283,242. Of these 108,407 are. registered as villani,
49 as dimidii villani; there are 82,119 bordarii, 490 bordarii pauperes, 15 dimidii bordarii, 5054
cotarii, 16 coteri (merely a different spelling), 1749 coscets. The number of servi is 25,156.
32. This is clearly the explanation of the “copyholds of imperfect tenure,” still frequently found in the
western counties. Pollock, Land Laws, 203.
33. Ellis gives 10,097 liberi homines, of whom Suffolk has 5344; 2041 liberi homines commendati, of
whom Suffolk has 1895; and 23,072 sochemanni.
34. For examples of socmen with considerable estates, see Domesday, i. 314b (Yorks.); i. 336b
(Stamford); ii. 182 (Norfolk). For a freeman in a similar position, ii. 345 (Suffolk).
35. There is an instance to the contrary in the Liber Niger (Chron. Petrob., 164: “Et ibi sunt xxix.
sochemanni et operantur i die in ebdomada per totum annum.”
36. E.g., “In Estona ix. sochemanni... et serviunt cum militibus quantum illis jure contingit;” Chr. Pet.,
172: on p. 173 the phrase “serviunt cum militibus” occurs thrice of socmcn, and twice “cum militibus”
only. On p. 169 there is a curious case of fractional responsibility: “Ricardus Enganie ii. hidae in
Hamtonascira et servit pro i. milite. Sed socemanni faciunt quartam partem militis, et ipse iii. partes
unius militis.”
37. Thus the Liber Niger, Chr. Petr., 158, records in one village only 8 villeins, but 44 socmen: “Et
omnes isti sochemanni habent viii. carrucas, et inde arant iii. vicibns per annum. Et quisquis eorum
metit in Augusto de blado domini dimidiam acram et ii. vicious in Augusto precationem. Et quisquis
herciat i. die ad tremeis (in spring).”
38. Thus, in Domesday, ii. 317 (Suffolk): “Huic manerio pertinent v. sochemanni de LVI. acris.... Hi v.
non potuerunt vendere terram suam nec dare alicui;” and ib., 321, “In eadem i. sochemannus cum
xxx, acris et non potuit vendere nec dare.”
39. Thus, in Domesday, ii. 66 (Essex): “Isti sochemanni, sic comitatus testatur, non poterant removere
ab illo manerio.”
40. Maine speaks of Bracton as “putting off on his countrymen as a compendium of pure English law
a treatise of which the entire form and a third of the contents were directly borrowed from the
Corpus Juris;” Ancient Law, 82.
41. Thus, in a Wiltshire manor belonging to Battle Abbey, there were, in the reign of Ed. I., Liberi
tenentes, Majores Erdlinges scilicet Virgarii, Minores Erdlinges, Halferdlinges et majores Cotarii,
Minores Cottarii, and Coteriae, Cust. Battle, 72–81; and an Inquisition of 19 Ed. I. presents theAn Introduction to English Economic History and Theory, volume one / 35
following gradation of ranks,—Liberi tenentes per cartam, Liberi tenentes qui vocantur fresokemen,
Sokemanni qui vocantur molmen, Custumarii qui vocantur werkmen, Consuetudinarii tenentes 4
acras terrae, et Consuetudinarii tenentes 2 acras terrae; Vinogradoff in Engl. Hist. Rev., i. 757. On the
manors of Gloucester monastery were Liberi tenentes, Consuetudinarii, Lundinarii, Tenentes Honilod,
Ferendelli, Tenentes Penilond ad vitam et ad voluntatem domini, Medii, Cotlandarii (and Cotarii),
Tenentes forlonde, Akermanni; Historia Glouc., iii. cv, 121–149; but some of these names are prob-
ably equivalents.
42. Thus in certain Articles of Visitation of 1320 occurs the clause, “Item, an aliqua terra, quondam
custumaria, teneatur libere a serviciis et consuetudinibus quas facere consueverunt: quae, per quem,
qualiter, et a quo tempore; et qualiter nunc teneatur, per quae servicia;” Domesday of S. Paul’s, 157*.
43. The fine for giving a daughter in marriage was known as mercheta, maritagium, and culage. That
it was regarded as a distinguishing mark of servile tenure is shown by the entry in the Hundred Rolls
for Bedfordshire (ii. 329): “Sunt illi villani ita servi quod non possunt maritare filias nisi ad voluntatem
domini;” Seebohm, 41 and n. 1. Entry of pay. ment frequently occurs in the manor rolls; examples
are given in Rogers, Hist. of Agric., ii. 608, seq.
44. A son would be much less likely to leave the manor owing to marriage than a daughter, and this may
be the reason why the fine was only exacted in the latter case. In later times the fine seems to have
been heavier when the woman was leaving the manor, than when she wag marrying an inhabitant of
the manor. Thus, in one of the cases given by Mr. Rogers, a woman pays a shilling in 1308, “pro se
maritanda infra manerium” while another pays two shillings in 1318, “ut possit maritari extra
libertatem domus;” Hist. of Agric., ii. 611. Cf. Articles of Visitation, 1320: “Item, an nativi custumarii
maritaverint filias suas intra manerium vel extra, vel vendiderint vitulum pullanum vel bovem de
propria nutritura sine licencia domini, vel arbores in haieiis suis extirpaverint vel succiderint sine
licencia; “ D. of S. P., 157*. So also on the estates of the Norman abbey of Mont S. Michel, the fine
for “licentia maritandi” was only “si maritaverit filiam suara extra terram S. Michaelis;” Délisle,
679.
45. The case recorded in the Placitorum Abbreviatio (ed. 1811), p. 90, is important enough to be quoted
in full: “Assisa venit et recognovit si Cicilia etc. injuste etc. disseisiavit Baldwinum juvenem, de
libero tenemento suo. Jurati dicunt quod ipsi certi sunt quod predictus Baldwinus fuit seisitus de i.
virgata terrae... et quod ipsi eum disseisiatum, sed nesciunt si sit liberum tenementum vel non. Quia
si ipse habuerit eam. cam ipse arabit domino suo tres acras ad cibum suum proprium, ita tamen quod
in estate dum arat habeat herbagium ad boves suos tantummodo dum arat. Dicunt etiam quod ipse et
alii debent falcare tres turnos et introducent fenum in grangiam domini sui, et habuerunt pro hoc
meliorem multonem quem eligere possint in falda domini sui. Debent etiam in autumno facere
precarias ad cibum domini et reddere ad Pascha de qualibet acra quam tenent unum ovum. Dicunt
etiam quod nunquam audiverunt did de filiabus eorum quod finem facerent eum domino de eis
maritandis, neque de bobus suis vendendis. Dicunt etiam quod antiquitus in septennio solebat domi-
nus eorum petere auxilium, et ei auxiliebantur. Consideratum est quod per servicia illa non est
tenementum illud villanum. Et ideo ipse habeat seisinam.”
46. Thus in the Chartulary of Gloucester, Hist., iii. 134, among four persons in a manor who “tenent
per cartam in perpetuum” it is specially noticed of one holding half a virgate of land “non potest
vendere equum nec bovem sine licentia domini, et si vendiderit dabit tonnutum (tax) pro equo quat-
uor denarios: et non potest maritare filiam suam nec filium alienare.”
47. Vinogradoff in Engl. Hist. Rev., i. 736, 737.
48. See note 46, and cf. the quotation from the Register of S. Edmundsbury of 18 Ed. I., where, among
the arguments that certain molmen were “servilis conditiones” in spite of the fact that the abbots
“relaxarunt eis servicia majora et consuetudines pro certa pecunia,” it is alleged that they do not hold36 / William J. Ashley
“per cartam sed per virgam in curia;” qu. Hist. Rev., i. 736.
49. This is clear from the article in the Extenta Manerii (Statutes of the Realm, i. 242): “De libere
tenentibus... inquirendum est... qui tenent per cartam et qui non.” There is a noteworthy example in
the Ibstone rental of 1298, printed in Rogers, Hist. of Agric., ii. 656, where among thirty-one free
tenancies of all sizes from a virgate downward, only eight are said to be held “per cartam,” while
four are expressly said to be held “ad terminum vitae,” “ad voluntatem domini,” and one “sine
scripto.”
50. According to Ellis, the number of these recorded is 159, of whom 54 are in Yorkshire, 42 in Derby-
shire, 36 in Essex, more than 14 in Lincolnshire, 11 in Dorsetshire, 2 in Nottinghamshire. In some
cases, like the more important socmen and liberi homines already referred to, they have villeins
holding of them, e.g., “Ibi ii. censores habent ix. villanos cum iii. carrucis;” Domesday, i. 331 (York-
shire). For the continental use of the word, see Ducange, s.vv. Censarii (defined by him as “villani
censui obnoxii, qui censum praestant”), and Censualis.
51. Of a total of 858 coliberti in Domesday, 260 are in Wilts, 216 in Somerset, 103 in Gloucestershire,
98 in Hampshire, 49 in Cornwall, and the rest scattered over the other western counties. Ducange
elaborately discusses Colliberti with the conclusion that they occupied a middle position between
what he calls “servi” and “liberi,” and paid census.
52. Domesday, ii. 1, “In hoc manerio erat tunc temporis quidam liber homo de dimidia hida, qui modo
effeotus est unus de villanis;” cf. ib., 350b, “Huic manerio addidit normannus filius tanredi iii.
liberos homines regi commendatos.”
53. Rotuli Curiae Regis., i. 357. The jurors declare in a case tried at the beginning of the reign of John,
“Wilhelmus et antecessores ejus tenuerunt illam terram libere usque x. annos obitum suum, et tunc
intravit in consuetudinem nesciunt utrum vi vel aliter.”
54. Besides the instances of the Burton and S. Paul’s estates commented on later, it may be noticed that
in twelve manors belonging to the Priory of S. Mary of Worcester there are recorded in Domesday
only three liberi homines, and apparently no socmen at all, while in 1240 there were fifty-five liberi
and eighty-five socmen; Hale, Introd. to Register of Worc., vi., xvii. Archdeacon Hale indeed here,
as in his other writings, argues that the omission of free tenants from Domesday does not prove their
non-existence. But he gives no sufficient proof of the proposition, which would, indeed, throw early
social history into inextricable confusion: and,—to mention no other objection,—it is inconsistent
with the statement of the English chronicle that “not a yard-land” was omitted from the survey.
55. Malmen, molmen, and molland appear in many parts of England, and their position has recently
been discussed in the Engl. Hist. Rev.; see especially Vinogradoff in i. 734. But it has not there been
noticed that “mails and duties” was, until perhaps the eighteenth century, the common term for rent
in Scotland; see Stair, Institutions, 326, 376. Scott frequently uses “mail,” “mail-duties,” and “mail-
ing,” e.g., where he makes the dying Dumbiedikes bid his son to “let the creatures stay at a moderate
mailing;” Heart of Midlothian, ch. vii. The word “mailen” was often used for a farm; as in the lines
of Burns beginning, Last May a braw lover.
56. One of the passages in which the term occurs is also valuable as describing the division among the
sons of a previous tenant: “Terra quae fuit Ormi habent iii. filii ejus hoc modo. Uivetus habet ii.
bovatas pro ii, solidis et debet facere contuetudinen (occasional labour services) ceterorum
censariorum. Eaven et Leysingus habent ceteram terram, id eet vi. bovates de Warlanda et iiii. de
Inlanda pro viii. solidis quoque anno et debet ire ad Ofielawe hundred et praeter hoc facere oinnia
sicut alii censarii;” Collections for Hist. Staffordsh., v. 19. The meaning of warland, here frequently
used, is not clear. It seems to be frequently opposed to inland or demesne, e.g., “In terra warlanda
sunt xxxii. bovatae ad opus, et inter warlanda et inlands xxxii. ad malara, id est totum lxiiii. bovatae
terrae,” where it appears to be the same as land in villenage. Possibly it was land specially subject toAn Introduction to English Economic History and Theory, volume one / 37
some military burden or tax for military purpose; cf. “Liberi ab omnibus armorum oneribus, quod
warscot Anglici dicunt,” in the apocryphal Constitutions of the Forest of Canute (Cn. iii. 9, Schmid,
319), and in this case connected with hidage. But the whole subject of Saxon land-measures and
terminology is still in the greatest obscurity. For other examples of censarii, see Staf. Collections, v.
24, where in an extent, or survey, of 1114, the tenants are regularly divided into villani (bound to full
services) and censarii (bound “bis in anno praestare aratrum et ter in angusto secare cum suis”).
57. Domesday of S. Paul’s, xxii. 114, 27,118, lv.
58. The precise holdings of the libere tenentes were one holding 50 + 30 + 15 + 15 + 10 + 1 acres + 1½
virgates, one with 4 virgates, one with 3 virgates + 5 acres, one with 2 virgates, three with 1 virgate,
one with 22½ acres, one with 10 + 7½ acres, two with half virgates, and one with 15 acres, three with
10 acres, two with 7½ acres, and one with 5 acres.
59. Mollond and Werklond are distinguished from one another in an entry in a S. Paul’s Inquisition of
1279; “Terra cum pertinentiis de mollond et werklond;” Hale, D. of S. P. lxxv. Cf. werkmen in n. 31
above.
60. Thus on the manor of Thorp, belonging to the monastery of Peterborough, at Domesday Survey
there were twelve villani, two bordarii, four servi; at the time when the Liber Niger was drawn up
(1125–28) there were, besides two free tenants with dependent villeins, and one socman, six bordarii,
twelve plene-villani, and six dimidii villani. But here the plene-villanus holds only eleven acres;
Chron. Petrob., 158. Cf. also the change in Castre, Werminton, Esctona, and Stannige. In Werminton,
temp. Liber Niger, “xx. pleni villani et xxix. semi-villani tenent xxxiv. virgas et dimidiam” (p. 160),
which is obviously a virgate for each full-villein, and half a virgate for each half-villein.
61. Thus, e.g., on a manor belonging to the monastery of S. Peter of Gloucester (Hist. iii, 137), ten
consuetudinarii each hold “dimidiam virgatum terrae servilis,” and fourteen hold half a virgate
between every two of them “conjunctim.” So, as late as 1298, on one manor belonging to Merton
College, there are thirteen holders of half virgates described on the roll itself as custumarii, but in the
side rubric as nativi; Rogers, Hist. Agric., ii. 654; cf. also 658.
62. Besides the example in n. 58 above, see the Worc. Reg. 60a, where the three free tenants on one
manor hold 1½, 3, and 2 virgates respectively; 81a, where the free holdings are of 2, 5, 2½, 1, 2, 1, 2,
1½, 3½ virgates. The latter case is very interesting, for most of the holdings seem to have passed to
tenants in chivalry, who held them “pro homagio” or “per homagium;” in some cases it is added
“sine servicio” or “nihil inde solvit,” in others “solvit inde annuatim” a certain amount. But it is very
clear that all the holdings, free and servile, were reckoned in virgates, i.e., bound together by the
compulsory rotation of crops, and probably by a co-operative system of agriculture: thus “xl. virgatae
terrae tam liberorum quam villanorum sunt geldantes” and “summa virgatarum liberarum,” etc.
63. Engl. Village Community, 178, 309.
64. See the discussion in Pollock, Land Laws, 206–209. It is true that “Borough English (inheritance by
the youngest son) was very widely held in mediaeval England to imply servile occupation of land;”
Vinogradoff in Engl. Hist. R., i. 736: but that custom seems to have prevailed only in certain districts
of Kent, Surrey, Sussex, around London, and in Somerset, and to a still less extent in Essex and East
Anglia, and Hampshire; Elton, Origins of Engl. Hist., 118–119.
65. As, for instance, on the estates of Worcester Priory, n. 54 above. On one of the manors, Pillesgate,
in Northamptonshire, belonging to Peterborough Monastery there were, in 1086, 26 socmen; forty
years later, 44.
66. Worc. Reg., 526, 67a, 78a, 80b. In some cases they are registered as, like the villeins, holding
technically at will: e.g., “de sokemannis ad placitum,” ib., 176. Cf. Vinogradoff, u.s.
67. Statutes of the Realm, i 2.
68. Thus in a manorial Presentment as late as 1819 occurs the clause: “The Homage do further present38 / William J. Ashley
that by the custom of this manor the lord may, with the content of the Homage, grant by copy of court
roll any part of the waste thereof, to be holden in fee according to the custom of the manor, at a
reasonable rent and by the customary services, or may, with such consent, grant or demise the same
for any lesser estate or interest;” Seebohm, 447.
69. Examples of “tenentes de veteri essarto” and “novo essarto” are very frequent in the Domesday of
S. Paul’s (e.g., 6, 8, 11, 12,) and the Worc. Register.
70. For weavers, see Dom. S. Paul’s, 28, 30; Cust. Battle, 63; Hist. Glouc., iii. 167; tailor, in Reg.
Worc., 896; Battle, 63.
71. Sir Henry Maine, Village Communities, 122, 135–136, compares the village waste to the national
folkland, and represents the rights of the lord over the waste as, like those of the king over the royal
demesne, due to usurpation. But there is no direct evidence of this, and the statute of Merton, as well
as the custom requiring the consent of the homage to enclosure, may equally well be represented as
limitations of an earlier arbitrary power of the lord.
72. There are abundant examples. As a specimen, see the Domesday of Ralph de Diceto, 1181, in
Domesday of S. Paul’s, 114. There the “Inquisitio” of Beauchamp begins with “Isti tenent de dominio,”
35 in all, holding 158 acres; “remanent in dominio de terra arabili circiter ccccc. acras,” as well as
meadow and woodland: forty years later there were 44 tenants of demesne land, holding 180 acres.
In 1181, “Robertug persona” holds more than 34 acres, Ralph the reeve 24 acres, and a certain
widow half a virgate, but the other holdings are all very small. And “in augmentum terrae suae”
occurs 12 times. The lists sometimes mention to whom the change was due, e.g., “Michael films
Adae i. acram pro ii: denariis, quas (quam?) nicholaus eanonicus dedit ei in augmentum.” The man-
ors belonging to the Chapter of S. Paul’s were distributed among the canons, who paid a fixed ferm
to the common fund and made what profit they could.
73. See previous note.
74. Reg. Worc., 41b, 42a.
75. Ib., 47b–50a.
76. In the 1222 Domesday of S. Paul’s (70–71), in the list of those who “tenent de antique dominico” on
a certain manor, is inserted in 14 cases (mostly in a later hand), “Item... de cremento per capitulum
ut sit perpetuum.” In one, and that apparently the earliest case, the addition is very small, only one
penny to a previous payment of 27d.; but in the other cases it is an addition of about half, e.g., where
previously 10d., 5d. is added; where 4d. or 5d., 2d. This, as Hale suggests, Introd., lxxxix., probably
explains the meaning of the obscure opening sentence in the Beauchamp Rental of 1240: “Homines
infra scripti, tenentes terras de dominico quas vocant Inlandes sine auctoritate capituli, augmentaverunt
redditum assisum ut auctoritas capituli interveniret.”
77. E.g., “Valet dicta arura quatuor denarioa;” “Valet hersura quatuor denarios et obolum; “ ”et plautabit
fabas per unum diem, et valet obolum;” Hist. Glouc., iii. 37, 38, et passim. Cust. Battle, passim.
78. “Terra ista fuit operaria usque ad tempus Hugonis de Runewell, servientis (i.e., bailiff) Ricardi
archiediaconi qui primo posuit eam ad denarios;” D. of S. Paul’s, 49.
79. In some cases there seems a threefold division, e.g., “Inferius notati tenent ad censum,” yet bound
to a few “precariae;” “inferius notati sunt operarii,” working, in addition to precariae, two days a
week, and “Isti faciunt magnas operationes,” free from week-work, but with a great number of
services; Ib., 61, 62. For an instance of the retention of boon-days and of the tenants remaining in
villenage in spite of commutation, Reg. Worc., 73a, “De vilenagio: In hoc manerio sunt xi. virgatae
terrae de vilenagio, quarum quaelibet posita ad firmam reddit per annum iiii. solidos... et arabit bis
per annum et faciet iii. benrip, quamlibet cum iii. hominibus, et falcabit i. die cum uno homino, et
levabit fenum et dabit auxilium et merchet. Si autem fuerint ad operationem,” they are bound to
heavy week-work, which is recorded. The same careful distinction is observed throughout: thus, toAn Introduction to English Economic History and Theory, volume one / 39
take another example: “In vilenagio sunt xvii. dimidiae virgatae, quarum quaelibet cum censat reddit,
etc.; cum vero fuerit ad operationem invenit qualibet ebdomada duos homines,” etc., ib., 56a.
80. “Dimidia virgata quam tenuit ad censum modo tradita est alio ad operationem;” D. of S. Paul’s. 23.
81. Besides the instance given in n. 79, see Worc. Reg., 18b, 19a, and in many other places.
82. “Isti tenent tam ad censum quam ad operationem;” D. of S. Paul’s, 49, 55.
83. Worc. Reg., 186, 436, and elsewhere. “Rent of assize” became a technical phrase,—thus in the
Extenta Manerii it is directed that inquiry should be made as to free tenants, “quantum valeant per
annum et reddant per annum de Beditu assisae,” and as to the custumarii “quantum valeant opera et
consuetudines... per annum, et quantum reddat de redditu assisae per annum praetcr opera et consue-
tudines;” St. of Realm, i. 242. For other examples of increase, see the Great Roll of the twenty-fifth
year of Bp. Bec, of Durham, 1307, printed in appendix to the Boldon Bk. of the Surtees Society: of
the “redditus asskae” a very small part is said to be “de novo incremento nunc primo incipiente,”
xxvii.; while for the manors in another district only the “novus redditus” is given, xxx.
84. Besides the instances in n. 79, notice the rubric “De consuetudinibus villanorum cum fuerint ad
operationem;” Reg. Worc., 105.
85. Thus the aukermonni and cotmanni on a Worcester manor, ib., 436; though they apparently had the
option of commuting for a lump sum.
86. Examples abound; a convenient one is given by the Ibstone Rental of 1298, printed in Rogers, Hist.
of Agric., it 656.
87. Rogers, Six Centuries, 71, 76.
88. Reg. Worc., 106, 496.
89. Ib., 56a: “give censat sive non, summagiabit.”
90. Six Centuries, 218. It probably took place first on the smaller manors, e.g., Brodeham, in Cust.
Battle, 159 (5 Ed. II.).
91. Reg. Worc., 1196. Fleta quoted in Hale’s Introd. to Worc. Reg., xcvi., c.; Cust. Battle, xxix.; Rogers,
Hist. of Agric., ii. 329, seq.
92. It may be conjectured from the fact that one person is especially described in Domesday as a liber
bovarius, Ellis, Introd., ii. 511–514, that the oxherds were at that time usually slaves. When we
compare the descriptions of the Peterborough manors in Domesday and the Liber Niger, we find that
servi appear in the former and not in the latter, and bovarii in the latter and not in the former. But
there are traces that they were in 1125 only gradually rising from slavery, as in the entry on one
manor: “Et unas-quisque bovarius dat i. denarium pro capita suo, si liber est. Et si semis est, nichil
dat;” Chr. Petr., 163.
93. Rogers, Hist. of Agric., ii. 620, 621.
94. Ib., 578, col. 1.
95. Specimens ibid., 617, seq.; described in Six Cent., 48.
96. This will explain what Mr. Rogers wonders at, in Six Cent., 18.
97. “In stipendio clerici qui fecit compotum ii s., et ii. de gracia;” Hist. of Agric., ii. 621.
98. Provisions of Westminster (1259), Statute of Marlborough (1267), Statutes of the Realm, i. 11. 24.
Select Charters, 404, § 19.
99. A sharp distinction in theory was drawn later by the lawyers between the Court Baron and the Court
Customary: though it was acknowledged that they might be held at the same place and tune, the
Court Baron was defined as the court of the free tenants; and it was laid down that, for the holding of
a Court Baron (and therefore for the very existence of a manor, since the possession of a Court Baron
was regarded as the essence of a manor), two freeholders at least were necessary. But it is doubtful
whether this distinction was ever generally recognized. Thus Kitchen, in his Court Leete (1580), p.
4a, says most precisely, “Mes note que divers sont appel manors deins queux ne sont ascuns qui tient40 / William J. Ashley
de ceus maners forsque copiholders, ‘ad voluntatem domini secundum consuetudinem manerii,’ et
ne sont ascnns franktenants que tient par charter, et uncore ceux seignories sont appel maners et en
eux sont Court Barons.”
100. “Hall-moot” seems to have been the old English term, possibly at first only for a court with
criminal jurisdiction, i.e., a Court Leet. It occurs in the so-called Leges Henrici Primi, is. 4 (Select
Charters, 106): “Omnis causa terminetur vel hundredo, vel comitatu, vel halimoto socam habentium,
vel dominorum curiis,” etc. [See now Pollock and Maitland, History of English Law, i. 573.] As late
as 1222, in an “Inquisitio facto in Halemoto de Thorp,” the exercise of criminal iurisdiction is shown
by the mention of the duty of the “foreman,” or reeve, “Furem captum in curia custodiet et judicatum
suspendet;” D. of S. Paul’s, 38, 39. For the official record of the trial and execution of a man, in
1337, for stealing a robe worth ten shillings, see Rogers, Hist. of Agric., ii. 666.
101. Notice the naive hypocrisy of the canons of S. Paul’s, who write of the vicar that “dum servit altari
sit contentus altario;” D. of S. Paul’s, 146; cf. xlv. Mr. Hatch, in his recent Growth of Church Institu-
tions (chap. iii.), has shown that the early history of parochial revenues is not one of usurpation by
patrons, but of the gradual limitation of the arbitrary rights of ownership of the lord of the manor
over the Church fabric and its revenues.
102. This was technically known as sequela or secta molendini—in English, suit and grist. See. Worc.
Reg., x., xi., 32a.
103. E.g., Chron. Petrob., 67, s.a. 1284. Hand-mills, known as querns, were still used last century in
the Hebrides. Pennant describes a quern as “made of two stones about two feet broad.... In the centre
of the upper stone is a hole to pour in the corn, and a peg by way of handle. The whole is placed on
a cloth; the grinder pours the corn into the hole with one hand and with the other turns round the
upper stone with a very rapid motion, while the meal runs out at the sides on the cloth.” In some
manors there was also a common oven or bakehouse, which the tenants were bound to use, paying a
fee known as fornagium: for an example, as late as 1714, see Yorkshire Weekly Post, March 19,
1887. Cf. for Newcastle, as to hand-mills and oven, Select Charters, 112.
104. E.g. Boldon Book in Domesday, iv. 570: “Molendinum est in manu episcopi, nondum ad firmam
positum,”—proving that already it was usual to let it. Cf. D. of S. Paul’s, 28: “In dominico est unum
molendinum ad ventum quod poteat poni ad firmam pro una marca deductia expensis.”
105. The accounts of half the manors in the Liber Niger contain the phrase, “Est ibi unus molendinus
cum molendinario et... solidos reddit.” The importance of the mill is shown by its being separately
mentioned when the whole manor was let; thus, “Manerium est ad firmam, cum dominio et villanis
et molendino et cum instauratione,” etc.; Boldon Book, D. B., iv. 579. The miller might either hold it
at a fixed quit-rent or at the will of the lord: hence the Worc. Reg., 12a, distinguishes the mill in one
manor as a “molendinum ad placitum;” with which may be compared the entry, “De molendinis ad
firmam mutabilem “ in the Mont S. Michel Survey, c. 1250, in Délisle, 679.
106. The communal character of these offices is shown best in the Boldon Book, where, in many
manors, the entries occur one after the other,” Pre-positus tenet... acras, pro suo servicio, Faber... pro
suo servicio,” Carpentarius... pro suo servicio;” e.g., in three manors, on p. 568. The amount of land
is usually twelve acres, as, to take another example, “Faber tenet xii. acras pro ferramentis carucarum
fabricandis.” Cf. D. of S. P., 68; Worc. Reg., 66a; Chart. Ramsay, xxxiii. In the later entries the
obligation is sometimes, as in the case of other labour-dues, “to furnish” a blacksmith, e.g., “Alicia
relicta Petri Fabri tenet ferdellum terrae et inveniet unum fabrum domino et toti villae.”
107. Boldon Book, 568, 569. But as the keeping of the pound is not likely to be onerous, he has other
services and payments in kind to render.
108. Cf. Roscher’s sketch of the economic character of mediaeval society in his Gesch. der Nat.
Oekonomik, 2.An Introduction to English Economic History and Theory, volume one / 41
109. Riley, Introd. to Liber Albus (Munimenta Gildhallae, i.), LXXXV.
110. Wor. Reg. xi.; Rogers, Hist. of Agric., i. 455.
111. Rogers, id., i. 469.
112. E.g., Reg. Worc., 56a: “N... facit ferra earruoarum et Prior inveniet ei ferrum et carbonem, vel ii.
solidos pro carbone.”
113. Rogers, Hist. of Agric., ii. 606, seq.
114. Ib., i. 460, seq.
115. See the very interesting account of the journey to London of Robert Oldman, the bailiff of Cuxham,
in Oxfordshire, in 1331, ib., 506, and Six Cent., 113.
116. The account of one manor in the Worc. Reg., 132a, contains the amusing entry: “Omnes, tam liberi
quam villani, excepta persona, debent adjuvare cum hominibus et bobus ad summonitionem servientis,
ad trahendam molam, vicissim, successive, quantum necesse fuerit, excepto opero. Prior vero inveniet
karram (the cart) et hominem et duos boves subtus karram.”
117. In the Boldon Book, in some eight cases the phrase occurs towards the end of the account of a
manor, “Dominium est ad firmam et reddit...;” in some seven cases, “Dominium est in manu episcopi.”
Sometimes the villein dues are expressly included, e.g., 579, quoted in n. 105, above. Cf. Rogers, Six
Cent., 50.
118. Boldon Book, 568: “Villani de Southbydyk tenent villam suam ad firmam,” though they are still
bound to labour-dues at, apparently, a neighbouring village.
119. E.g., 1240, Worc. Reg., 47a: “Curia cum pertinentiis, et duae carrucatae terrae de dominico, cum
pratis et proventibus et herietibus et vilenagio traditae sunt villanis ad firmam pro c. quarteriis fru-
menti,” and other payments in kind. The Prior still kept in his hands a granary, land which had once
been a vineyard, a little arable land, and some meadow. In another case, 545, where the holding by
the villeins at ferm is described as “ab antique,” the advowson is excepted; the ferm is “ad placi-
tum;” half of the proceeds of the court of heriots go to the Prior; and the villeins are bound to certain
services at neighbouring villages.
120. As in Worc. Reg., 15a: “Nullua exeat de terra sine licentia;” where it is also said, “Rediment filios
si de terra recesserint,” and “Nullus faciat filium clericum sine licentia.” This latter clause, with the
addition of a prohibition to “coronare,” i.e., “make a monk of him,” is very frequently found.
121. The Dialogus de Scaccario speaks of the “ascriptitii qui villani dicuntur, quibus non est liberum
obstantibns dominis suis a sui status conditione recedere;” Sel. Charters, 202.
122. Examples abound; e.g., Worc. Reg., 15a: “Nullus vendet bovem sine licentia vel equum. Si quis
vendiderit bovem vel equum dabit Thol, scilicet i. denarium.”
123. In a case reported in the Year Books, 13–14 Ed. III, ed. Pike (Rolls’ Series), xxvi., “the plaintiff
pleaded that there were ‘in ecclesia S. Pauli’ twenty-four hides of land, and that within them there
were divers tenures of which one was called customers-land.... The tenants of this customers-lond,
she said, might grant their tenements to any persons with whom they might agree, to hold to the
grantees and their heirs, or for life, according to the estate held by the tenants themselves. The
grantor was to come into the court of the lord, and there in full court surrender the tenements to the
use of the person with whom the agreement had been made,” whereupon the bailiff ought to put him
in possession. “The defendant admitted the tenure of customers-lond, but said that every tenant
wishing to grant his estate to another had to come into the court of the lord, and there in full court
surrender the tenements into the hand of the lord, whereupon the bailiff of the lord of the court
would deliver the tenements, per virgam, to be held at the will of the lord and not otherwise.” “The
jurors decided that the bailiff had to place in seisin the person to whose use the surrender was made,
not on making a certain fine, e.g., 12d. for every acre, but on making a flne at the will of the lord.” It
would seem from this case that such a transference was so usual that tenants were beginning to omit42 / William J. Ashley
the formal act of surrender into the hands of the lord, to claim the right to make grants for life or for
ever, although their own holdings were technically only at will, and to do this on paying only a small
and fixed fine. This evidence from the fourteenth century may be compared with the entry in Domes-
day, i. 179, about the 103 “homines” in Hereford, a town on the royal demesne. They bad clearly
risen from the position of villeins; each, besides a rent of 7½d., paid 4d. “ad locandos caballos,” and
was still bound to certain labour services,—“tribus diebus in Augusto fecabat, et una die ad fenum
congregandum erat, ubi vicecomes volebat.” Yet “si quis eorum voluisset recedere de civitate, poterat,
concessu pre-positi, domum suum vendere alteri homini servitiuni inde debitum facere vulenti, et
habebat prepositus tertium denarium hujus venditionis.”
124. An abstract of the documents in the Burton Chartulary is given in Staffordsh. Collections, v. 82,
seq. For Glanvill see Sel. Charters, 162.
125. For further comment on this dictum, see bk. ii. ch. iv., §50.
120. “I know of only one distinct period of famine in the whole economical history of England. This is
the seven years, 1315–1321, especially in the first two and the last; “Rogers, Six Cent., 62.
127. Mill., Pol. Econ., bk. ii. ch. xvi. §4: “The farmer requires the ordinary rate of profit on the whole
of his capital;... whatever it returns to him beyond this he is obliged to pay the landlord, but will not
consent to pay more.”
128. Cunningham, Growth of Engl. Industry, 249.
129. Cf. Lassalle, Bastiat-Schuhe de Delitzsch, ch. iv.
130. Hildebrand in Jahrbücher für Nationalökonomie, ii, (1864), p. 1, seq. He distinguishes three
stages, the third being Credit-wirthschaft; “Either goods,” including services, “are exchanged di-
rectly for goods; or use is made of a means of exchange, the precious metals, money; or, finally,
goods are exchanged for a promise in the future to give back the same or a like value, i.e., on credit.
In all these three methods of exchange, what may be the measure of value used in the exchange is
quite indifferent. On the basis of these three possible means of exchange three Economic systems
develop themselves,—Natural-wirthschaft, Geld-wirthschaft, and Credit-wirthschaft;” p. 4. Knies,
criticising this statement, says that the istinction between Natural-wirthschaft and Geld-wirthschaft
is valuable, “the third stage, however, is not at all a contrast to the other two,—a mistake due to
misunderstanding of the nature of credit. Our whole system of credit is one based on money;” Politische
Œconomic vom geschicht-lichen Standpuncte (1883), 382. Wagner accepts this criticism: “Credit-
wirthschaft is not a development from Geld-wirthschaft, in the same way as that is of Natural-
wirthschaft, for it implies the maintenance of a metal currency as a standard and measure of price;”
Lehrbuch der Pol. Oekon. i. 194. As Roscher says, the ideas represented by the three terms are not
co-ordinate; Nat. Oekonomik in Deutschland, 1038. The application of the distinction to the Eng-
land of this period is pointed out by Ochen-kowski, Englands wirthtchaftliche Entwiekelung, 9, and
Nasse, Agricultural Community, 67.
131. Introduction to Domesday of S. Paul’s, xlvi–li.
132. Dialogue, ed. Hughes, Crump, Johnson, 30, 89.
133. Hawkins, Silver Coins of England, (2nd ed. 1870), 36.
134. Ruding, Annals of the Coinage (3rd ed. 1810), i. 126.
135. Ib., i. 137.
136. “Before Christmas, King Henry sent from Normandy to England and commanded that all the
moneyers should be mutilated. And this because a man might have a pound, and yet not be able to
spend one penny at a market. And Roger, bishop of Salisbury, sent over all England, and desired all
of them to come to Winchester at Christmas; and when they came thither his men took them one by
one, and cut off their right hands. All this was done within the twelve days, and with much justice,
because they had ruined this land with the great quantity of bad metal;” Engl. Chronicle, s.a. 1125.An Introduction to English Economic History and Theory, volume one / 43
137. Ruding, i. 165, 170, 171, 181, 202. For the two coinages of Henry II, see Ralph de Diceto (Rolls’
Series), i. 302; ii. 7.
138. Ruding, i. 181, 182. Round halfpennies are said, but on little evidence, to have been issued by
Henry I. The government must at this time have been anxious to issue them to a large amount, for
twice as many dies for halfpence and farthings were issued to the moneyers as for pennies, and also
several weeks earlier. None of these halfpennies, according to Ruding, now remain; and he supposes
that, as they were much disliked by the people, they were recalled, and no new ones struck till 1248.
139. Ib., i. 186. Kenyon, Gold Coins of England, 14, 15.
140. Ruding, i. 216–218.
141. Ib., i. 222.Chapter 2: Merchant and Craft Gilds
[Authorities.—(a) The Merchant Gild. The best work on this subject is Gross, Gilda Mercatoria
(Göttingen, 1883), which has for the first time shown the universality of this organization in English
towns, and its functions in the thirteenth century. The only two bodies of gild statutes that have been
preserved are those of Southampton (13th c.) and Berwick (1249–94): of the former the French text
will be found in Archaeol. Journal, xvi. (1859), translated in Davies, Hist. of Southampton (1883); the
Latin text of the latter is in Cosmo Innes, Acts of Parl. Scotland (1844), and an English abstract in
English Gilds (Early Eng. Text Soc., 1870). The only Merchant Gild surviving, though but in name, till
the present time is that of Preston, of which ordinances of 1308 and 1328, and gild rolls from 1397 are
printed in Abram, Memorials of the Preston Guilds (1882), and Preston Guild Rolls (Record Soc.
Lanc. and Chesh., 1884). The gild rolls of two other towns, Leicester and Totnes, have been preserved:
accounts of them are given in Thompson. Hist. of Leicester (1849), and for Totnes in Third Rep. Hist.
MSS. Comm. (1872). For general sketches of early town history, see Kemble, Saxons in England, bk. ii.
ch. vii.; Thompson, Engl. Munic. Hist. (1867): Stubbs, Const. Hist., chs. v., xi., xiii.
(b) The Craft Gilds. The first and, until recently, the only work in English on craft gilds was
Brentano’s Essay, prefixed to English Gilds (1870), appearing later in German as Einleitung to the
same writer’s Arbeitergilden der Gegenwart (1871). Brentano exaggerated both their independence
and their economic importance, as is pointed out, with some exaggeration in the opposite direction, by
Ochenkowski, Englands wirthschaftliche Entwickelung im Ausgange des Mittelalters (1879). A clearer
idea may be obtained by reference to the craft ordinances translated in Riley, Manorials of London
(1868); with which may be compared for Paris the Livre des Métiers d’Étienne Boileau, ed. Depping
(1857). In the Early Hist. of the Woollen Industry in England (Amer. Econ. Assoc., 1887), by the
present writer, will be found an attempt to trace the history of England’s most important craft. Much
scattered information is given in Herbert, Hist. of the London Livery Companies (1837); and the rela-
tion of the craft gilds to the municipal organization is examined in Stubbs, Const. Hist., III, xxi. For
France, see also Gasquet, Précis des Institutions de l’Ancienne France (1885), and for Germany, Maurer,
Gesch. der Städteverfassung, II. (1870). The most detailed analysis of the mediaeval organisation of
industry is that of Schönberg, Zur wirthschaft. Bedeutung d. deutschen Zunftwesens im Mittelalter, inAn Introduction to English Economic History and Theory, volume one / 45
Hildebrand’s Jahrbucher für N. Oekonomie (1867); and the characteristics of the various forms of
industry are briefly compared by Held, Zwei Bücher zur Socialen Gesch. Englands (1881), bk. ii., ch.
iii.
(c) Trade. The history of the treatment of foreign merchants has been for the first time adequately
investigated by Schanz, in Englische Handelspolitik gegen Ende des Mittelaltert (1881), pt. ii., ch. iii.;
and the relations between English and foreign towns are illustrated by the Calendar of Letters, 1350–
1370, ed. Sharpe, printed (1885) by authority of the Corporation of London. For the Hanse of London,
see Wamkoenig, Histoire de Flandre (1835–46), trans. Gheldolf; for the Teutonic Hanse and the Steel-
yard, Lappenberg, Geschichte des Hansischen Stahlhofes zu London (1851), and the popular article on
the Steelyard, by Pauli, in Pictures of Old England (1861). Much information on markets, fairs, and
means of communication may be gathered from Rogers, History of Agriculture, and Kitchin, Winches-
ter Cathedral Records, No. 2 (1886), and some little from Jusserand, Vie Nomade d’Angleterre au xiv.
Siècle (1884). The Statutes of the Realm are of especial value for this subject ]
§7. The Merchant Gild. At the time of the Norman Conquest there were some eighty towns in Eng-
land.1 Most of these were what we should now consider but large villages; they were distinguished
from the villages around only by the earthen walls that surrounded them, or the earthen mounds that
kept watch over them. London, Winchester, Bristol, Norwich, York, and Lincoln were far in advance of
the rest in size and importance; but even a town of the first rank cannot have had more than seven or
eight thousand inhabitants.2 We shall perhaps be not far wrong if we estimate the town population at
about a hundred and fifty thousand, out of a total population of about a million and a half.3
As to how these towns had come into existence, it were scarcely profitable to construct any defi-
nite theory until the condition of the body of the population of early England has been more satisfacto-
rily determined than it is at present. But it is readily seen that population would tend to congregate at
places where high roads crossed one another, or where rivers could be forded; such places, indeed,
would in many oases be of strategic importance, and so would come to be fortified. There is no reason
to suppose that any monastic orders, before the Cistercians, “lived of set purpose in the wilderness;”4
monasteries and cathedral churches were placed where villages were already in existence. But beneath
the shelter of the monasteries the villages soon grew into small towns;5 the labour services to which
their inhabitants were bound, or the commutation for them which they paid, long testifying to the
originally servile character of the holdings.6 Many a village around the fortified house or castle of some
great noble had a similar history.
Such towns necessarily became centres of what little internal trade there was. For although agri-
culture long remained one of the principal employments of the burgesses, yet it must have early been
necessary for supplies of food to be brought from the country around: this is the most primitive and
essential form of trade. The lords, to whom the towns were subject, would see their interest in the
establishment of markets, in which protection was guaranteed, and paid for in the shape of tolls: and so
came into existence those weekly or half-weekly market days’ which, in spite of improved moans of
communication, are still so important in England.
Commerce with the Frank kingdom had long been carried on from London and the ports of Kent,
especially Sandwich and Dover. Traffic with the Danish settlements on the Irish coast, a traffic in
which slaves were the chief commodities, brought Chester and Bristol into prominence in the tenth and
eleventh centuries; and the connection with the Scandinavian kingdoms, caused by Canute’s conquest,
brought York, Grimsby, Lincoln, Norwich, Ipswich, and many other ports along the eastern coast, into
active commercial communication with the Baltic countries.8 Yet the tiade with foreign countries can-
not have been large; the wares which, in an old English dialogue, the merchant describes himself as
bringing with him, seem to be all articles of luxury such as would be needed only by the higher classes—46 / William J. Ashley
“purple cloth, silk, costly gems and gold, garments, pigments, wine, oil, ivory and brass, copper and
tin, sulphur, glass, and such like.”9 The mention of merchants in the English laws is so infrequent10 that
we can hardly suppose that any considerable trading class had come into existence.
In the troublous years which followed the landing of the Conqueror the more important English
towns suffered greatly; in some cases a third or half the houses were destroyed, and the population
reduced in like proportion,—a result to which the chances of war and William’s policy of castle-build-
ing contributed in equal measure.11 But even during the twenty years before the great survey of 1086,
the towns on the southern coast had begun to profit by the closer connection with the opposite shore.12
And as soon as the Norman rule was firmly established, it secured for the country an internal peace and
order such as it had never before enjoyed; the temporary retrogression was more than made up for; and
in town after town arose the merchant gild.
The merchant gild, or hanse, for the words are used synonymously, was a society formed prima-
rily for the purpose of obtaining and maintaining the privilege of carrying on trade,—a privilege which
implied the possession of a monopoly of trade in each town by the gild brethren as against its other
inhabitants,13 and also liberty to trade in other towns.14 The exact character of the monopoly probably
vaiied somewhat from place to place. Everywhere, apparently, non-members were left free to buy and
sell victuals;15 but if they went further and engaged in regular trade they became subject to tolls from
which the gild brethren were free.16 If the trader was prosperous enough to pay the entrance money and
become a member of the gild, but obstinately refrained from doing so, he was coerced into compliance
by repeated fines. In some places a promise to inform the gild officers of any man trafficking in the
town and able to enter the gild was part of the entrance-oath of every brother.17 Each member paid an
entrance fee, and probably other dues to the gild chest, which were spent for the common purposes of
the gild, especially in festivities. And since no society could be conceived of in the Middle Ages with-
out some sort of jurisdiction over its members,18 the gild merchant, in its meetings known as “morning-
speeches,”19 drew up regulations for trade and punished breaches of commercial morality. Now, there
certainly had existed before the Conquest both religious gilds and frith gilds, i.e., clubs or societies for
the performance of certain pious offices, and for mutual assistance in the preservation of peace.20 It is
quite possible therefore that similar societies for the purpose of trade may have been formed equally
early; but the first positive mention of a merchant gild is certainly not earlier than 1093.21 With the
reign of Henry I begins the long series of charters granted to towns by the king or other lords. Under
Henry II such charters were obtained, among other places, by Bristol, Durham, Lincoln, Carlisle, Ox-
ford, Salisbury, Southampton; and in all these charters the recognition of a merchant gild occupies a
prominent place.22 Indeed, the lawyer Glanvill, writing at this time, regards the commune, i.e., the body
of citizens with rights of municipal self-government, as identical with the gild merchant.23 Such mer-
chant gilds may have been in existence for some time before they were recognized by charter: the value
of the charter lay rather in the sanction which it gave to the coercive action of the society, and the rights
which it secured for its members in other than their own towns. In spite of the paucity of evidence, the
existence of a merchant gild can be definitely proved in ninety-two towns out of the hundred and sixty
represented at one time or other in the parliaments of Edward I. No considerable name,—with two
exceptions, namely London and the Cinque Ports—is wanting from the list. It is impossible not to
conclude that every town, down to those that were not much more than villages, had its merchant gild.
This fact of itself is enough to prove the great part it must have played in the town life of the time.
The evident similarity of the regulations of those four gilds whose ordinances have been pre-
served, in places so far apart as Totnes, Southampton, Leicester and Berwick, can only be explained by
supposing that merchant gilds all over England had much the same organization. Each was presided
over by an alderman (in some cases two), with two or four assistants, usually known as wardens or
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or twenty-four. The alderman and wardens, besides summoning and presiding over the meetings and
festivities, managed the funds of the society, as well as its estates when, as was frequently the case, the
gild had purchased or otherwise acquired land.24
Who were eligible for membership it is impossible with certainty to determine. It is clear that the
association included a very considerable number of persons, e.g., as many as two hundred in the small
town of Totnes;25 that while it embraced merchants travelling to distant markets, it did not, at any rate
at first, exclude craftsmen as such;26 that the eldest sons or heirs of gildsmen had a right to free admis-
sion, and younger sons on paying a smaller entrance fee than others; and that, certainly also at first,
members could give or sell their rights, and transmit them to heiresses, who might exercise them
themselves or give them to their husbands or sons.27 The most usual term for the rights of membership
was seat, sedes: members were said to seek, have, sell, or give their seat,28 which was often described
as below or above that of another—a phrase possibly referring originally to a place in the market. The
word gild is also sometimes used for all the rights of membership, though more frequently for the
meetings of the society, especially for the solemn gatherings once or twice a year.29
We know that merchants from other towns were admitted to membership, and that the same
privileges were often obtained by neighbouring monasteries and lords of manors.30 But clearly the bulk
of the members belonged to the town itself; and there are strong reasons for supposing that, of the
inhabitants, only such were admitted to membership as held land within the town boundaries,—the
burgage tenants, burgenses or cives, burgesses or citizens par excellence, who alone were fully quali-
fied members of the town assembly.31 We must not, however, regard the members of the gild as being
all of them great merchants. In most towns, agriculture was still one of the main occupations of the
burgesses;32 but most holders of land would find it desirable to sell at any rate their surplus produce.
The articles most frequently mentioned in the gild documents—skins, wool, corn,33 etc.—show that
the trade consisted almost entirely in the sale and purchase of the raw products of agriculture. It has
already been noticed that non-members were often permitted to buy and sell subject to the payments of
tolls, but in some cases trade in certain articles was entirely forbidden to them, e.g., in skins?34 More
important still is it to observe that in some places the manufacture of cloth had become so considerable
that the merchant gild thought it worth while to obtain from the king a monopoly of the retail sale of the
dyed cloth used by the upper classes,35 or even of the retail sale of all cloth.36 We shall see later how
these privileges brought them into conflict with the craft gilds.
We have noticed that the gild assemblies, or its officers on its behalf, drew up regulations and
exercised a jurisdiction in matters of trade. These regulations illustrate clearly a characteristic common
both to the merchant and craft gilds, namely that, while each individual member was within certain
limits allowed to pursue his own interest as he thought best, there was nevertheless a strong feeling that
the trade or industry was the common interest of the whole body; that each was bound to submit to
regulations for the common good, and to come to the assistance of his fellow-members. Thus it was
ordered in Leicester that the dealers in cloth, going to the fair of S. Botolph at Boston, should place
themselves on the southern side of the market, and the wool dealers on the northern. Somewhat later it
was provided that the Leicester merchants at Boston should always display their cloth for sale within
the “range” in which the Leicestershire men were accustomed to stand, under penalty of having to pay
a tun of ale. A man might, indeed, for the sake of security, take his cloth home with him at night to a
lodging outside the “range,” but he was not to sell it outside the row.37 Only in such a way was it
possible to exercise any supervision over those who claimed to come from Leicester; and only in this
way could a fraudulent dealer be hindered from ruining the good credit of the town’s wares. But in
return for these restrictions the gilds-man gained the benefit of protection. If a gildsman of Southamp-
ton were put into prison in any part of England, the alderman and the steward with one of the échevins
were bound to go at the cost of the gild to procure his deliverance. At Berwick, “two or three of the48 / William J. Ashley
gild” were bound to “labour” on behalf of any one in danger of losing life or limb, though only for two
days at the gild’s expense.38 Individuals were not to monopolize the advantages of trade. In Southamp-
ton, while a bargain was being made, any other member could come up and claim to join in it on giving
security that he could pay for the portion he desired. In Berwick, a man who bought a lot of herrings
must share them at cost price with the gildsmen present, and any one not present could have his share
on paying the price and twelvepence to the buyer for profit.39
The jurisdiction of the gild had, of course, for one of its chief purposes the maintenance of the
society’s privileges. There are frequent ordinances against acting as agents for the sale of goods be-
longing to non-members, or teaching or aiding a strange merchant to purchase to the injury of the
gild.40 But an equally important object was the maintenance of fair dealing and of a high standard of
quality in the goods sold. The rolls contain numerous records of fines for dishonestly dyeing wool, for
mixing bad wool with good, for short weight, for selling at more than the assize or fixed price, as well
as for the offence of forestalling, which we shall see later to have been so carefully guarded against.41
The brotherhood, moreover, was unlike a modern society aiming at some particular material ad-
vantage, in that it entered into a great part of everyday life. Sick gildsmen were visited, and wine and
food sent to them from the feasts; brethren who had fallen into poverty were relieved; their daughters
were dowered for marriage or the convent; and when a member died his funeral was attended by the
brethren and the due rites provided for.42
§8. It was, as we have seen, in the second half of the eleventh century that merchant gilds began to
come into existence; during the twelfth century they arose in all considerable English towns. The rise
of craft gilds is, roughly speaking, a century later; isolated examples occur early in the twelfth century,
they become more numerous as the century advances, and in the thirteenth century they appear in all
branches of manufacture and in every industrial centre.
Craft gilds were associations of all the artisans engaged in a particular industry in a particular
town, for certain common purposes: what those purposes were will be seen later. Their appearance
marks the second stage in the history of industry, the transition from the family system to the artisan (or
gild) system. In the former there was no class of artisans properly so called; no class, that is to say, of
men whose time was entirely or chiefly devoted to a particular manufacture; and this because all the
needs of a family or other domestic group, whether of monastery or manor-house, were satisfied by the
labours of the members of the group itself. The latter, on the contrary, is marked by the presence of a
body of men each of whom was occupied more or less completely in one particular manufacture.43 The
very growth from the one to the other system, therefore, is an example of “division of labour,” or, to use
a better phrase, of “division of employments.” If, like Adam Smith,44 we attempted to determine “the
natural progress of opulence,” we might formulate the law of development thus: in an agricultural
community the first division of employments that will appear will be between the great bulk of the
population who continue to be engaged in agriculture, and that small number of persons who occupy
themselves in transferring the surplus raw produce of one place to other places where there is need of
it. When, however, as in the case of England, a country is surpassed by others in the arts, or is unable to
furnish itself with articles of luxury, such as spices or silks, dealers in such imported commodities
desired by the wealthier classes will appear even before there is a class of dealers in the raw produce of
the country. But in any case the growth of a small merchant or trading class precedes that of a manufac-
turing class.
When the place of the young manufactures of the twelfth century in the development of mediaeval
society is thus conceived, the discussion as to a possible Roman “origin” of the gilds loses much of its
interest.45 No doubt modern historians have exaggerated the breach in continuity between the Roman
and the barbarian world; no doubt the artisans in the later Roman Empire had an organization some-
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corporations may have had a continuous existence from the fifth to the twelfth century. It is even
possible that Roman regulations may have served as models for the organization of servile artisans on
the lands of monasteries and great nobles,—from which, on the continent, some of the later craft gilds
doubtless sprang. But when we see that the growth of an artisan class, as distinguished from isolated
artisans here and there, was impossible till the twelfth century, because society had not yet reached the
stage in which it was profitable or safe for a considerable number of men to confine themselves to any
occupation except agriculture; and that the ideas which governed the craft gilds were not peculiar to
themselves but common to the whole society of the time; then the elements of organization which may
conceivably have been derived from or suggested by the Roman artisan corporations become of quite
secondary importance.
There is, as we have said, little doubt that some of the craft gilds of France and Germany were
originally organizations of artisan serfs on the manors of great lay or ecclesiastical lords. This may also
have been the case in some places in England, but no evidence has yet been adduced to show that it was
so. But it must be remembered that as yet we know very little of the early history of the towns; and just
as it is possible that in many cases the burgesses who afterwards formed the merchant gild were origi-
nally villeins bound to labour services to their lords, so it is possible that there were in some places
groups of artisans working for a lord, and under regulations and officers appointed by him, who gradu-
ally freed themselves from servitude, and became free craftsmen. But this is no more than speculation;
at the time when the craftsmen first appear in such documents as are at present accessible, they are
personally free, and not subject to seigneurial supervision.
The relation of the craft gilds to the merchant gild is a still more difficult question. In many of the
towns of Germany and the Netherlands a desperate struggle took place during the thirteenth and four-
teenth centuries between a burgher oligarchy, who monopolized the municipal government, and were
still further strengthened in many cases by union in a merchant gild, and the artisans organized in their
craft gilds; the craftsmen fighting first for the right of having gilds of their own, and then for a share in
the government of the town. These facts have been easily fitted into a symmetrical theory of industrial
development; the merchant gilds, it is said, were first formed for protection against feudal lords, but
became exclusive, and so rendered necessary the formation of craft gilds; and in the same way the craft
gilds became exclusive afterwards, and the journeymen were compelled to form societies of their own
for protection against the masters. It was not difficult to explain the much scantier notices as to English
affairs by the light of this theory, and to make up for the silence of English chroniclers by foreign
analogies.46
The very neatness of such a theory, the readiness with which it has been accepted by popular
writers in spite of the paucity of English evidence, have perhaps led some historians to treat it with
scant consideration. It is urged that there is no evidence of any such contest in this country between
burghers and artisans.47 It is further maintained that the craft gilds had but little independence, and are
to be regarded as merely the machinery by which municipal authorities supervised manufacture.48 Yet
this view does not seem satisfactory in view of the information which has been lately brought to light
with regard to the merchant gild. The following theory as to the relations of the various bodies cannot
be regarded as more than a theory; but it does not seem to be in collision with facts, and it is confirmed
by much indirect evidence.
Membership of the town assembly, the court leet, or port-manmote, seems to have been originally
bound up with the possession of land within the town boundaries; and it was the right to appear in such
an assembly that must originally have made a man a burgess or citizen. Of such burgesses the merchant
gild of each town was constituted.49 At first the term “merchant,” or “trader,” would cover all those
who had occasion to sell or buy anything beyond provisions for daily use; and the holder of a plot of
land, however small, who was also a craftsman, would not be excluded. But this harmonious union50 / William J. Ashley
must have been disturbed in two ways. There came into existence a class of landless inhabitants of the
towns,—owing probably in the main to the natural increase of the town population itself, but also
perhaps partly to some influx of serfs from the country districts. These landless inhabitants could not
be regarded as burgesses at all, and therefore could not be admitted into the merchant gild, even if they
had desired, and had been able to pay the entrance money. Many of them would become servants to the
richer citizens, but some would turn to handicrafts. And, secondly, although in a small town, such as
Totnes, the traders’ gild might long continue to include craftsmen, in the larger towns there would be a
tendency for the management of the gild to fall entirely into the hands of “merchants” in the modern
sense of the word; until at last they could venture to impose and enforce the rule that before admission
to the gild an artisan must abjure his craft.50 But by this time the merchant gild, whose members must
from the first have exercised a predominant influence in the town, had become practically identical
with the governing body; or, rather, a municipal organization had come into existence which combined
the rights of jurisdiction of the court-leet with the rights of trade of the merchant gild.” Thus two
distinct issues were raised: were the craftsmen to obtain for their gilds rights of supervision and juris-
diction over their members, apart from and independent of the powers of the municipal authorities?
and were they to continue to submit to the trading monopoly of the gild merchant?
The first craft gilds that come into notice are those of the weavers and fullers of woollen cloth. It
was the weavers’ gild, all over western Europe, that began and led the struggle against the old govern-
ing bodies. The reason is obvious: the manufacture of materials for clothing was the first industry in
which a wide demand would make it worth while for men to entirely devote themselves to it, and
therefore it was the first in which a special body of craftsmen appeared. Gilds of bakers, indeed, are to
be found almost as early;52 but so much less skill is required in baking than in weaving, that it long
remained, as it still does to a great degree, a family employment. Hence bakers could never be so
numerous as weavers; and as the former manufactured for immediate consumption, they scarcely came
into conflict with the trading monopoly of the merchants.53
We owe to the chance existence of the Pipe Roll for 1130 the knowledge that in that year there
were gilds of weavers in London, Lincoln, and Oxford,54 making annual payment to the king in return
for his authorization of their existence; the weavers of Oxford, referring in the reign of Edward I to the
time when the payment was fixed, declared that their gild then contained sixty members.55 In the same
reign there was also a gild of corvesars, or leather-dressers, in Oxford.56 During the early years of
Henry II gilds of weavers are also found at York, Winchester, Huntingdon, and Nottingham, and a gild
of fullers at Winchester, each making annual payments to the Exchequer.57 The annual payment was
not merely a tax; it was the condition upon which they received the sanction of the Government. Gilds
that the king had not authorized were amerced as “adulterine,” as was the case in 1180 in London with
the gilds of goldsmiths, butchers, pepperers, and cloth-finishers.58 But there seems to have been no
attempt to forcibly dissolve the adulterine societies; they were not large enough to arouse the jealousy
of the London burgesses; and every one of them survived to take its place among the later companies.
The only definite provision, besides a general confirmation of “liberties and customs,” in the
earliest charters,—such as those granted to the weavers of London and York by Henry II, —was that no
one within the town (sometimes the district) should follow the craft unless he belonged to the gild.59
The right to force all other craftsmen to join the organization,— Zunft-zwang, as German writers call
it,—carried with it the right to impose conditions, to exercise some sort of supervision over those who
joined. It was natural that the earliest gilds, growing up in a certain antagonism to the burgesses, should
seek to make their jurisdiction as wide as possible. But such an independent authority would intensify
the jealousy of the governing bodies in the towns. The lengths to which the antagonism between the
burghers and artisans might go is clearly illustrated in London. We do not know whether there had ever
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obtained complete municipal self-government, and consequently the recognition of the same rights
over trade and industry as a gild merchant would have exercised.60 Almost immediately they offered to
make an annual payment to the Exchequer if the weavers’ gild were abolished. John accepted the offer,
and in 1200 the gild was abolished by royal charter.61 For some reason or other it was again restored in
two or three years; but long afterwards the weavers did not feel themselves out of danger.62
In other towns it is the economic struggle that is most clearly discernible. We have seen that the
charters to towns, granting permission to have a merchant gild, usually contained a clause to the effect
that none but members of that society were to engage in trade, and that it is expressly stated in one ease
that they are to have the monopoly even of the retail sale of cloth.63 There is reason to believe that this
was a monopoly very generally insisted upon. The London “Book of Customs” contains certain en-
tries64 entitled the “laws” of the weavers and fullers of Winchester, Oxford, Beverley, and Marlborough,—
reports or copies which the London magistrates must have obtained some time in the thirteenth cen-
tury, to strengthen their cause. These “laws” draw a sharp distinction between the craftsman and the
freeman, franke homme, of the town. No freeman could be accused by a weaver or fuller, nor could an
artisan even give evidence against one.65 If a craftsman became so rich that he wished to become a
freeman, he must first forswear his craft and get rid of all his tools from his house. No weaver or fuller
might go outside the town to sell his own cloth, and so interfere with the monopoly of the merchants;
nor was he allowed to sell his cloth to any save a merchant of the town.66 Indeed, he must get the
consent of the “good men” of the town before he can even carry on his craft; and he was not to work for
any but the good men of the town.67 This last rule reappears in an order of the gild merchant of Leices-
ter as late as 1265, prohibiting the craftsmen of that town from weaving for the men of other places so
long as they had sufficient work to do for the burgesses of Leicester.68
The materials are not yet accessible which would allow us to trace the way in which the old
organization of the burgesses lost its exclusive lights; or, what is perhaps only the other side of the
same change, the way in which the craftsmen gained the rights of burgesses. The trading monopoly
was lost, probably, before the end of the thirteenth century.
It is, at any rate, evident that the statute of 1335 allowing foreign merchants to trade freely in
England is framed in such terms as clearly to include English craftsmen in the permission it gives, and
that it must have had the effect of weakening any monopoly which the governing class in any of the
towns might still claim. “The king hath ordered,” it runs, “that all merchants, aliens, and denizens, and
all other, and every of them, of whatever estate or condition they may be that will buy or sell corn,
wine, avoir du poys, flesh, fish, and all other articles of food, wool, cloth, wares, merchandise, and all
other things vendible, from whencesoever they come,... at whatsoever place it be, city, borough, town,
port of the sea, fair, market,... within franchise or without,... may freely without interruption sell them
to what persona it shall please them.”69 With the loss of their trading monopoly disappeared the raison
d’etre of the gilds merchant, and with it of the gilds themselves as separate organizations. In many
towns the name long survived, but only as a term to describe certain functions of the municipal autherities,
especially the admission of apprentices to the freedom of the city. In others the gild reorganized itself in
the shape of a social and religious society; while in one or two, it is possible that the later company of
Merchant Adventurers grew out of the gild merchant. But the latter development, which is of extreme
interest, has not yet been adequately investigated.70
§9. The result of the contest between the municipal government and the craft gilds in the matter of
jurisdiction cannot be precisely defined, because it was not precisely defined at the time. Brentano
represents craft gilds as entirely independent; as issuing regulations concerning prices, wages, the
character of the work, and the processes of manufacture; and as exercising an independent jurisdiction
in trade matters over their members. His critics, on the other hand, point out that regulations such as the
gilds issued were certainly also issued both by municipal authorities and in statutes; they are even52 / William J. Ashley
inclined to deny to the gilds all real judicial power, attributing to them only what may be called police
functions —the power, that is to say, of bringing offenders before the municipal tribunal. A truer state-
ment would seem to be this: the town magistrates were recognized as having a vague but real authority
over the gilds, enabling them, if they pleased, to issue ordinances binding upon any craft; but most of
the gild statutes were really drawn up by the craftsmen themselves, and the approval of the town
magistrates, necessary to give them binding force, was granted as a matter of course. The everyday
regulation and supervision of manufacturing processes was surrendered to the gild officials. As to
jurisdiction, however, there were almost certainly wide differences between the various gilds. Most
gilds, or crafts (mestiers, mysteres), as they came to be called, were empowered to deal in their courts
with petty disputes or breaches of rule on the part of their members, though the accused person could
demand to be tried before the mayor; and, indeed, the municipal authorities could bring the offender
before them in the first instance, if they thought proper. But some of the crafts were brought within the
gild organization comparatively late, and rather to enable the municipal authorities the more easily to
control them than for any advantage the craftsmen might themselves have seen in union; these had,
apparently, no judicial powers at all, and the only duty of their wardens was to present offenders against
the regulations before the mayor. On the other hand, the London weavers, and probably some others of
the older gilds, had courts with considerable independent judicial authority, and their members could
claim to be tried by the court of their gild and by no other.
The London weavers held a “gild” once a year, and a court every Thursday. The court was pre-
sided over by four bailiffs elected by the men of the craft and accepted by the mayor. There was a clerk
to assist in holding the court, and there was a sergeant to summon offenders before it: these two offi-
cials were paid half a mark a year out of the fines received by the court. Any of the folk of the craft
impleaded in the sheriffs’ court could be removed from it to the gild court on the demand of one of the
bailiffs: two bailiffs acting together had the power of removing to the gild court pleas brought against
weavers even by non-members, though it was added later that it was not to have the power of fining
non-members. The matters in which the gild court had jurisdiction are defined as “pleas of debt, con-
tract, agreement, and petty offences,”—limited only in the case of disputes with the burellers, who
prepared yarn for them, by an agreement in 1300 that such cases should be decided in the mayor’s court
by a jury composed equally of members of the two bodies.71 When we find that the charters conferred
on other gilds by Henry II,—as, for example, that to the corvesars of Oxford,—were drawn up in
precisely the same terms as that to the London weavers, we cannot help conjecturing that much the
same powers as those exercised by the weavers may have been exercised by some other of the more
ancient gilds, both in London and elsewhere.
At the end of the reign of Edward III there were in London forty-eight companies or crafts,72 each
with a separate organization and officers of its own, a number which had increased to at least sixty
before the close of the centuiy. Other important towns must have seen a like increase in the number of
artisans and a like formation of companies, though the subdivision did not go so far. In towns of the
second rank, such as Exeter, the development is later, and occupies the following century:73 while in
smaller towns companies were only formed when there was a considerable body of men employed in
the same craft; so that many artisans remained unbound by any such organization, and subject only to
the regulations imposed by statute, or by the mayor or bailiff.
We are able roughly to determine the period at which the formation of companies, instead of being
opposed, began to be forwarded by the municipal authorities. Until the reign of Edward I, seemingly,
craft gilds had arisen spontaneously, for the mutual help and advantage of the craftsmen: they had been
obliged to make annual payments to the king or other lords to secure recognition; and they had found it
difficult to maintain their rights against the municipal authorities. The reign of Edward I appears to
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the governing bodies in the towns, and therefore exerted his influence on their side.74 On the other
hand, the establishment of a strong central authority made it less necessary and less possible for the
newly rising gilds to obtain such extensive rights of jurisdiction as the Zünfte in Germany, or the
weavers’ gild in London in the previous century. Accordingly we see a new policy in the craft ordi-
nances, which from the reign of Edward II have been preserved in such numbers. The gild system was
no longer merely tolerated; it was fostered and extended, though doubtless primarily for police pur-
poses,—to ensure due supervision of the craft, and the punishment of offenders against regulations,
through persons chosen by the craft but responsible to the municipal authorities. Up to this time the
gilds had been few in number, because there had been few artisans, and those only such as were en-
gaged in meeting most elementary wants, food and clothing; such, namely, as bakers, butchers, leather-
dressers,—above all, those engaged in the manufacture of cloth, weavers, fullers, and dyers. But now
a rapid increase in the number of artisans takes place; new wants begin to be felt, and each new want is
supplied by a separate body of craftsmen. Consequently we find the municipal authorities confirming
or creating companies, not only of such wholesale dealers as grocers and drapers, but also of such
artisans as spurriers, helmet-makers, brace-makers, farriers, wax-chandlers, scriveners, and piemakers.
It is often not easy to determine whether the ordinances which first mention these companies actually
created them. In many cases, probably, they had come into existence spontaneously, somewhat before
the date of the ordinances “accepted by the mayor and aldermen at the suit and request of the folk of the
trade.”75 But in many cases, also, the organization was imposed from without by the municipal rulers;
as with the masons in 1356, “because that their trade has not been regulated in due manner by the
government of folk of their trade, in such form as other trades are:” while in one case, that of the wax-
chandlers in 1371, “the reputable men of the trade,” show the mayor and aldermen how that “their trade
has been badly ruled and governed heretofore, and there still is great scandal... because they have not
Masters chosen of the said trade, and sworn before you, as other trades have, to oversee the defaults
that are committed in their said trade, and to present them to the mayor and aldermen.”76 This last
sentence illustrates the limited character of the jurisdiction of the new companies. In some the only
duty of the masters, wardens, or overseers was to present offenders to the mayor’s court:77 in all the
new crafts an offender had the right of appeal from the decision of the gild officials to the mayor,78 who
however seems to have always called in the aid of a small jury chosen from the particular craft.79
It must be remembered, as to the relation of the gild to the municipal authorities, that in London
during the fourteenth century,—and doubtless the same was the case elsewhere in this and the follow-
ing century,—the municipal organization was itself changing. The master craftsmen were becoming
more prosperous; and before the end of the reign of Edward III, instead of the craftsmen being incapa-
ble of citizenship, citizenship came to be bound up with membership of one of the companies. The old
jealousy between craft gild and “commune” disappeared when the leading men of the gilds came to
exercise influence in the government of the commune. But by that time the gilds themselves had as-
sumed a different character.80
§10. The internal organization of the gilds can be briefly described. The most important part of it
was the authority of the wardens, overseers, bailiffs, or masters, whose chief duty was to supervise the
industry and cause offenders to be punished.81 They were elected annually at full assemblies of the men
of the craft, absence from which was punished by fine;82 and it was at such or similar gatherings that
from time to time new regulations were drawn up to be submitted to the approval of the mayor and
aldermen. No one could work at the craft who had not been approved and admitted to the gild by its
officials; and it would seem that in London, from the middle of the fourteenth century, admission to the
freedom of the city and to a craft took place at one and the same time.83
In the early part of the fourteenth century, apprenticeship was only gradually becoming an abso-
lutely necessary preliminary to setting up as a master;84 to the same period is due the fixing of the term54 / William J. Ashley
of apprenticeship at seven years. A separate class of journeymen was also only just coming into exist-
ence. It was still, apparently, the usual practice for a man, on coming out of his apprenticeship, to set up
for himself. Such “serving-men” as there were, made contracts with master-craftsmen to work for them
for a certain term, sometimes for a period of several years. But from the frequency with which the rule
is repeated, that “no one shall receive the apprentice, serving-man, or journeyman of another in the
same trade during the term agreed upon between his master and him,” and the frequency also with
which the mayor of one town has to write to the mayor of another to ask that runaways should be sent
back, it appears that apprentices often became discontented, and absconded.85 The gild ordinances
imply that, as a rule, only master craftsmen took part in the government of the fraternity, but there is at
least one case where ordinances are described as agreed to “as well by serving-men as masters.”86 It
does not appear that as yet the number either of journeymen or of apprentices that one master could
take was limited by legislation or ordinance: but we shall see later that the limitation of number in the
sixteenth century was in order to maintain an existing state of things, so that it is probable that at this
time a master artisan would not usually have more than one or two journeymen and one or two appren-
tices.87
The regulations drawn up by the crafts aimed at the prevention of fraud, and the observance of
certain standards of size and quality in the wares produced. Articles made in violation of these rules
were called “false,” just as clipped or counterfeit coin was “false money.” For such “false work” the
makers were punished by fines (one half going to the craft, the other half to the town funds), and, upon
the third or fourth offence, by expulsion from the trade. Penalties were provided, as far as possible, for
every sort of deceitful device; such as putting better wares at the top of a bale than below, moistening
groceries so as to make them heavier, selling second-hand furs for new, soldering together broken
swords, selling sheep leather for doe leather, and many other like tricks.88 It was for the same reason
that night-work was forbidden; not, as Brentano says, with the philanthropic object of providing work
for all, but because work could not be done so neatly at night, and because craftsmen, knowing they
were not likely to be visited at that time by the wardens, took the opportunity to make wares “falsely,”
or because working at night disturbed the neighbours.89 It seems, however, to have been a general rule
that men should not work after six o’clock on Saturday evening, or on the eves of Double Feasts.90
There is, indeed, one regulation which does seem designed to ensure men’s having work, and that is,
that “no one shall set any woman to work, other than his wedded wife or his daughter.”91
It is certain, from the analogy of the gilds merchant, as well as from what we know of the later
usages of the companies and of the practices of similar bodies abroad, that in each of the craft gilds,
besides regulations as to manufacture, there were rules providing for mutual assistance in difficulties,
for meetings, festivities, and common worship. But the documents which would throw light on the
subject have not yet been published. The craft statutes contained in the archives of the corporation of
London deal almost exclusively with the regulation of processes; and this is easy to explain, for only
the action of the gilds in the supervision of industry would fall beneath the view of the city authorities;
with their internal life as friendly societies the corporation had nothing to do. Fortunately one set of
ordinances therein contained, those of the white-tawyers or leather-dressers, in 1346, are more de-
tailed;92 and from these we may conjecture similar customs in other crafts. They have a common-box
for subscriptions: out of this sevenpence a week is paid to any man of the trade who has fallen into
poverty from old age or inability to work, and sevenpence a week likewise to a poor man’s widow, so
long as she remains unmarried. “If any one of the said craft shall depart this life, and have not where-
withal to be buried, he shall be buried at the expense of the common-box; and when any one of the said
trade shall die, all those of the said trade shall go to the vigil and make offering on the morrow.” Some
of the companies, as we learn later, had chantries and side chapels in parish churches, and solemn
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in the Church of All Hallows, near London Wall.” And there is one clause which clearly displays the
effort after fraternal union: it is one ordaining that “those of the trade” shall aid a member who cannot
finish work he has undertaken, “so that the said work be not lost.”
§11. In the first half of the fourteenth century, the gild system reached its highest point of effi-
ciency. For two centuries afterwards this form of organization continued to be adopted by one industry
after another as it arose in each town. Yet, as early as this, signs of decay may be observed; new
difficulties begin to show themselves; and, in the one considerable manufacture that England pos-
sessed, the increase of foreign demand led to the breakdown of the gild system altogether.93 Deferring,
however, the examination of these changes till a later section, let us look at the economic characteris-
tics of the gild system while it was still intact.
i. It was distinguished from the earlier “family system” of industry, in that manufacture was car-
ried on for the purpose of supplying consumers outside the domestic group. There was a market, in the
sense of a number of purchasers; and therefore the goods produced can be called wares, as they could
not before. To use modern technical phraseology, there were values-in-exchange, as well as values-in-
use. But the market was very limited; in most cases restricted to the people of a particular town or
district. Indeed, looking at England as a whole, it may be said that there were then a number of local
markets; not as there tends to be now, one market. To-day, for instance, the price of corn is affected by
the whole demand of England, or rather of a much larger area; then it would have been determined, but
for legislative action, by the demand of a comparatively small area. It was this local limitation of
demand that made the regulation of prices and methods of manufacture so much easier than it would be
in modern times.94 The same smallness of the market, and the fact that most of the articles demanded
were called for by necessity and not by fashion, caused demand to be stable: none of the social difficul-
ties now caused by the rapid and incalculable fluctuations in demand had as yet begun to show them-
selves.
ii. Capital played a very small part. In order to set up as a master-artisan a man needed to be able
to hire a house, and buy the necessary tools, as well as, in many crafts, a little money to buy materials.
But skill and connection, the ability to produce good wares, and the steady demand of a small group of
customers were far more important. This element of technical skill modern machinery has driven far
into the background.
iii. There was as yet no large class of wage-labourers, no “working-class” in the modern sense of
the term. By “working-men” we mean a number of men, from among whom individuals may indeed
rise to become masters, but the majority of whom cannot hope ever to rise to a higher position. But in
the fourteenth century a few years’ work as a journeyman was but a stage through which the poorer
men had to pass, while the majority probably set up for themselves as master craftsmen as soon as
apprenticeship was over. There were, therefore, no collisions between “capital and labour,” though
there might be occasional quarrels between individuals. The hard-working journeyman expected to be
able in a few years to become an independent master; and while he remained a journeyman there was
no social gulf between himself and his employer. They worked in the same shop, side by side, and the
servant probably earned at least half as much as hia master.
iv. If, therefore, we compare the working-class of to-day with that of the fourteenth century, it is
not with the journeymen, but with the master craftsmen, that the comparison must be made. The most
important contrast that strikes us is that the mediaeval craftsmen were personally independent, in a
sense in which the modern workman is not. He worked in his own shop, owned his own tools, and
worked at what hours he pleased, subject to the restrictions as to work at night or on Sunday. In some
crafts, it is true, he received the raw material from customers, giving back finished articles for the
customers’ own use; in some he was more or less dependent on the men of other crafts, receiving half-
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craftsman bought his own materials, and sold the goods to such customers as presented themselves,
i.e., he combined the functions of a trader with, those of a manufacturer.95 The shopkeeper class was
only beginning to come into existence.
v. We have seen that the gilds were not independent, but were subject to the control of the munici-
pal and central authorities. The chief object of this control, as of the gild statutes, was to secure the
good quality of the wares produced. The modern state has abandoned the attempt, except in the case of
certain articles of food. But it must be recognized that the task was an easier one in the Middle Ages.
Wants were comparatively few and unchanging; they were supplied by neighbouring craftsmen; con-
sumer and producer stood in direct relation with one another. Such regulations had regard, not only to
the interests of the consumers, but also to those of the craft itself, which would be injured by the
knavery of individual members.96 They only disappeared when production became much greater, and
aimed at satisfying a wide and changing market. As we should expect, the doctrine caveat emptor97
first appears in the cloth industry: a petition of the London fullers, in 1369, urges that those who bought
cloths with patent defects should do so at their peril.98
vi. The supervision of the processes of manufacture was the chief reason for the action of the
central and local authorities in encouraging and even insisting on the separate organization of different
branches of the same industry, and the rule that every craftsman should choose his craft and abide by it.
An Act of Parliament of 1363 ordained that “artificers and men of mysteries (mestiers, i.e., crafts) shall
each join the craft he may choose between this time and the next Candlemas;” “trespassers” were to be
punished by imprisonment for half a year, and by a fine to the king.99 This was followed up by special
ordinances “that no dyer or weaver shall make any cloth,” i.e., interfere with the trade of the cloth-
finishers.100 The division was sometimes amusingly minute: bowyers were not to make arrows,—that
was to be left to the fletchers; cord-wainers, “the craft of workers in new leather,” were not to retail or
make up old boots and shoes for sale, and so interfere with the “cobelers,” though the cobelers were
specially permitted to use new leather for resoling old boots.101
vii. The members of each craft usually lived in the same street or neighbourhood. Thus in London
the saddlers lived round, and attended, the church of S. Martin-le-Grand; the lorimers lived in Cripplegate,
the weavers in Cannon Street, smiths in Smithfield, and bucklers in Buckler sbury.102 So in Bristol there
were Tucker Street, the home of the tuckers or fullers, Corn Street, Knifesmith Street, Butcher Eow,
Cooks’ How, and the like.103 Such a grouping must have enormously strengthened the sense of corpo-
rate life in each craft, and must also have made the work of supervision comparatively easy.
So large a part of the manufacturing work of the country was arranged on the gild system, that that
term may be fairly used to describe the whole organization of industry. But in some occupations and
districts, while there was a sufficient demand for some commodity to induce men to give up them-
selves to a particular sort of labour, there could never be a demand large enough to call into existence
a body of men of the same craft large enough to form a gild or company. Thus most villages had a
smith, but only in the largest town was there a smiths’ gild. Isolated weavers and fullers were probably
to be found scattered up and down the country. In such cases the individual craftsman would be without
the support and control of the gild; but the essential characteristics of his position were the same as of
the position of the gild member. His capital was very small; he dealt directly with the customer; and
between himself and the one or two men or boys he might employ, there was no social gulf.104
§12. Internal Trade. Under conditions such as are above described, a much smaller part must have
been played in the economic life of society by domestic and foreign trade than in the England of to-day.
Such trade as there was, was regulated by the strong government of the Angevins on principles which
the circumstances of the time readily explain. Unless traders were brought together at definite centres
at definite times, it was impossible either to protect them, or to supervise their dealings in the interest
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revenue. Hence the policy of the government was to create for trade regular channels within which it
might be compelled to move.
The roads were bad, though probably not so bad as they became in the seventeenth century; the
chief highways were of Roman construction, and tended to become worse rather than better as time
went on. No general law for the repair of roads was passed until the Statute 2 & 3 Philip and Mary.105
The Statute of Winchester, 1285, provided that bushes and underwood, though not oaks or great trees,
should be cleared away for two hundred feet on each side of highways leading from one market town
to another; but this was only to prevent men “lurking in them to do hurt.”’106 The obligation of repairing
highways lay, by common law, upon the parish, except in those cases where the burden was attached to
a property through or near which the road passed: neglect could be dealt with by indictment;107 and the
destruction of bridges and roads was one of the subjects into which the sheriffs were bound to inquire
in the view of frankpledge. Moreover, the great proprietors whose estates were scattered over many
counties had an interest in the maintenance of roads, which was lessened in succeeding centuries by the
greater consolidation of estates. Yet the roads were often almost impassable. In London the plan was
adopted, in 1356, of charging tolls for every cart or packhorse entering or leaving one of the city
gates,—except, curiously enough, those of great people and other folks bringing victuals for use in
their own houses,—for the repair of the roads immediately outside the metropolis.108 The maintenance
of bridges was recognized as especially important, and as, in some measure, a religious duty. Very often
they were entrusted to special wardens, who were empowered to take toll; thus Rochester Bridge, on
the main route to the ports for France and the Low Countries, was in the hands of wardens and assist-
ants, who had an organization similar to that of a gild, and administered, for the repair of the structure,
revenues derived from “proper” and “contributory” lands.109 But the right of receiving bridge toll was
often obtained by persons who neglected their duties; and, in the case of bridges not specially entrusted
to individuals, it was often a difficult matter to determine which of the neighbouring landowners was
responsible, and still more difficult to make him pay.110 Inns were plentiful; the warden of Merton and
two of the fellows, travelling on business to Northumberland and back in 1332, stayed almost every
night at inns on their way.111 Apparently it was only the very poor, from charity, or the very powerful,
from fear, who were entertained in monasteries.112
Every town had a market and fixed market days, where, as now, the surplus produce of the country
districts was sold to the townsfolk, and the manufactures of the town artisans were sold to the farmers.
The possession of a market could be claimed only on the ground of a royal grant, or of immemorial
usage; and as it was a valuable right, and the establishment of a market in the neighbourhood, by
diminishing the trade of those already established, lessened the lords’ profits, there was always the
greatest jealousy of any rival, a jealousy which furnished frequent occasion for lawsuits. Thus, in the
reign of Henry II, the men of Oxford and Wallingford declared that at the Abingdon markets in old time
nothing had been sold except bread and beer, or at any rate that nothing used to be taken there in boats
or waggons.
The king, however, was on the side of the monastery, and granted permission to hold a “full
market,” though goods were not to be brought to it in any but the abbot’s boats.113 Bracton lays down
that a market shall never be established nearer than six miles and two-thirds to one already existing,114
but it is not probable that any such rule was ever observed. The Oxford market on Wednesdays and
Saturdays was regulated by the University as early as 1319. The articles sold were hay and straw,
faggots, timber, pigs, beer, coal and roots, leather and gloves, furs, linen and cloth, leather, corn and
dairy produce; and the place in the High Street and Corn Market at which each kind was to be sold was
strictly determined.115 Pigs, for instance, were to be stationed for sale between S. Mary’s and All Saints;
the setting apart in our towns of a piece of ground for a cattle market away from the main streets is a
refinement of a later age.58 / William J. Ashley
To buy foreign goods, or the products of distant counties, men had to wait until the great fairs, of
which the traces are now everywhere gradually disappearing. They usually began on a saint’s day,—a
fact pointing to their origin in the concourse of people to particular shrines on great festivals; the
disorders in churchyards on such occasions were a frequent subject of condemnation by early Church
councils. An especially convenient day was September 1, the festival of S. Giles, for then stores could
be laid in for the winter; and the chapel of the hermit saint, always outside the walls, was a convenient
place of gathering. The most important fairs were those of Stourbridge, near Cambridge, for East
Anglia and the trade with Flanders,116 and of Winchester for the southern counties and the trade with
France: the former retained considerable importance down to the last century; the latter fell into decay
in the fifteenth century, so that more particular notice must be given to it in this place.117
A fair for three days, on the eastern hill outside Winchester, was granted to the bishop by William
II; his immediate successors granted extensions of time, until by a charter of Henry II it was fixed at
sixteen days, from August 31st to September 15th. On the morning of August 31st, “the justiciars of the
pavilion of the bishop” proclaimed the fair on the hilltop, then rode on horseback through the city,
receiving the keys at the gates, took possession of the weighing-machine in the wool market of the city
to prevent its being used, and then, with the mayor and bailiffs in their train, rode back to the great tent
or pavilion on the hill, where they appointed a special mayor, bailiff, and coroner to govern the city in
the bishop’s name during fair-time. The hill-top was quickly covered with streets of wooden shops: in
one the merchants from Flanders, in another those of Caen or some other Norman town, in another the
merchants from Bristol. Here were placed the goldsmiths in a row, and there the drapers; while around
the whole was a wooden palisade with guarded entrance,—precautions which did not always prevent
enterprising adventurers from escaping payment of toll by digging a way in for themselves under the
wall. On the first day also had appeared, with horses and armour, before the bishop’s juisticiars, those
tenants of the bishop who were bound so to appear by their tenure; from among them three or four were
appointed to see that the sentences of the court and the orders of the bishop’s marshal were duly
executed in the fair, in Winchester and in Southampton. All trade was compulsorily suspended at
Winchester, and within a “seven-league circuit,” guards being stationed at outlying posts, on bridges
and other places of passage, to see that the monopoly was not infringed. At Southampton, outside the
circuit, nothing was to be sold during the fair-time but victuals, and even the very craftsmen of Win-
chester were bound to transfer themselves to the hill, and there carry on their occupation during the
fair.118 There was a graduated scale of tolls and duties: all merchants of London, Winchester, or
Wallingford who entered during the first week were free from entrance tolls; after that date new comers
paid tolls, except the members of the merchant gild of Winchester.119 For weighing a bale of wool,
fourpenoe was paid as “bishop’s weighing-money,” as well as a penny from the seller and a penny from
the buyer as the weigher’s fee; and there were similar dues on other goods. In every fair there was a
court of pie-powder (of dusty feet), in which the lord’s representative decided by merchant law in all
oases of dispute that might arise, suspending for a time the ordinary jurisdiction of the town; at Win-
chester this was called the Pavilion Court. Hither the bishop’s servants brought all the weights and
measures to be tested; here the justices determined upon an assize, or fixed scale, for bread, wine, beer,
and other victuals, adjudging to the pillory any baker whose bread was found to be of defective weight;
and here, every day, disputes between merchants as to debt were decided by juries upon the production
and comparison of the notched wooden tallies.120
Similar in general character to the Winchester fair, but of less importance, were those of Boston,
S. Ives in Huntingdonshire, Stamford, and S. Edmundsbury,—all, it will be noticed, in the south-
eastern half of England. At Oxford there was S. Frideswide’s fair for seven days in July, during which
time the government of the city was in the hands of the prior.121
To escape tolls, merchants often tried to linger on after the fair was legally over. This was forbid-An Introduction to English Economic History and Theory, volume one / 59
den by a Bishop of Winchester in the first year of the fourteenth century, on pain of excommunication.
The lords of fairs themselves sometimes tried to unduly prolong their fairs, and so both injure other
lords of fairs and also defeat the royal policy of forcing trade into particular channels. Accordingly the
statute of Northampton in 1328 enacted that proclamation should be made at the beginning of each fair
how long it was going to last: if the lord permitted it to last longer than the time limited by charter, the
franchise, i.e., the right of receiving tolls, would be forfeited; and an act, somewhat later, imposed on
merchants who sold goods after the closing day a fine of double the value of the wares sold, and of this
the informer was to have a quarter.122
§13. In the history of the foreign trade of England three periods may be roughly distinguished. In
our own day it is the “world-market” to which attention is chiefly and of necessity directed. We are
accustomed to compare the amount of exports from England to all other countries with that of the
imports to England from all other countries. In an earlier period, what occupied the thoughts of mer-
chants and statesmen was rather the relation between the amount of exports to each particular country,
and of imports from that country. But, during both these periods, it has been the trade of the whole of
England that men have usually had before their eyes. There has, in fact, during both been a national
trade. But there was a yet earlier period, and it is with that we have now to do, in which there was
nothing that could be called inter-national commerce; what existed was scarcely more than a trade
between certain towns, an inter-communal or inter-municipal commerce.
To fully realize the contrast, we must endeavour to picture to ourselves the state of society in the
twelfth and thirteenth centuries. Modern towns include so many professions aud industries, so many
classes with divergent interests, yet each with some influence on the government of the town; so much
manufacture is carried on outside the limits of towns, so much trade, also, directed from outside;
moreover, the control of the central authority representing the interests of other towns and districts is so
constant and effectual, that it would be absolutely impossible nowadays for municipal authorities to
regulate the economic affairs of citizens in the exclusive interest of one class. But, as we have seen,
that was both possible and actually effected in the English towns of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries.
In each, a limited number of the inhabitants, the “burgesses” proper, held in their hands both the govern-
ment of the town and the monopoly of trade to and from it. What is true of England, is also probably
true of the whole of western Europe. But as England was industrially and commercially far behind
other lands, foreign merchants visited this country and carried on a considerable trade both of export
and import, at a time when few Englishmen ventured to cross the sea. This trade was not carried on by
isolated individuals: just as the merchants from a particular town, attending a distant fair, held together
and occupied neighbouring booths, so the merchants of a foreign town, coming to England, clung
together, and sought privileges to be enjoyed in common.
This fact also is closely connected with the character of municipal government at the time. Nowa-
days, to a merchant who goes from Manchester to reside in a foreign country, there is no particular
advantage in entering into partnership with another merchant from Manchester, rather than with one
from Rochdale; the custom-duties he will have to pay, in either case, will be the same, and in any
difficulty it will be the English consul to whom he must appeal. But in the thirteenth century the
merchants of, let us say, Amiens, residing in England, formed part of that body of burghers that gov-
erned Amiens; they were regarded as representing the interests of Amiens; their treatment depended on
particular treaties with or conditions granted to Amiens; and, in any difficulty, it was to the magistrates
of Amiens that they would look for assistance.
The towns of Flanders and northern France, and those of northern Germany and on the Rhine,
were able to carry out an arrangement for partially remedying the defects of such a system,—the plan,
namely, of a union of towns for the joint protection of their commerce; and thus arose the two Hanses,
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considered as directed towards the creation of a national trade, towards the safeguarding of the inter-
ests of France or Germany, as such; they were rather alliances of the merchant oligarchies of several
towns for their mutual advantage; and they were obstacles rather than aids to the growth of nationali-
ties.
When foreign traders arrived at an English port they found themselves face to face with a govern-
ing body of the same character as that to which they themselves belonged at home. They were not,
indeed, unwelcome; for they carried away the raw produce of the country, wool, woolfells, and leather,
which the merchants of the town had bought at fair or market; and they brought fine cloth from Flan-
ders, wine from Gascony, and other wares, which the town merchants could gain profit by retailing.
But they were regarded with constant suspicion, lest they should succeed in what, of course, they were
ever attempting, viz., in breaking down the monopoly of the English merchants themselves in the
internal trade. Hence we find them subjected to a stringent code of regulations, drawn up and enforced
by the municipal authorities. They must buy their goods only of “burgesses;” they must sell only to
“burgesses,” and that only on market days, i.e., in full publicity; they must not venture on retail trade;
they must not go inland with their goods; and, to ensure their not going beyond the limits marked out
for them, they are not to remain in this country more than forty days.
Such was the condition of things at the date of Magna Carta. Two articles of the Charter provided
that merchants should have safe passage to and from England, and should be free from exorbitant
customs. This was but a vague and indefinite promise, and by no means secured freedom of trade. For
almost a century the English burgesses were able to maintain their exclusive rights; but these rights
were opposed to the interests of the great nobles,123 who thought that by dealing directly with the
foreign merchants, and dispensing with the English middleman, they could get a better price for the
produce of their manors, as well as buy at a cheaper rate the luxuries from foreign countries. The king,
himself the greatest landowner in the country, could not fail to share these views; with the additional
stimulus to action in the knowledge that the foreign merchants were ready to pay higher duties, and so
add very considerably to his revenue, if only they were given larger opportunities for making profit
themselves.
No direct attempt was made to break down the burgher monopoly until the time of Edward I.
During the long reign of Henry III, however, with the increase of the number of foreign merchants,
especially from southern France and Italy, came a slight relaxation of the restrictions to which they
were subject. Instead of being obliged to reside in the houses of citizens, they were permitted to have
warehouses and residences of their own;124 and it became usual for the king to grant licenses to trade, or
safe-conducts, to whole towns, and not, as before, to individual merchants.
In 1237, indeed, the merchants of Amiens, Corbie, and Nesle,—three, that is to say, of the most
important towns of the Hanse of London,—were fortunate enough to secure from the merchants of
London a relaxation of their regulations, in return for a subscription of £100 “towards making the
conduit for bringing water from the spring of Tyburn,” and a promise to pay £50 three times a year,—
at the fairs of S. Ives, of Holland (i.e., S. Botolph at Boston), and of Winchester.125 Henceforth they
were allowed to carry any of their merchandise, except wine and corn, to any place they pleased in
England, to trade therewith as they thought fit; while of the merchandise disposed of within London
itself, woad, garlic, and onions could be sold to non-citizens.
The quarrel between Edward I and the burgesses of London gave the king his opportunity. For
fourteen years (1285–1298) the privileges of London were in the hands of the king, and the city was
governed by wardens of his appointment. The natural result was that both native artisans and foreign
merchants profited at the expense of their common enemy. It was, as we have seen, during this period
that the London weavers’ gild was finally successful in securing its privileges, and that the foreign
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merchant class, complained in Parliament that “whereas foreign merchants had not been wont to stay
more than forty days, during which they used to sell to natives who lived by the profit (i.e., of retailing),
now the foreigners themselves carry off that profit.”126 As soon as the Londoners regained their powers
of self-government they renewed and re-inforced the ancient restrictions. But in 1303 Edward was
ready for the great stroke, which for some time he had been preparing. In that year he granted to the
foreigners the Carta Mercatoria, wherein, in return for the payment of additional customs, he abol-
ished all the previous limitations as to the time and place of residence, and as to the persons to whom
goods might be sold; and although of the retail sale of most articles the English burgesses were still to
retain a monoply, that of spiceries and merceries,— wares of increasing importance,—was especially
permitted to the foreigners. At the same time, severe penalties were threatened against municipal au-
thorities who refused to do justice to a foreigner; and it was ordered that in such suits as might in future
arise between natives and aliens, one half of the jury should consist of merchants from the town whence
the foreigner in question came.
It is unnecessary to follow the details of the struggle which occupied the next fifty years. In 1309
the burgess members complained in Parliament that the new duties increased the prices of imported
goods: Edward II thereupon removed them for a time, to see if this really was the case; but re-imposed
them in 1310, declaring that prices had not diminished after the change. Taking advantage of the dis-
putes between the king and the barons, the burgesses secured the abolition of the new custom-dues by
the ordinances of 1311, only in order that they might immediately put into force the old restrictions as
to time of residence, etc., on the ground that on ceasing to pay the additional imposts the foreigners lost
their new liberties. Edward, victorious over the barons in 1322, restored the foreign merchants to their
former position; with the consequence that violent riots took place in London, and the houses of the
Bardi were sacked. The weak Government of the early years of Edward III was at first obliged to
restore to the towns their old privileges; but bit by bit they were gradually put aside: in 1335, foreign
merchants were again permitted to deal with any natives they pleased; in 1343 they were allowed to
stay more than forty days, on condition that in that case they should become liable to the ordinary
taxation; in 1351 they were given the right to sell by retail; and in 1353 the additional customs imposed
in 1303 were at last confirmed by act of Parliament. The sequel must be deferred till later.
It must be noticed, in order fully to understand the matter at issue, that the burgesses treated the
merchants of other English towns in much the same way as they treated foreigners. Thus we meet with
a petition from the merchants of Southampton that merchants coming to the town from Winchester or
Salisbury should be prohibited from buying from any save burgesses; and the same request was sent
from Lynn with regard to the traders of Ely and Cambridgeshire.127 Other instances of the same policy
of monopoly have been already given in describing the merchant gild. The word foreigner, indeed, is
used for any non-burgess, whether English or alien; and it is sometimes not easy to determine which is
meant. Doubtless there was always a certain feeling of national antagonism. Yet it is clear that foreign
traders were hindered and watched, not so much because they were aliens, as because they were not
burgesses of the town to which they came.
The inter-municipal character of the trading relations of the time, and the fact that the civic au-
thority treated all other towns alike, whether they were English or foreign, is illustrated by the recently
printed Calendar of Letters from the mayor and corporation of London during the years 1350–1370.
They are all directed to the magistrates of other towns, and almost all insist on the payment of debts
alleged to be owing to Londoners. The same phraseology is employed whether the letter is to the
“Mayor and Commonalty of the Town of Bristol,” or to the “Chief-Executor of the Ordinance of Jus-
tice, the Priors of the Arts, and Gonfalonier, the People and Commonalty of the City of Florence;” to
Colchester, Yarmouth, Oxford, or to Bruges, Ghent, or Pendermonde. In each case the magistrates of
the town addressed are requested to cause justice to be done, “in such manner as they would wish their62 / William J. Ashley
folk to be treated;”128 or threatened that, if the debt is not paid, reprisal will be taken upon the folk of
that town repairing to London.129
§14. It remains now only to speak of the associations formed by the foreign merchants and of the
organization which the English merchants themselves received in the first half of the fourteenth century. Of
the former, the Hanse of London and the Teutonic Hanse were by far the most important. Flanders and the
north of France were industrially far in advance both of England and of the rest of northern Europe: and the
wool, needed for their main industry, cloth-making, had always been obtained from England. For a long time
the Low Countries furnished probably by far the most considerable number of traders visiting England; and
the towns engaged in the trade are found, in the early part of the thirteenth century, united in a league, known
as the Hanse of London, for mutual help.130 But its members had other objects besides the maintenance of
freedom of trade for themselves: they rigidly excluded all artisans of their own towns from either buying the
raw material in England, or selling there the finished produce; and there are many signs that the organization
strengthened the hold of the burgesses on the government of their towns. The Hanse of London at one time
included as many as seventeen towns, among them all those in Flanders of any importance, and for a while
even Chalons, Rheims, S. Quentin, Cambray, Amiens, and Beauvois. It lingered on until the fifteenth cen-
tury, but it had long fallen into the background before the new wealth and vigour of the Teutonic Hanse.
The first German town, outside the Netherlands, to rise to commercial importance was Cologne, which
in manufactures, especially in the manufacture of cloth, was far in advance of the rest of Germany.131 As
early as 1157 we find mention, in a letter of protection, of the hanse of the men of Cologne in London.132 In
a writ of Richard I, issued at Cologne itself on his return from captivity in Austria, they were granted
permission to trade over the whole of England, especially at the fairs, and the payment of two shillings yearly
“for their guildhall in London” was for a time remitted. The merchants from all other German towns trading
in England found it desirable to join the Cologne Hanse. This arrangement did not present any difficulties so
long as the only other towns of commercial activity were those of western Germany. But early in the thir-
teenth century the towns of the Baltic, chief among them Lübeck, began to rise into eminence, owing largely
to the fact that the Baltic was at that time the only home of the herring. The efforts of Cologne to exclude
them from trade with England were fruitless: they were granted a safe conduct by Henry III in 1238; in 1267
they were permitted to form a separate Hanse. And before the end of the thirteenth century, Lübeck, which
by its alliance with Hamburg had gained the entire control of the Baltic trade, had forced Cologne into a
position of subordination, and the old Hanse of Cologne had been swallowed up in the Teutonic Hanse
under Lübeck’s presidency.133
It does not enter into our present purpose to show how from this alliance of merchants in London and
other trading centres, especially Bruges, Novgorod, and Bergen, arose an alliance of the towns from which
they came, an alliance to which the struggle against “Waldemar III of Denmark (1361–1370) gave the
character of a confederate state. We have at present only to do with the settlement in London. It is obvious
that the compact organization of the Hanseatic merchants,—the facility with which they could act, and be
treated, as a corporate body,—must have powerfully contributed to the break-down of the monopoly of the
English burgesses in the internal trade.
It is interesting to notice that the society at the Steelyard the name early given to their establishment in
London or the Thames’ side, had the characteristics as it were of a merchant gild within a fortress. None but
unmarried men could reside there. They dined together in a common hall, the masters at a high table, the
apprentices below; their dwellings, warehouses, wharves, and gardens were surrounded by a strong wall,
with gates which were closed at curfew. Every master had his own suit of armour.134 Like all other gilds, their
corporate business and funds were managed by an alderman, assistants, and a council chosen by themselves.
Like other gilds, also, each member was left free to pursue his own interests: trading was individual, not
corporate, yet within limits imposed for the common good.
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leather, tin, and lead, —was almost entirely in the hands of foreign merchants. But about that time we
begin to trace the growth of a body of English merchants exporting English products to foreign mar-
kets, and it is then that the organization known as the Staple first makes its appearance. The Staple, in
its primary meaning, was an appointed place to which all English merchants were to take their wool
and other “staple” commodities for sale. Its purpose was to bring merchants so closely together that
trade might be more easily regulated and supervised; and, especially, in order that the custom duties
might be more easily levied. The institution was due to royal policy and initiative; for a long time it was
opposed by many of the merchants. We cannot, indeed, help seeing that fiscal motives largely prompted
the various regulations;135 and that the power of removing the staple from one foreign town or state to
another was valued by the sovereigns as a useful weapon of diplomacy. Yet the difficulties in the way
of foreign trade were so great that some such system was necessary, at a time when Englishmen were
but beginning to venture on foreign trade, and were without the strength which numbers and wealth
gave to the Flemish and Hanse merchants. As late as 1363 the Commons complained of the injuries
done to English subjects in lands outside the jurisdiction of the king—injuries which he was therefore
unable to redress.136
For a century there was no fixed policy as to the town in which the staple should be placed.
Usually it was in Flanders, and then almost always at Bruges; but political considerations again and
again caused it to be removed to Brabant, especially to Antwerp. The ministers in the minority of
Edward III, doubtless under pressure from the English merchants, for a time removed all restrictions as
to place of sale; but after a few years the staple was again fixed in Flanders. For some years, from 1353
onward, the plan was tried of establishing some ten or more staple towns in England, and forcing
foreign merchants to come to England to buy, a plan to which Richard II once again resorted. The
conquest of Calais, however, furnished a place which combined the advantage of being abroad, and
therefore near the foreign market, with that of being within English territory, and there were some
obvious political reasons for favouring the new possession. Accordingly, after the staple had been
again and again placed at Calais for short periods, from the middle of the reign of Richard II it became
fixed there permanently. Whatever might be the staple town, the management of the trade was the
same. In each place there were mayors of the staple, usually two in number, nominated at first by the
king and ater elected by the merchants of the staple themselves, and there was certain number of
aldermen. It was their duty to try suits which arose between merchants, by “law merchant;” to fix prices
below which wool and other wares were not to be sold; and to see that the royal customs were duly
paid.”137
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there had been 1320 “burgenses;” at the time of the survey there were only 665 “burgenses anglici;”
some 32 “burgenses” had gone to neighbouring villages; while, on the other hand, a new borough
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of toll from all non-members selling in the market; Chron. Jocelin de Bralselond, 74; see also n. 27
below.
17. Thompson, Hist, of Leicester, 30.
18. “Es lasst sich nach germanischen Ideen keine Genossenschaft ohne genossenschaftliche
Gerichtsbarkeit denken;” Maurer, Gesch. der Stadteverfassung, ii. 389.
19. The actual terms used are morwenspeach, morgespreche, morrowspeche, marwinspeche,An Introduction to English Economic History and Theory, volume one / 65
morrowspeche. It is not certain whether these are to be interpreted as morning-speech or morrow-
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[Authorities —For mediaeval theories as to property, industry, and trade, and the duties of Christians in
relation to them, the chief authority is the Corpus Juris Canonici. Many of the rules which it contains
were expressly intended for the guidance of ecclesiastical courts; but at least an equally large part of its
contents must be regarded rather as the expression of opinion than as law which could actually be
enforced. But as all its decisions, whatever may have been their original source, were confirmed by
successive pontiffs, they could not fail to influence the more conscientious clergy in their treatment of
social questions, especially in the pulpit and confessional. Of the Canon Law the first and most impor-
tant half was made up of the Decretum of Gratian, a monk of Bologna, who, inspired by the revived
study of the civil jurisprudence, aimed at putting together a body of ecclesiastical law derived from the
writings of the Fathers, canons of councils, Frankish capitularies, papal letters or decretals, and
penitentials, which should bear the same relation to ecclesiastical jurisprudence aa the codification of
Justinian to secular jurisprudence. His work, composed about the middle of the twelfth century, con-
tained no papal decisions later than 1139. Accordingly Gregory IX issued, in 1231, a compilation from
subsequent decisions, known as the Decretals of Gregory IX; Boniface VIII added to these, in 1298, the
Liber Sextus; and John XXII, in 1317, the Clementinae. During the fifteenth century, collections of
decretals omitted from the Clementinae or issued later, were made by canonists; and two such, the
Extravagantes Joannis XXII and the Extravagantes Communes, were admitted to equal authority with
the earlier works, by being published with them by Gregory XIII in 1582. For a more detailed account
of the Canon Law, see the article under that title in the Encyclopaedia Britannica, vol. v., and as to the
extent to which the Canon Law was received in England, see two lectures in Stubbs, Lectures on
Medieval and Modern History (1886), and the criticism of them in the Dublin Review, October, 1887.
The best modern works on the economic doctrines of the Canon Law are those of W. Endemann,
Die Nationalökonomischen Grundsätze der Canonistischen Lehre, published in Hildebrand’s Jahrbücher
für Nationalökonomie, vol. i., and afterwards separately (1863), and Studien in der Romanitch-
cananistischen Wirthschafts und Sechtslehre (vol. i., 1874; vol. ii., 1883). Invaluable for their learning
and completeness, the usefulness of these works is lessened by the slight attention which the author72 / William J. Ashley
pays to the historical development of the teaching he is criticizing. He is too much inclined to systema-
tize, and follows too closely the canonists of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, especially Scaccia,
in the reasons they assign to, and the deductions they draw from, the simple prescriptions of the early
Canon Law. W. Boscher has a very brief but admirable section on the Canon Law in the introduction to
his Geschichte der Nationalökonomik in Deutschland (1874). Mr. Cunningham is the only English
writer who has called attention to the true character and significance of mediaeval economic ideas, —
in his English Industry and Commerce (1882), §§ 36, 43, 45, and Politics and Economics (1885), ch. 2;
and, still better, with especial regard to Usury, in a paper, City Opinion on Banking in the Fourteenth to
the Seventeenth Centuries, in the Journal of the Institute of Bankers, February, 1887. His Christian
Opinion on Usury (1884) is unfortunately out of print. But long before other writers had touched the
subject, Karl Knies, in the half-dozen pages devoted to the subject in his Politische Œkonomie vom
Standpuncte der Geschichtlichen Methode (1853), had gone to the root of the matter, and shown the
relative justification of what had hitherto been ascribed merely to “ignorance of Political Economy”
(pp. 115–120 of the new edition, 1883, under the title P. E. vom Gesehichtlichen Standpuncte). The
teaching of Aquinas has been commented on by several modern writers, especially by Contzen; but it
can be more clearly understood from the Summa Theologica itself, under Quaestiones, lxxvii, lxxviii,
in the second division of the second part. Some useful historical information on Usury is given by
Boscher in the notes to his Political Economy, bk. iii, ch. iv., §§ 190, 191 (trans. Lalor, Chicago, 1878;
ii., p. 128).
There is no good account of early legislation on economic matters: the enactments themselves are
all printed in the first volume of the Statutes of the Realm, and with them must be compared the
municipal regulations in the Munimenta Gildhallae, ed. Riley; and the ordinances of the crafts, there
and in Riley’s Memorials of London. For the history of royal policy with regard to the currency, see
Keary, Introd. to Catalogue of Eng. Coins in Brit. Mus., I. (1887), and Ruding, Annals of the Coinage
(3rd edit., 1840), and for foreign trade, Hubert Hall, The Customs Revenue of England (1885). Most of
the authorities referred to in the previous chapter are also useful here.]
§15. The social development with which hitherto we have been dealing may, in a sense, be called
spontaneous; we have now to see how the forces of Church and State took hold of the growing society,
and attempted to control its activity. The nature of this attempt, however, can only be understood when
we have examined the ideas by which it was prompted.
The teaching of the Gospel as to worldly goods had been unmistakable. It had repeatedly warned
men against the pursuit of wealth, which would alienate them from the service of God and choke the
good seed. It had in one striking instance associated spiritual perfection with the selling of all that a
man had that he might give it to the poor. It had declared the poor and hungry blessed, and had proph-
esied woes to the rich. Instead of anxious thought for the food and raiment of the morrow, it had taught
trust in God; instead of selfish appropriation of whatever a man could obtain, a charity which gave
freely to all who asked. And in the members of the earliest Christian Church it presented an example of
men who gave up their individual possessions, and had all things in common.1
We cannot wonder that, with such lessons before them, a salutary reaction from the self-seeking
of the pagan world should have led the early Christian Fathers to totally condemn the pursuit of gain. It
took them further—to the denial to the individual of the right to do what he liked with his own, even to
enjoy in luxury the wealth he possessed. “What injustice is there in my diligently preserving my own,
so long as I do not invade the property of another?” “Shameless saying!” says S. Ambrose. “My own,
sayest thou? what is it? from what secret places hast thou brought it into this world? When thou enterest
into the light, when thou earnest from thy mother’s womb, what wealth didst thou bring with thee?...
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unjust, in not distributing to us the means of life equally, so that thou shouldst have abundance while
others are in want? Or is it not rather that He wished to confer upon thee marks of His kindness, while
He crowned thy fellow with the virtue of patience. Thou, then, who hast received the gift of God,
thinkest thou thou committest no injustice by keeping to thyself alone what would be the means of life
to many?... It is the bread of the hungry thou keepest, it is the clothing of the naked thou lockest up; the
money thou buriest is the redemption of the wretched.”2
The highest moral and legal philosophy of the ancient world strengthened this purely religious
feeling, by bringing to its aid the doctrine of a “law of nature.” Sir Henry Maine has shown how this
conception had arisen, and how it had influenced Roman law; he has pointed out how that, in spite of
its profound influence on men’s minds, jurisconsults were by no means agreed, either as to whether
there ever had been a state of nature in the past, or as to the precise tests by which to distinguish those
institutions in the present which accorded with natural law. But there were two principles on which
they were all agreed, and which they succeeded in impressing upon the minds of educated men: first,
that the characteristics of nature were simplicity and similarity; and secondly, as the main consequence
of this, that all men were by nature equal.3 Christian writers and preachers drew from these principles
a conclusion which the lawyers seem to have carefully avoided,—the conclusion that private property
was contrary to nature. Hence it was that, while the ecclesiastical law of the later Middle Ages, the
Corpus Juris Canonici, began by distinguishing natural law from civil law in almost the very words of
Justinian’s Institutes, it went on to add to marriage and the nurture of children, which are the only
definite examples of natural law there given, community of goods, and personal liberty.4 “The use of all
that is in the world,” says Clement,” ought to be common to all men. But by injustice one man has
called this his own, another that, and thus has come division among mortals.”5
This view as to the origin of property gave Christian moralists a philosophical basis for their
teaching. To seek to enrich one’s-self was not simply, they could argue, to incur spiritual risk to one’s
own soul; it was in itself unjust, since it aimed at appropriating an unfair share of what God had
intended for the common use of men. If a man possessed more than he needed, he was bound to give
his superfluity to the poor; for by natural law he had no personal right to it; he was only a steward for
God. And with Christian teachers such injunctions were no longer mere philosophical deductions: they
came with all the weight of practical precepts, pointing to duties to be observed and sins to be avoided
on pain of punishment in another world.6
If, however, to seek to enrich one’s-self was sinful, was trade itself justifiable? This was a ques-
tion which troubled many consciences during the Middle Ages. On the one hand the benefits which
trade conferred on society could not be altogether overlooked, nor the fact that with many traders the
object was only to obtain what sufficed for their own maintenance. On the other hand they saw that
trade was usually carried on by men who had enough already, and whose chief object was their own
gain: “If covetousness is removed,” argues Tertullian, “there is no reason for gain, and, if there is no
reason for gain, there is no need of trade.”7 Moreover, as the trader did not seem himself to add to the
value of his wares, if he gained more for them than he had paid, his gain, said S. Jerome, must be
another’s loss; and, in any case, trade was dangerous to the soul, since it was scarcely possible for a
merchant not sometimes to act deceitfully.8
To all these reasons was added, by many of the more saintly churchmen, yet another, which, had
it been listened to, would have put an end to secular activity altogether. The thought of the supreme
importance of saving the individual soul, and of communion with God, drove thousands into the her-
mit life of the wilderness, or into monasteries; and it led even such a man as Augustine to say that
“business” was in itself an evil, for “it turns men from seeking true rest, which is God.”9 It needed no
little courage for more sober churchmen, such as Leo the Great, to reply that it is the way in which a
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well as dishonourable.10 Yet there were valid reasons for treating clergy and laity differently; and ac-
cordingly ecclesiastical legislation early prohibited the clergy from engaging in trade; if they must
needs turn their attention from divine duties in order to provide food and clothing for themselves, it
should be to agriculture or handicraft; in these, at any rate, they would produce some useful thing, and
they would be free from the temptations which commerce would put in their way.11
Such was the general character of the teaching of the Church on economic matters during the early
Middle Ages. It would be unprofitable here to consider how far such teaching might be beneficial or
hurtful under modern circumstances; nor, since we are now dealing only with the social history of the
eleventh and succeeding centuries, need we consider whether it was altogether justified in the age
when it was first urged upon men’s consciences. Certainly the condition of western Europe long after
the establishment of the Teutonic kingdoms was such that it could do but little harm, and probably did
great good. It could do little harm, because there was scarcely any commerce, and such commerce as
there was was directed to the supply of articles of luxury for princes and nobles. The condemnation of
trade therefore, if indeed the clergy continued to repeat it, might weigh hardly upon individuals, but did
not impede any useful circulation of goods. And by stimulating the clergy to rebuke the greed and
violence of the powerful, by creating a public opinion on the side of contentment and charity, the
teaching of the Church on worldly goods could not fail to be beneficial.12
In the eleventh century began a great moving of the stagnant waters. The growth of towns, the
formation of merchant bodies, the establishment of markets,—even if they did no more than furnish
the peasant and the lord of the manor with a demand for their surplus produce, brought men face to face
with one another as buyer and seller in a way they had not been before. But they did more; they
prepared the way for the growth of a new class, a class of craftsmen, who could exist only on condition
that they were able to sell their manufactures. At the same time, new needs for money appeared both in
the crusades and in the passion for church-building, which the religious revival of the tenth century
brought with it. Hence economic questions, especially such as concerned the relations of seller and
buyer, of creditor and debtor, became of the first importance.
To deal with these new questions a new jurisprudence presented itself,—the jurisprudence based
on the revived study of Roman law, which can be traced in Italy towards the end of the eleventh
century, and which found a centre for itself in Bologna. The teaching of the founder of the Bolognese
school of “glossators,” Irnerius, and of his successors “the four doctors,” attracted crowds of pupils;
knowledge of Eoman law became so profitable that the study of theology was almost abandoned, and
council after council in the twelfth century had to prohibit the study of secular law to the clergy.13 Now,
the Eoman law, in the finished form in which the codification of Justinian presented it, rested on a
theory of absolute individual property which was entirely alien to the usages of early Teutonic peoples,
among whom community of ownership, or at any rate community in use, was still a prevalent custom;
and it recognized an unlimited freedom of contract, which may have been suitable to the active com-
merce of the Mediterranean, but was sure to be the instrument of injustice when appealed to in the
midst of more primitive social conditions.14
These considerations are scarcely weakened, in the case of England, by the customary statement
that Roman law was never recognized in this country. If not actually quoted from the bench, it was
always in the minds of lawyers for guidance or comparison. Stephen’s order did not succeed in putting
an end to the study of civil law which Vacarius introduced at Oxford.15 The writers of text-books, such
as Bracton, made large use of the civil law, and the judges of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, there
can be little doubt, frequently consulted it for principles to guide their decisions.16 Maritime law also
was, as we know, largely borrowed from the Roman jurisprudence; and this was so intimately bound up
with the interests of the mercantile community that we cannot suppose other questions arising from
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With these new dangers before them, churchmen began once more to turn their attention to eco-
nomic matters, and to meet what they regarded as the evil tendencies of the Roman law, “the principle
of the world,” by a fresh application of Christian principles. On two doctrines especially did they
insist,—that wares should be sold at a just price, and that the taking of interest was sinful. They en-
forced them from the pulpit, in the confessional, in the ecclesiastical courts; and we shall find that by
the time that the period begins of legislative activity on the part of the secular power, these two rules
had been so impressed on the consciences of men that Parliament, municipality, and gild endeavoured
of their own motion to secure obedience to them.
§16. What Christian morality, as represented by its highest teachers, aimed at was not merely the
prevention of obvious injustice or deceit, but the fulfilment of the law of Christ, “Whatsoever ye would
that men should do unto you, do ye also unto them.”17 In nothing was the contrast between this precept
and the conduct sanctioned by the civil law more evident than in purchase and sale. Was a man to be
satisfied with his conduct, if, in selling an article, he got the highest price a purchaser was willing to
pay, so long only as he did not fraudulently mislead him as to the character of the ware; or was he to aim
at some standard of fair price, such as he himself would be willing to abide by if he were himself a
purchaser? The principle recognized by the Roman law had been that price was entirely a matter to be
determined by free contract. It left the two contracting parties entirely free to agree upon a price at their
own risk, subject only to the limitation that the seller was bound to reveal faults interfering with the
proper enjoyment of the thing sold. This was stated very clearly by the legist Paulus, early in the third
century: “In buying and selling, a man has a natural right to purchase for a small price that which is
really more valuable, and to sell at a high price that which is less valuable, and each may seek to
overreach the other.” The last clause but echoes the dictum of Pomponius, a legist of the previous
century: “In purchase and sale it is naturally allowed to the contracting parties to try to overreach one
another.”
Both these utterances were quoted as authoritative in Justinian’s digest.18 And it is very noticeable
that the one limitation admitted by Roman law to the application of this principle, a limitation intro-
duced by a rescript of Diocletian, aimed only at protecting the seller. It was enacted that when a thing
was sold for lees than half its value, the seller could recover the property unless the buyer chose to
make up the price to the full amount. It was, indeed, contended by many later jurists that this applied
only to land, because the instance actually given in the rescript is a farm; and it seems probable that it
was intended to meet a special need, to remedy injustice caused by forced sale.19 It is referred to by the
Fathers as showing that even the civil law limited freedom of contract in an extreme case; but this
scarcely weakened the impression which the civil law produced, that buyer and seller were free to
make what bargain they could. Against this the Church held out the opposite ideal, that of “a just price”
unaffected by the temporary caprice or need of either party. The phrase itself seems to occur first in S.
Augustine of Hippo, and he illustrates it by what to us to-day may seem an extreme example: “I know
a man who, when a manuscript was offered him for purchase, and he saw that the vendor was ignorant
of its value, gave the man the just price though he did not expect it.”20
We shall understand better how the doctrine was taken hold of and developed by the theologians
and canonists of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, if, instead of attempting to draw out from their
writings a number of abstract propositions, we try to follow the argument of the greatest of all the
mediaeval schoolmen, S. Thomas Aquinas; who, in this, as in all the speculation of his time, both,
summed up the teaching of his predecessors, and gave a foundation for subsequent construction. There
is, indeed, no reason to suppose that Aquinas took any special interest in the economic side of life. His
reason for dealing with it evidently was that his object and method was encyclopaedic, aiming at
surveying the whole field of thought. But it is worth while noticing both how wide his experience had
been and how great his reputation soon became. Born about 1225, of a noble family in the kingdom of76 / William J. Ashley
Naples, he became, when a mere boy, a member of the preaching order of Dominicans, studied at
Cologne and Paris, for many years taught at Paris, taking his share in the struggle between the Univer-
sity and the Friars, and finally returned to Italy, to work for eight years at his encyclopaedia, the Summa
Theologica, and to die in 1274. Even before his death he had been recognized as the greatest of theo-
logical teachers; and he soon came to be regarded as the typical representative of theology, of intellect
applied to the service of Christian truth. His position in mediaeval thought is illustrated by the well-
known picture, ascribed to Taddeo Gaddi, in the church of S. Maria Novella, in Florence: there the
grave square-browed figure of Aquinas is high and lifted up upon a throne; supporting him on either
side are the sacred and profane sciences, each with its best representative among men; while beneath
his footstool are the arch-heretics, Arius, Sabellius, Averrhoes.
Aquinas had been discussing the intellectual and moral virtues: he had come to justice, which he
defines as “the perpetual and constant will of giving to every one that which is his right;” and this
brings him to the subject of trade. And the first question he puts is, whether it is allowable to sell a
thing for more than it it worth. His method usually is first to give the arguments against the proposition
that he intends himself to prove; then some crushing dictum against these arguments, from the Bible, or
out of the Fathers; then the conclusion of the writer, with the reasons by which he supports it; and then
a careful disproof, one after the other, of the arguments which he had begun by quoting. And so here he
begins by stating various reasons which might be alleged for supposing that a man can rightfully sell a
thing for more than it is worth. In the first place, “justice” is that which is according to the civil law; and
the civil law permits buyer and seller to try to outwit one another.21 The authority of the Roman law, we
see, is put in the forefront of the argument. The next argument is also one that might be expected from
a lawyer: it rests on an appeal to “nature:” every one wishes to buy cheap and sell dear; but what is
common to all must be natural, and what is natural cannot be a sin. The third reason assigned is sophis-
tical: if you accept a gift from a friend and feel bound to give something in return, what you give should
be in proportion to the benefit you have received, which is sometimes greater than the intrinsic worth
of the gift itself; and if you can thus in friendship give more for a thing than it is worth, surely you can
by a contract of sale.
But all these arguments are clearly opposed to the words of the gospel: “Whatsoever ye would that
men should do unto you, do ye also unto them.” For no one likes to pay more for a thing than it is worth,
therefore no one ought to take more for a thing than it is worth. Aquinas’s own decision is that to buy
a thing for less or sell a thing for more than its value is, in itself, unallowable and unjust, though special
circumstances may sometimes make it permissible. His reason both for the decision and the exception
he thus states. We may put on one side cases in which there is positive deception: they are clearly
sinful. But the very institution of selling and buying wares must have been introduced for the common
advantage of mankind. If that is so, it ought to be for the equal advantage of both parties. And this can
only be, if each gets an equal value. And they do not get an equal value if the price one obtains is really
more than the article sold is worth.
But suppose one man wants a thing greatly, but its possessor will suffer by giving it up, a price
may justly be arranged above the real value so as to compensate for the hurt. If, on the other hand, the
seller incurs no special hurt, but the buyer will suffer if he goes without it, the seller has no right to
charge more highly for it on that account; the hurt is not his to reckon for. The buyer under these
circumstances may, indeed, from good feeling give something over and above the value, but this is to
be decided by his own free will. Then Aquinas turns back and answers the arguments which he began
by quoting. First, as to that based on the Roman law. Human law cannot prohibit all that is against
virtue, it can only prohibit what would break up society. Other wrong acts it treats as quasi-lawful, in
the sense that, while not approving them, it does not punish them. But Divine law leaves nothing
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denying that a vice is made less a vice by being common to all: “common,” that is to say, “to all who go
along the broad road.” And here he quotes what Augustine says of “just” price. As to the third, commer-
cial justice is a different thing from friendship—in the former it is equality in the thing itself that is
required, in the latter equality in the advantage each obtains: an answer which is as sophistical as the
argument it meets.22
Thus, then, Aquinas meets arguments derived from the civil law or from a supposed “nature,” by
the gospel precept, which he confirms by an argument based on the common weal and the equal rights
of every man. And throughout he assumes that everything has one definite “just price,” or “what it is
worth,” and that this can be pretty accurately ascertained.
Such a treatment of the subject is sure to seem irritatingly vague and unsatisfactory to one who
approaches it with his mind filled with recent discussions on Value. Modern economists, beginning
with a definition of the subject-matter of their science, wealth, as that which has exchange value, have
believed themselves bound to enter into metaphysical and philological disquisitions as to what value
really is, and the laws by which it is determined. Forty years ago they seemed to have come to the end
of their task, and J. S. Mill declared that “there is nothing in the laws of value for any future wiiter to
clear up.” But the last twenty years, especially since the publication, in 1871, of Jevons’ Theory of
Political Economy, have seen a renewal of the discussion; and now one of the most learned and mod-
erate of recent writers is obliged to confess that “the opinion that the doctrine of value is, as it were, the
sure stronghold of certain truth, lifting Economics as an exact science above the changing rules of
human conduct, and making a clear distinction between Economics and Ethics, is simply a huge mis-
take.” The modern reader of Aquinas asks himself what relation this “valet” of the great schoolman, or
the “justum pretium” of Augustine, can bear to such distinctions as those between “value in use” and
“value in exchange,” between “market value” and “normal value,” between “total utility” and “final
utility.” Yet their meaning is clearly enough understood when we picture to ourselves the circum-
stances of the time, and compare them with those of our own day. The modern “consumer” usually
buys what he wants at a shop, i.e., of a middleman who stands between him and the actual producer;
usually, indeed, there are two or three such middlemen between the makers and the users. The wares
mostly come from a distance: the buyer has scarcely any idea of the original cost of the materials, or the
condition of the workmen. Into the manufacture of most articles, again, enters a very considerable
division of labour; so that it is becoming increasingly difficult to estimate how much recompense is
due to each sort of labour,—a difficulty enormously increased by the number of different qualities of
the same kind of goods, and the frequent changes of fashion. But in the thirteenth century the great
majority of articles in the daily use of the mass of the people were bought by the consumer from the
actual maker. If the making of an article was divided between several crafts, as e.g., that of cloth
between weavers, fullers, and dyers, each of these groups of craftsmen lived within a narrow circuit,
and under the eyes of most of those who ultimately bought their manufactures. If price, therefore, was
to be determined by the rule of doing to others as we would wish that others should do to us, then the
maker should receive what would fairly recompense him for his labour; not what would enable him to
make gain, but what would permit him to live a decent life according to the standard of comfort which
public opinion recognized as appropriate to his class.
It has been well said that what mediaeval moralists aimed at was that price should be determined
by the permanent cost of production. But here we must distinguish between the sense such a phrase
bears in our own time, and the sense that must be attached to it in applying it to the earlier period. It has
been the doctrine of orthodox English economists that normal value, or price (i.e., value expressed in
terms of one particular commodity, gold, when the value of the latter itself does not fluctuate), is, in the
case of the vast majority of articles, determined by cost of production.23 So that it might seem that the
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bring about the result which the moralists and statesmen of the Middle Ages sought to effect by teach-
ing and legislation. But let us consider what the modern economist understands by the phrase. “The
term cost of production includes not simply the cost of material and the wages of labour, but also the
ordinary profit upon the capital employed.”24 To take the last element first; the presence of that by itself
makes “cost of production” now a different thing. Capital now plays a part in production almost as
great as labour itself, and public opinion recognizes its right to a separate reward, even when there is
absolutely no personal exertion or personal risk. But, as has been shown, in the period of which we
have been treating, capital was only beginning to come into existence. In agriculture and industry it
scarcely appeared at all; skill was far more important. And even if capital had been able to play a larger
part in industry, moralists and public opinion denied that it had a right to reward.
The contrast as to wages is almost as great. Doubtless the yardlings and cotters and craftsmen
sometimes suffered from famines; doubtless their surroundings were often unsanitary. Still there was a
standard of comfort which general opinion recognized as suitable for them, and which prices weie
regulated to maintain. But now we are content that wages should be determined by the standard of
comfort which a class can manage to maintain, left to itself, or, rather, exposed to the competition of
machinery and immigrant foreign labour.
The fundamental difference between the mediaeval and modern point of view lies deeper than
this. It is that, with us, value is something entirely subjective; it is what each individual cares to give for
a thing. With Aquinas it was something objective; something outside the will of the individual pur-
chaser or seller; something attached to the thing itself, existing whether he liked it or not, and that he
ought to recognize.25 And as experience showed that individuals could not be trusted thus to admit the
real values of things, it followed that it was the duty of the proper authorities of State, town, or gild to
step in and determine what the just and reasonable price really was.
Aquinas then turns to the question, whether a tale it made unlawful by a defect in the article sold,
meaning, it is clear from the context, when the article is not of the substance, quantity, or quality it
professes to be.26 There are three reasons for supposing it is not made unlawful: first, if an article serves
all the human wants that it could serve if made of the proper substance, it is not unfair to sell it, e.g.,
alchemic gold for real gold (or, as we might now say, Aluminium or “Abyssinian gold” for real gold);
secondly, as to measures, they differ from place to place, and as insufficient measures cannot always be
avoided, they are not wrong,—a mere sophism; thirdly, as to quality, great knowledge is required to tell
the true qualities of things, and many dealers are without such knowledge.
Against all these is the saying of Ambrose: “It is a manifest rule of justice that to deviate from the
truth, to cause any one unfair injury, or to be in any way guilty of deceit, does not become a good man.”
Hence the conclusion of Aquinas: to sell or buy one thing for another, without observing due quality
and measure, is unlawful.
There are three sorts of defect. As to defect in substance, if the vendor is aware of it when he sells,
he commits a fraud, and so acts wrongfully. So also as to measures; he who wittingly uses a defective
measure, acts fraudulently, and therefore wrongfully. As to quality likewise; a man selling a broken-
down hack as a sound horse, if he does it wittingly, is guilty of fraud. In all such cases, the seller is
bound to make restitution. If the defects were present without his knowing it, the seller has not indeed
committed sin, but is equally bound to restitution. And the same is true if a buyer has got a thing too
cheaply, owing to the ignorance of the seller.
And now as to the three arguments. That based on alchemic gold is worthless; for gold is es-
teemed, not only for its material uses, but also for the dignity and purity of its substance and for its
medicinal properties. If alchemy could make real gold, it would not be wrong to sell it as gold. As to the
diversity of measures, this must indeed be the case from place to place, because where things are to be
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of every place to appoint fitting measures, having regard to the circumstances. And only measures thus
instituted by public authority or custom ought to be used.27 And as to quality, what has to be considered
is the use a thing is to be put to, and this depends on qualities which seller and buyer can easily learn.
Thus in all these cases Aquinas takes us back to the question whether the vender knowingly sells
a thing not of the quality or measure that the buyer thinks it to be. If so, he is guilty of fraud and
therefore of sin, which Divine law will prohibit even if human law does not.
Aquinas next considers a question of even greater practical importance: Is the seller bound to
reveal a fault in an article? The reasons assigned for thinking that he is not, are four in number. First,
the purchaser is not compelled to buy; it is left wholly to his judgment; and, if he is mistaken in his
judgment, that is no fault of the seller.29 Secondly, it would be foolish to act in such a way as to prevent
your carrying on your business, and this would be the result of revealing faults in goods for sale.
Thirdly, to know the way of virtue is much more important for a man than to know the qualities of
goods. But you are not bound to give every one moral advice, therefore you are not bound to advise
every one in their purchases. Finally, the only reason for revealing faults in articles is that their price
may be lowered. But price would often be lowered if you told other things besides these; for instance,
if you came with a supply of wheat to a market in which corn was scarce, but knew that many other
supplies were being brought up behind you, you would get less for your own wheat if you revealed that
fact. But you are not supposed to be bound to reveal such a fact; whence it follows that you likewise
ought not to be bound to reveal defects.
But against all this is the saying of S. Ambrose: “Faults in sale are bound to be revealed.” Aquinas’s
conclusion is worded with more moderation; a seller may sometimes justly, to avoid injuring himself,
keep silence about the secret faults of an Article, provided that such concealment does not turn to the
loss or peril of the purchaser.
It is always wrong, he argues, to cause peril or loss to any one, and this is what you do if you sell
faulty articles without warning: causing loss, if the thing, on account of the defect, is really worth less,
and the price is not proportionally reduced; peril, if the use of the thing is thereby rendered danger-
ous—e.g., if a lame horse is sold as a safe one, a tottering house as a solid one, bad meat as good. And
if the defects are not revealed, the seller acts fraudulently, and is bound to pay compensation. But if the
fault is obvious, e.g., a one-eyed horse; or if the article does not suit the seller but may suit somebody
else; and provided that the price is proportionally lessened, the seller is not bound to speak about the
fault, for if he does the buyer may perhaps want to have the price reduced more than would be fair.29
And as to the arguments on the other side. First, judgment can only be exercised upon what is
clearly before one, so that if a fault is hidden, the matter is not altogether left to the purchaser’s judg-
ment.30 Secondly, you need not send the town crier round to proclaim the fault, for that might drive
away persons to whom the article would be serviceable; but you must tell any individual who offers to
buy, that he may compare the good and bad qualities of the article. Thirdly, though you are not bound to
tell the truth on every subject to every person, yet you are bound to tell it when your own act may result
in injury to some one. The fourth argument ought to give Aquinas more difficulty, for it would seem, on
the principles of Christian morality, that a corn-dealer was really bound to tell would-be purchasers
that other dealers were on the road. Aquinas, however, makes a concession to the growing commercial
spirit of the time, and allows that such a dealer would not be doing wrong by keeping silent, though to
reveal the future supply or sell his own corn at a less price, in consequence, would show more abundant
virtue. Accordingly he has rather lamely to argue that the cases are not parallel,—that the value of the
corn will only be lessened by the arrival of the other supplies, while the faulty article is already of less
value owing to the fault.31
It will be noticed with what moderation Aquinas states his position. A man is not knowingly to
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purpose, it may be for another. We have an amusing instance in the next century in London, showing
how regard was actually paid to considerations of this kind. In 1378, a certain tanner was brought up
before the mayor by the overseers of the cordwainers’ craft, for exposing “false” hides for sale. The
tanner maintained that though these hides were not good for cordwainers, they were good for other
craftsmen. Whereupon a jury was formed, consisting of two saddlers, one pouchmaker, one girdler,
two leather bottle makers, two tanners, two curriers, and two cordwainers, “who declared upon oath all
the said hides to be raw, and in their then state to be of no service to any trade,” and accordingly they
were forfeited.32 Clearly the tanner would have escaped if he could have proved his hides good for
anything at all.
The three previous questions have concerned the relations of agriculturists and of master-crafts-
men to the public: Aquinas has left to the last the question most difficult for him to answer, that of the
relation of the non-manufacturing merchant to the public. As we have seen, the earlier Christian mor-
alists had often spoken as if a merchant’s profession were in itself a sinful one. But Aquinas clearly sets
out upon the discussion Is it right in trade to buy cheap and sell dear? with the intention of answering
the query in the affirmative, though with very important limitations. There are three arguments for the
sinfulness of trade. First, it must be sinful, because Chrysostom says “he who buys a thing in order to
sell it, unaltered, for gain, is the merchant driven from the Temple.” Secondly, it has already been
proved that it is wrong to sell a thing for more or buy it for less than it is worth; but he who buys cheap
and sells dear must do one or the other. Thirdly, Jerome tells us to “flee as from a pestilence from the
priest who is a merchant and out of poverty becomes rich,” and what is wrong for the clergy, cannot be
right for the laity.
But Augustine tells us that though the covetous tradesman curses at a loss and lies about prices,
these are vices of the man and not of the occupation, which may be carried on without them. Aquinas’s
own decision is that it is permissible to trade in order to obtain the necessaries of life; but to trade for
the sake of gain is in itself base,33 unless the gain is for some honourable purpose.
Aristotle, he says, distinguishes between two kinds of exchange. There is, first, the natural ex-
change, where one thing is exchanged for another, or wares for money, on account of necessity; but this
sort of exchange is rather that of housekeepers or of statesmen, who have to provide necessaries for a
family or a State. And there is the second sort of exchange, where money is given for money or goods
for money, for the sake of gain. Such trade is in itself base, for it is the servant of lust for gain, which
knows no limit.” So that trade in itself is base, in so far as it implies no necessary or honourable end.
Yet gain, the object of trade, is not in itself, contrary to virtue (meaning that gain is not wrong, only the
measureless desire for gain). And as there is nothing to prevent gain being devoted to some necessary
or even honourable object, this would make trade lawful; as, for instance, when a man seeks in trade a
moderate gain for the maintenance of his family or the relief of the poor; still more when trade is
carried on for the public good, that a country may not be without the necessaries of life, and the mer-
chant looks upon the gain, not as the object, but as the reward of his labour.”35
Aquinas has accordingly no difficulty as to the saying of Chrysostom. Trade is indeed sinful, he
says, when gain itself is the ultimate object, still more when the article is sold unchanged for a higher
price. If the article is improved in the meanwhile, the gain is but reward for the additional labour; and
even gain may be lawfully aimed at when it is for some necessary or honourable purpose. He meets the
second objection by drawing a distinction between buying cheap merely in order to sell dear, and
buying cheap and then for some other reason selling dear. This latter may justly happen when the
article has been improved meanwhile; or in cases where the price at some other place or time happens
to be different; or because of the danger incurred in transferring the article from one place to another.
Elsewhere Aquinas distinctly recognizes a right to a higher price on account of the labour of bringing
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sinful, for the clergy ought to avoid what has even the appearance of evil.
We are now in a position to look at the teaching of Aquinas as a whole. He clearly considers that
in any particular country or district there is for every article, at any particular time, some one just price:
that prices, accordingly, should not vary with momentary36 supply and demand, with individual ca-
price, or skill in the chaffering of the market. It is the moral duty of buyer and seller to try to arrive, as
nearly as possible, at this just price. Moreover, there are for all articles proper measures and qualities,
and these also must be secured; and if the wares have any flaws or defects, it is the duty of the vendor
to state them.
As to trade, though he hesitates at the exact point at which the line is to be drawn, he clearly would
draw a line between licit and illicit. The distinction is rather one depending on the motive of the trader:
if he aims not so much at gain, as at supplying himself and his family, or, through himself, the poor,
with the necessaries of life; or if he imports into his country goods of which it has a real need, and,
while he accepts what gain he can get as a reward, is not bent merely on making gain; then this is trade
that is worthy of approbation. But if it is just the desire for gain that impels a man, such trade is mean,
base. And, what is still more important, Aquinas absolutely condemns all merely speculative trading,
all attempt to make gain by a skilful use of market changes. He does not indeed tell us how the just
price of an article brought by a trader to a distant maiket is to be determined; but it seems to follow
from what he says of the sort of trading that is justifiable, that he would deem it to be such as would
cover the just price paid for it by the merchant himself, together with such gain as would secure for the
merchant what public opinion regarded as the necessaries of life for a man of his class.
The only form of state action that Aquinas himself distinctly recommends is the regulation of
weights and measures. But the inevitable result of such teaching as to what was sinful and what not in
the economic sphere would be an attempt on the part of the authorities of State, municipality, and gild
first to correct particular evils, and then, as the number of evils to be corrected increased, to control
industry and trade in every direction. For it was not until comparatively recent times that either public
opinion or legislative theory drew the distinction between law and morality. Whatever was wrong, men
thought might fitly be forbidden under penalty. There were disputes as to the proper limits between the
authority of the two great powers, spiritual and temporal; there were diverse theories as to what consti-
tuted the supreme temporal authority in a State; and there were conflicts between the various organs of
the State, as, for instance, between the central authorities and municipalities. But there was nothing
like the modern feeling that certain sorts of actions are matters entirely for the individual conscience,
and not rightly to be “interfered with from outside.”
§17. The teaching of the Church on the subject of usury, i.e., the taking of any payment for a loan
of money, was due, even more directly than the doctrine of just price, to the lessons of the Gospel. It
began with the very natural attempt to enforce the precept, “Lend, hoping for nothing again,”37 as part
of the duty of brotherly love among Christians; and as having the force of a Divine command, and
therefore to be obeyed, even had the precept not appealed, as to most of the Fathers it seemed to do,
directly to the conscience. At first the prohibition of lending money for gain was a disciplinary regula-
tion binding only on the clergy; the Council of Nicaea, in 325, forbade the clergy to take usury on pain
of degradation from their clerical office, and the duty of abstaining from such base gain was repeatedly
insisted upon by the decrees of synods and in the wiitings of the Fathers. The prohibition was extended
to the laity in western Europe by the capitularies of Charles the Great, and the councils of the ninth
century.38 But for some time after this the subject is very little noticed in contemporary records; prob-
ably because cases in which individuals had command of large sums of money were so rare, and the
influence of the Church was so considerable, that instances in which payment was obtained for loans
very seldom occurred.
We cannot fail to connect the renewed attention given by churchmen to the sin of usury, from the82 / William J. Ashley
twelfth century onward, with the revived study of Roman law in the West. No legislator or judge could
remain ignorant that the code which men looked on as the highest embodiment of human wisdom and
statecraft distinctly permitted loans for gain, and provided means for enforcing the payment of usury as
well as capital.39 The greatest of the “glossators,” Accursius of Bologna (1182–1260), entirely ignored
the Canon Law in his interpretation of the section of Justinian’s code concerning usury; and, indeed,
specially refers to Irnerius and his pupil Bulgarus, in the previous century, as authorities for saying that
a contract to pay usury is entirely justifiable.40 If contemporary satire can be trusted, Accursius was not
afraid to illustrate his theory by practice; to his gains as a professor he is said to have added those of a
moneylender, even to his own pupils.41 It is interesting to Englishmen to notice that this jurist’s son
was, for at least seven years, in the service of Edward I as a member of his inner council.42
Papal legislation, to meet what was deemed a growing evil, had begun as early as 1179. Among
the canons of the great Lateran Council held by Alexander III in that year, one ran as follows: “Since in
almost every place the crime of usury has become so prevalent that many persons give up all other
business and become usurers, as if it were permitted, regarding not its prohibition in both testaments,
we ordain that manifest usurers shall not be admitted to communion, nor, if they die in their sin, receive
Christian burial, and that no priest shall accept their alms.” Clergy disobeying this order were to be
suspended from their office until they had satisfied their bishop.43 The same pope, in letters to the
Archbishop of Salerno and the Bishop of Piacenza, had pronounced that usurers, and even the heirs of
usurers, ought to be compelled to restore their unjust gains under similar penalties.44
The rise of the mendicant and preaching orders in the early part of the following century, both of
them vowed to absolute poverty, gave fresh impulse to the effort to lessen the evils of usury by the
power of the Church: the former order contained a large party anxious to imitate S. Francis in his entire
contempt for worldly goods; the latter systematized Church teaching, and their greatest representative,
Aquinas, threw the argument against usury into a philosophical form. Up to this point none but spir-
itual penalties had been threatened against usurers, and no attempt had been made to directly influence
the secular authorities of the various states. It was at another great council, that of Lyons in 1274, that
Gregory X ventured to make a fresh advance in both of these directions. In one he ordains that no
community, corporation, or individual should permit foreign usurers to hire houses, or indeed to dwell
at all upon their lands, but rather should expel them within three months; and he forbids any one to let
houses to them. The disobedient, if they are prelates, are to have their lands put under interdict; if
laymen, to be visited by their ordinary with ecclesiastical censures.45 This latter provision was not
likely to be very effective; consequently the more importance must be attached to the next canon,
which ordained that the wills of unrepentant usurers,—of usurers who did not make restitution,—
should be without validity.46 This brought usury definitely within the jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical
courts, which had everywhere gained a monopoly of testamentary business.
The last step was taken in 1311, when Clement V boldly declared all secular legislation in favour
of usury null and void, and branded as heresy the belief that usury was unsinful. The canon appears
from its wording to be addressed primarily to town authorities, and, it would seem, especially to those
of Italy and southern France. “Whereas,” it runs, “grievous information has come to us that certain
communities, offending against God and their neighbour, against Divine and human laws alike, permit
by their statutes usury to be demanded and paid, and compel debtors to pay the same, we therefore
decree, with the approval of this sacred council (of Vienne), that whatever authorities, captains, rec-
tors, consuls, judges, councillors, or any other presume to make in future any statutes, either that
debtors shall pay usury or that a usurer is not bound to restitution, shall incur sentence of excommuni-
cation.” They are to incur the same penalty if, within three months, they do not abrogate all such
statutes. Usurers are to be compelled to produce their books when any case arises. And “if any one fall
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shall be punished as a heretic, and enjoin all ordinaries and inquisitors to proceed with rigour against
all suspected of this heresy.47
We cannot be surprised that, with such a warning before him, the legist Bartolus (1314–1357), the
founder of the second great school of civilians, should take up a very different position on the subject
from Accursius. He comments in the usual fashion on the law of Justinian concerning interest, but
frequently remarks that the taking of usury is now forbidden by civil law as well as by the canon law.48
But the change in the teaching of the civilians had been gradual. Even the law of Justinian had placed
certain limitations on the lending of money; 49 and, in explaining these, the civilians had naturally
tended to introduce some of the arguments of the theologians.50 We shall see later that it was during this
period that secular legislation itself began to follow the example of ecclesiastical; and the legist Baldus
(1327–1400), whose authority was especially great in merchant law, frequently refers to the prohibi-
tion of usury as enforced in his time in all the secular courts.”
Let us turn now to the arguments by which theologians and lawyers justified the prohibition. Of
these the most important, as has already been said, was the gospel precept, which was held to be
conclusive in itself, so that it was seldom considered necessary to explain the reasons which had led to
it. As secondary proof from Holy Writ, reference was made to the Mosaic law prohibiting the taking of
usury by one Hebrew from another, especially the warning, “If thou lend money to any of My people
that is poor, thou shall not be to him as an usurer, neither shalt thou lay upon him usury.52 Later writers
referred to the doctrine of Aristotle that money was itself barren, and that therefore fruit or payment
cannot justly be demanded for the use of it. This, of all the theoretic arguments, was the one most
readily grasped by the public mind, and the one consequently that appears most frequently in literature:
as in the well-known passage in the “Merchant of Venice,” where Antonio taunts Shylock with taking
“a breed for barren metal.” But the main argument by which the great schoolmen and legists main-
tained that the taking of usury was of itself opposed to natural reason and unjust, was one much more
subtle than this, and careful attention must be given to it. It turned upon a distinction derived from
Roman law, though applied in a manner foreign to Roman law, between consumptibles, things such as
corn, that are consumed or spent in use, and fungibles, such as a house, which is not consumed by use.
Money, it was said, belonged to the first class. So that to demand usury was, as it were, to sell a thing,
and then make a charge for the use of it, which was unjust. The modern reader will probably object that
the lending of money can hardly be called a sale. But it had been a doctrine of the Roman law, that
when money had passed into the hands of the borrower, he obtained not merely the possessio but the
dominium, i.e., the absolute right of property in it, and therefore the canonists argued that the transac-
tion must be regarded as a sale in which the payment of the price was deferred. And to any who still
objected that some payment ought to be made for the loss of time in waiting for the price, the canonists
replied that time was common property, and ought not to be sold.
The argument based on this distinction had appeared comparatively early; in the Decretum it is
attributed to S. Chrysostom. But it will be worth while here to quote it in the shape in which it was
stated by Aquinas, from whom it was taken and commented upon by all the later theologians and
legists.
“To take usury for a loan of money is in itself unjust: for it is to sell what does not exist, which is
an inequality, and therefore an injustice. To understand this, it must be known that there are some
things whose use consists in the consuming of them, as when we consume wine by drinking it, or corn
by eating it. In articles of this kind, therefore, the use of the thing must not be reckoned separately from
the thing itself; he who is given the use is thereby given the thing. And accordingly in lending a thing of
this kind, all the rights of ownership are handed over. If therefore a man wanted to sell wine and the use
of the wine apart from one another, he would be either selling the same thing twice (meaning that the
use is the wine), or would be selling what did not exist. Wherefore he would manifestly be committing84 / William J. Ashley
injustice and sinning. For the same reason, he would commit injustice who lent wine or corn, seeking
for himself two rewards, the restitution of an equal amount of the article, and also a payment for its use,
called usury.
“But there are some things, the use of which is not in the consuming of them; thus the use of a
house is to dwell in it, not to destroy it. And, accordingly, in cases of this kind the two things can be
granted separately, as when a man transfers the ownership of a house to another, but reserves to himself
the use of it for a certain time, or conversely. Therefore a man may lawfully receive a price for the use
of a house, and besides this demand the restoration of the house itself at the end of some period agreed
upon. But money, as Aristotle says in the fifth book of the Ethics and the first of the Politics, has been
devised for the making of exchanges. So that the first and chief use of money is its consumption or
spending. Wherefore it is in itself wrong to receive (besides the return of the money itself) a price for
the use of the money.”53
It will be shown in a later section how, in the sixteenth century, instead of the theory that all taking
of reward was usurious, arose the theory that it was only the taking more than a certain percentage; and
when we come to our own century we shall see how the practical difficulties involved in such a distinc-
tion, together with the belief in the natural right of every man to make what terms he pleased in money
bargains,54 caused all legal restraints to be removed. There was a period when to defend usury laws was
to obtain the character of a sentimental reactionary. But the political dangers which complete freedom
of contract in the matter of loans has caused in central and eastern Europe, dangers so great as to induce
the German legislature to retrace its steps and bring back the legal prohibition of usury in a more
woikable form,55 may dispose us to consider what sort of justification the ideas we have been stating
may have had in relation to the circumstances of the time in which they were dominant. But, first, we
must put on one side the argument in favour of interest which will probably suggest itself to nine out of
ten who think about the matter: “A man who has money is not bound to lend it; if he does choose to
lend it, surely he is free to make what conditions he pleases.” To this the mediaeval theorist would
reply, “True, he is not bound to lend it; but if he does, he can only do so on just conditions. If he persists
in making unrighteous conditions, he is to be punished by spiritual penalties, and, if these do not
suffice, by secular penalties. A man has not the right to do what he likes with his own.”
Now, speaking generally, it may be said that, during the period from the eleventh to the fourteenth
century, there was but a very small field for the investment of capital.56 In the trading centres there
were, indeed, during the later part of the period, occasional opportunities for a man to take part in a
commercial venture, and no obstacle was put by the Church or public opinion to a man’s investing his
money in this way, when no definite interest was stipulated for, but he became a bona fide partner in the
risk as well as the gain.57 But such opportunities were still rare. We must not forget that England was
almost entirely an agricultural country, and that its agriculture was carried on under a customary system
which gave little opportunity for the investment of capital. Even in the rising manufactures of the time
there was little room for “enterprise” or “extension of business:” the demand was too small, the avail-
able workmen too few, for any such rapid increase in production as we are nowadays familiar with.
Under such circumstances, when money was borrowed, it was usually to meet some sudden stress of
misfortune, or for “unproductive” expenditure, e.g., by a knight to go on crusade, or by a monastery to
build a church. A good example is furnished by the history of S. Edmundsbury, on which Carlyle has
commented in Past and Present. The old abbot mismanaged the convent revenues; the Camera fell
into ruins; and £27 had to be borrowed of a Jew to rebuild it,—a debt which, by the accumulation of
compound interest, had, within a few years, risen to more than £400.58
In cases like these it seemed unjust that a person possessing money which he could put to no
productive use himself should make gain out of the necessities or piety of another. Ample security was
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remained idle in the hands of its possessor, he was in just the same position when his money came back
to him as if he had never parted with it. Surely, under these circumstances, we cannot blame the moral-
ists who thought that the evils of usury were so great that they did well to prohibit the payment of
interest altogether. And such an opinion was likely to be strengthened by the grievous results before
their eyes of such usury as was permitted,— that exercised by the Jews. The Jews of history were not
cringing cowards, but too often merciless bullies, confident of the royal protection. We can hardly
blame them. They were shut out by law or prejudice in almost every country from engaging in agricul-
ture, industry, or commerce, and were thus almost driven to trade in money. It was in vain that Innocent
III called upon all Christian princes to compel the Jews to give up their usuries; they were too profitable
a source of revenue to be parted with, until sovereigns could show self-denial and cruelty enough to
drive them out of the kingdom altogether, like Edward I in 1290. The ecclesiastical courts were obliged
to shut their eyes to them. Since, moreover, the extreme penalties that until 1274 the courts could inflict
were exclusion from communion and the refusal of Christian burial, it is difficult to see how the Jews
could have been hindered in their business, even had the courts been bold enough to attempt it.60
It is scarcely denied by competent modern critics that, during some part at any rate of the Middle
Ages there was such an absence of opportunities for productive investment as relatively to justify this
strong prejudice against interest; the only difference of opinion is as to how late that period reaches.
One writer is of opinion that even before the twelfth century the economic condition of things was such
that the papal decrees could not possibly meet with obedience: he can only regard the effort of the
Church as a vain struggle against irresistible tendencies.61 To another the prohibition seems justifiable
far into the fifteenth century.62 On the one hand, it is clear that the growth of commerce from the
thirteenth century onward must, by widening the field for profitable investment, have lessened the
injustice of taking usury, if, for instance, a man could make twenty per cent on a certain capital in
commerce, it might seem hard to prevent his borrowing money at ten per cent. It was impossible to
maintain that money was in all cases barren after Innocent III had expressly ordered that dowry in
certain cases was to be “committed to a merchant” in order that “honourable gain” might be obtained.63
On the other hand, we can scarcely suppose that the prohibition of usury would have been maintained
by public opinion, enacted by statute, and enforced in the courts throughout the fourteenth century, as
it certainly was, if cases had been of frequent occurrence in which it really prevented legitimate com-
mercial enterprise, or hindered the growth of manufactures. We may, perhaps, conclude that on the
whole it was suited to the economic condition of western Europe, though there may sometimes have
been cases in the active commercial life of the towns where it was felt to be a burden.
Later writers, especially those of the sixteenth century, occupying themselves in the work of sys-
tematizing canon law, and in applying it to new cases as they arose, arrived at certain theoretic concep-
tions concerning capital, money, and value which seemed to them to underlie the particular precepts.
They showed how these conceptions were related to one another, and in this way there came to be
formulated for the first time a general economic theory. This theory Endemann has explained with
great fulness; and his argument implies that because certain general conceptions seem to be the logical
basis of definite regulations, these conceptions must have been in the minds of those who issued the
regulations. But the ideas which we have already explained appear quite sufficient to account for the
rules and maxims of, at any rate, the period down to the middle of the fourteenth century. It seems
advisable, therefore, to postpone the consideration of the general canonist theory, as well as the excep-
tions, limitations, and pretexts for evasion which were gradually devised, until we come to the later
centuries.
We must, however, notice the application of the prohibition to cases other than money loans. The
repayment of a loan together with usury in money had, of course, been the first subject of prohibition;
but even the Fathers of the fourth and fifth centuries had rebuked those who pretended that usury86 / William J. Ashley
consisted only in taking money reward. If you lend money to a man expecting to receive from him more
than you have given, whether it is in money or in corn, wine, oil, or anything else, you are a usurer, says
S. Augustine. Jerome, in almost the same words, lays down that usury is to receive more than you have
given, and condemns those who for money they have lent “are wont to receive small presents of vari-
ous kinds;” while S. Ambrose declares “usury is whatever is added to the capital, whether it be food,
clothing, or whatever else you like to call it.” All these definitions were included by Gratian in his
Decretum.64 Gregory IX drew the deduction that to pay a sum of money on condition that you should be
repaid at a future time in wares—“a certain number of measures of grain, wine, or oil,”—when you
knew that before that time the value of those articles would rise above that sum, was also usury.65 Such
a transaction could be called either a loan or a purchase; and though the prohibition did not interfere
with a sale where the purchaser had no idea whether at the time of delivery the value of the goods
would be greater or less, it certainly stood in the way of speculative trading, where the purchaser
expected that values would rise.66 For it was not so much the actual receipt of greater gain, as the
intention to obtain greater gain that was sinful.
A second deduction, probably even more important, was that, since it was wrong in return for a
loan to receive back the principal in money together with usury in kind, or to receive in kind more than
the value of the money, it must also be wrong, if you do receive the value in kind, then in addition to
demand the capital sum in money. The application of this was to those cases where land had been
pledged in security for a debt. When the lender had taken possession of the land and had kept it long
enough to receive from its produce the value of the sum originally lent, he was bound to restore the
land. Cases of this kind must have been especially numerous. The canon drawn up on the subject at the
Council of Tours in 1163 dealt only with the misconduct of the clergy; the prohibition of such unjust
gain by the laity occurs in a Bull of Alexander III, addressed to the Archbishop of Canterbury and his
suffragans: “Since to pursue the gains of usury is dangerous not only to the clergy but to all others, we
enjoin you to compel by ecclesiastical penalty those who have received the capital they lent (together
with the expenses of management) from the possessions or woods they are known to hold in pledge, to
restore the same pledges.”67 And in the following century the rule was repeated in a canon issued by S.
Edmund Rich of Canterbury: “We forbid that any one should endeavour to retain a pledge, after from
the fruits of it he has received the sum he lent, together with expenses, since to do so is usury.”68 The
transition was easy from usury, strictly so called, to usurious practices in ordinary trade. Thus all pay-
ment of money in return for the giving of credit,—all bargains in which goods were sold at a price
higher than their real value in consideration of the seller’s having to wait some time before he was
paid,—were deemed usurious. For it was the same as if the seller were to charge usury for lending the
goods themselves, or the amount of money which was the just price of the goods, to the buyer, for the
period during which the seller waited for payment. It is significant that the direct prohibition of such
practices should appear first in a Bull directed by Alexander III, in 1176, to the Archbishop of Genoa,—
which city was then struggling with Pisa for commercial supremacy in the Mediterranean,—and that
the wares specially mentioned should be spiceries. It was the trade in spice which produced probably
the first body of wholesale merchants dealing in a special commodity, namely the grocers; and we may
perhaps conjecture that cases of purchase on credit, such as the letter speaks of, would be likely enough
to occur on the part of the small general dealers from the greater merchants. “You tell us it often
happens in your city that people buy pepper, or cinnamon, or other wares, at the time not worth more
than five pounds, promising to pay those from whom they received them six pounds at an appointed
time. Though contracts of this kind and under such a form cannot strictly be called usuries, yet never-
theless the venders incur guilt, unless they are really doubtful whether the wares will be worth more or
less at the time of payment. Your citizens therefore will do well, for their own salvation, to cease from
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It is easy to see how the theory of usury, when it had once been developed to this point, would
come to be interwoven with the theory of just price, until the one could in many doubtful cases be
brought to strengthen the other. It will be worth while to conclude this section with two quotations
which will show how the teaching was presented in a popular form. Hitherto we have referred only to
the writings of Fathers and Schoolmen, the canons of Councils, and the decrees of Popes: the following
are taken from the Ayenbite of Inwyt, a sort of manual for confessors, of wide use in the later Middle
Ages, itself a translation made in 1340 by a certain Dan Michel, a monk of Kent, from a French treatise
written in the previous century. “The eighth bough of Avarice is chaffering, wherein men sin in many
ways, for worldly gain, and especially in seven ways. The first is to sell things as dear as one can, and
buy things as cheap as one can. The next is lying, swearing, and forswearing, the higher to sell their
wares. The third is by weights and measures, and that may be in three ways: the first when a man has
divers weights or divers measures, and buys by the greater weights or measures and sells by the lesser;
the second when a man has right weights and measures but makes an untrue use of them, as when
taverners fill a measure with scum; the third when in weighing a thing it is made to appear heavier than
it is. The fourth manner of sin in chaffering is to sell to time [referring doubtless to such sales on credit
as have just been explained]. The fifth manner is to sell otherwise than one hath showed before, as the
scriveners do who begin with words fairly written. The sixth is to hide the truth about the thing one
sells, as do horsedealers. And the seventh is to contrive that the thing sold should appear better than it
is; as when cloth-dealers sell their cloth in a dim light.” Usury is also divided into seven kinds. “The
first when a loan is made in money, and the lender receives profits in money, or in horses, or corn, or
wine, or fruits of the land which he takes in pledge, over and above the capital sum, and without
reckoning them as part payment. What is worse, a creditor will sometimes demand payment several
times in the year, to raise the rate of usury, even when at each term he receives a gift; and he will often
turn the interest into the principal debt. These are usuries evil and foul. The courteous lender is he that
lendeth without making bargains for profit.... The next manner of usury is that of those who do not lend
themselves, but retain what their fathers, or those whose wealth they have inherited, have received
through usury. The third way is that of those who are ashamed to lend with their own hand, but lend
through their servants or somebody else. They are thus master money-lenders; and of such sin those
great ones are not free who support Jews and other usurers, that destroy the country, receiving from
them the ransom money of the goods of the poor. The next way is that of those who borrow at a low rate
of interest themselves and lend at a greater,—the little usurers. The fifth manner is when a man sells a
thing for more than it is worth at the time; or, what is worse, when he sells at a time when his wares are
greatly needed for twice or thrice as much as they are worth. Such trade is ruinous to the knights who
follow tournaments; they get from them their estates in pledge and never release them. Others buy
articles, such as corn or wine, for half as much as they are worth, and sell them for more than twice as
much as they are worth; or buy them in harvest time, or when they are especially cheap, with intent to
sell them again when they are dear, wishing for a time of scarcity; while others, again, buy corn in the
blade, and vines in the flower. The sixth manner of usury is to lend money to merchants on condition
that they shall share in gains but not in losses.... And finally the seventh manner is that of those who
lend a little to their poor neighbours when they are in need, on condition that they shall work for them,
and get out of them three pennyworth of work for every penny they have lent.”70
Nothing could better illustrate than this last passage the way in which the two rules, to sell at a fair
price and to avoid usury, had come to be almost identified with one another even in the mind of the
writer of a manual for the confessional. It has now to be seen how it was attempted in secular legisla-
tion to give expression to, and to enforce, these principles.
§18. Most of the economic questions which presented themselves to medieval thought were met
by the proposition that for every commodity or service there was a just money equivalent. But that88 / William J. Ashley
practical effect should be given to such a principle, it was necessary that a country should possess a
trustworthy currency. Moreover, the sole right of coinage had been expressly claimed by Roman law as
a prerogative of the head of the State, an example which could not fail to commend itself to the sover-
eigns whose kingdoms arose upon the ruins of the empire. For both these reasons, to maintain a pre-
rogative, and to satisfy a general need, the princes of the young states of western Europe began very
early to issue currencies of their own. And thus the provision of a medium of exchange was the first
assistance which the organization of the state rendered to society. It is therefore necessary to deal at
somewhat greater length with a subject to which brief reference has already been made.
The earliest function of a currency in early societies was not so much that of a medium of ex-
change as of a store of value. There was little regular traffic or purchase of commodities: men lived
upon the produce of their lands, tilled by themselves or by their dependents. Still, occasions sometimes
arose in which men might need or desire to buy for themselves food, land, or slaves; adventurous
traders sometimes ai rived at a great man’s house with jewels or robes for sale; sometimes there was a
wergild to be scraped together. And even if the store were not parted with, the very possession of things
universally desired as ornaments, would increase the respect in which a man was regarded. Such a
purpose was served among the English as among the Scandinavian nations by gold armlets or rings,71
and by the few Roman gold coins left behind after the barbarian conquest or brought by traders. The
first new and independent coinage in western Europe was struck by the Merovingian princes; it was in
gold, and in imitation of a small Roman coin.72 The introduction of Christianity into England, bringing
with it new ideas of royal duties and powers, and a closer connection with the Continent, led almost at
once to an imitation of the Merovingian currency. These first English coins were of gold; probably very
few were struck. The pieces comprising such a currency were far too valuable to be used conveniently
in trade. Moreover the Teutonic peoples had long shown a preference for silver over gold. Accordingly,
with the rise of trade along the Frisian shores, and the increasing importance of the Austrasian Franks,
there appeared a silver coinage along the lower Rhine.73 The example was followed in the English
kingdoms which carried on trade with those countries, namely Kent, Essex, and Mercia; and the silver
coins then struck, known as sceattas, were almost certainly the first coins that came into general use in
England for the purpose of trade.74 They were not destined, however, to play any considerable part in
the history of English currency: about a century later they were replaced by a coinage of a different
character, the silver penny, which from the end of the eighth to the middle of the fourteenth century was
the only coin in general use in this country. This also was a direct imitation of the “new pennies” issued
by Pepin the Short in the Frank kingdom, about 755;75 and, as we might expect, it was issued first by
Offa, who was in constant communication with the Carling princes. For some time Northumbria had a
copper coinage of its own; but towards the end of the ninth century this also gave way to a silver penny
currency, similar to that of the south.76
It is probable that the right of coinage was from the first in England regarded as specially attached
to the royal dignity. The sceattas indeed bear no inscriptions; but the silver pennies have on the one
side the name of the moneyer who struck them, and on the other usually that of the king by whose
authority they were issued. From this evidence, it appears that each of the kingdoms then existing in
England—Kent, East Anglia, Northumbria, Mercia, and Wessex—had its own issue, as long as it was
governed nominally by a king, even when it had fallen into the position of a vassal state. And although
the great ealdormen of later centuries became practically semi-independent princes, they never issued
money with their own names upon it. To the rule that the coinage was issued by royal authority there
are, however, three remaikable exceptions. There are a number of pennies extant bearing the names of
“Edmund, king,” or “S. Edmund,” struck, it would seem, at the end of the ninth and beginning of the
tenth century. It is probable that these were made to be worn in memory of the martyred king of East
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the two archiepiscopal coinages: that of Canterbury, bearing the name of its archbishops, from circ.
766 to circ. 914; and that of York, consisting of copper stycas (or pieces), with the names of the arch-
bishops, from circ. 734 to circ. 900, and of silver pennies, bearing the name of S. Peter, during the first
half of the ninth century.78 In the almost continuous anarchy during the reigns of the later Northumbrian
kings, both Anglian and Danish, the Archbishop of York gained a unique position as the one repre-
sentative of order in the northern half of England. The primate of Canterbury also had an influence and
authority that made it advisable for Egbert to enter into alliance with him as with an equal potentate.79
It is easy enough, therefore, to understand why the two archbishops should have been allowed to
exercise rights which the kings usually reserved to themselves. But it does not seem fanciful to suggest
that this was also due to the feeling that the Church was, in an especial way, the guardian of morality in
matters of trade, and therefore that it was fitting that the all-essential goodness of the currency should
be guaranteed by putting its issue into the hands of the great pastors. Even after the archbishops of
Canterbury had ceased to issue coins bearing their own name, they retained the right of appointing two
out of the seven moneyers employed in the city of Canterbury, while the abbot of Christ Church nomi-
nated one; and at Rochester the bishop appointed one out of three.80 Doubtless, as we find by later
grants, the right of having a moneyer implied also the receipt of certain profits.
In 954, the Danish kingdom in Northumbria came to an end. Henceforward the only king in
England was the ruler of Wessex.81 About the same time, moreover, the West Saxon kings began to
assume titles implying imperial power, such as Basileus, Imperator, and Caesar,82—partly, no doubt, to
assert their own overlordship over all other princes within Britain, but also partly, it is probable, to
claim for themselves a dignity such as they supposed belonged to Roman emperors. A natural conse-
quence was the assertion of the king’s exclusive prerogative of issuing money. “Let no man have a
moneyer except the king,” appears among the laws of Ethelred in 997.83 But it was long before the
work of minting was confined to one place immediately under the supervision of royal officials. It
would seem that moneyers were allowed to establish themselves, or were employed at intervals, in all
important trading centres, though little is known of their status or of the precise way in which the coins
got into circulation. It was the growing trade in the towns, especially at the ports,84 which made a
currency increasingly necessary, and the minters in each town may be regarded as primarily working to
meet the needs of the traders of that particular place. Indeed, it was so impossible to maintain the
standard of quality and weight unless the minting was done publicly in towns, under the constant watch
of the reeve, that it was enacted that it should be carried on nowhere else on pain of death.85
So far England had only followed the same course of development as the other countries of west-
ern Europe; but from the tenth century onward it presented a striking contrast to them. In France,
Germany, and Italy the right of coinage was gained by all the more important princes and cities; in
England, the king’s sole prerogative was never in danger except during the anarchy of Stephen’s reign.
Then, indeed, baronial mints appeared. The claim to strike their own coin was justly regarded by
contemporaries as an encroachment on the rights of sovereignty. But Henry II had no difficulty in
putting an end to this “adulterine” coinage;86 and it is to be noticed that the king’s sole right of regulat-
ing the currency was afterwards asserted, not only as against individual barons, but also as against
Parliament. A provision of the Ordainers, that no charge should be made on the coin of the realm
without the consent of the barons in Parliament, was repealed in 1322.87
Down to the reign of Henry VIII the kings of England were honourably free from the crime of
debasing the currency,—therein a striking contrast to their French neighbours. For a brief space there
was danger. William Rufus seems to have exacted or threatened to exact a payment from his subjects
known as moneyage, monetagium,—a recognition, apparently, of his right to alter the coinage, and a
bribe not to do so.87 But this, among other innovations, was expressly renounced by Henry I. From that
time the efforts of the sovereigns or of their ministers were steadily directed towards securing a sound90 / William J. Ashley
currency for the country. There were two main dangers: lest the moneyers should elude the vigilance of
the local authorities, and issue coins of base metal, and lest coins should he clipped as they pasbod
from hand to hand. The former evil was met and overcome by ruthless severity in the punishment of
fraudulent moneyers. Their hands were to be cut off and set upon the mint-smithy, says a law of Athelstan;
they were to be put to death, says a law of Ethelred.88 Henry I fell back upon the earlier punishment of
dismemberment; and in one swoop of avenging justice inflicted it, in 1125, on every moneyer in Eng-
land.89 It is clear from the chroniclers that Henry’s conduct was seen with gratitude by the nation. Only
two years before, a council at Rome, under Pope Calixtus, had pronounced upon such criminals the
highest penalty that an ecclesiastical authority could inflict, and had separated from the congregation
of the faithful whoever knowingly made or purposely circulated false money, as men accursed, oppres-
sors of the poor, disturbers of the State.90
The Government in the main succeeded: the difficulties which arose in the following centuries
were due to the importation of base money from abroad. The other danger was greater, and was but
partially avoided. The practice of clipping the coinage was carried on so generally that it was often
necessary to prohibit the use of the old currency, and cause a new one to be issued, as in 1180 and
1248.91 Henry I endeavoured to lessen it by ordering that all who lived within towns should take an oath
to preserve the coinage;92 the ministers of John, by a proclamation in 1205 that none were to keep
clipped money in their possession on pain of seizure,93 and, in the following year, by an Assize fixing
one-eighth as the limit of allowable under-weight, and ordering the use of a jury of inquest to discover
who were guilty of clipping.94
It was impossible altogether to put an end to this form of fraud so long as the process of minting
was as rude as it remained until the seventeenth century. Perfectly round coins could not be produced
until the die struck by the hammer had been replaced by the “mill;”95 and the fact that coins as issued
from the moneyers already differed somewhat in size rendered the work of the clipper easy. It was all
the more important, therefore, that such uniformity should be secured as was possible. In 1208, all the
moneyers, assayers, and keepers of dies were summoned from London, Winchester, Exeter, Chiches-
ter, Canterbury, Rochester, Ipswich, Norwich, Lynn, Lincoln, York, Carlisle, Northampton, Oxford, S.
Edmundsbury, and Durham, to appear at Winchester with their old dies; these were taken from them,
and they were sent back with new ones all of one pattern, —a precaution often repeated.96 This expedi-
ent had the additional advantage of hastening the slow tendency towards uniformity in the “type” or
pattern of the coins. As early as the reign of Henry II the number of types had been reduced to two, and
at last, tinder Edward I, it was limited to one. The first recorded public trial of the quality of the coins
issued was in 1248;97 in 1270 a general assay of the coins in use throughout the kingdom was ordered;98
and the first regular “trial of the pix,”—an examination of the coins recently struck at the mints of
London and Canterbury, by the barons of the Exchequer,—was in 1281 or 1282.99 And gradually we
find the local mints brought to some extent under a central authority, and their number reduced. In
1279, a skilled coiner from Marseilles was made master of the mint, with authority to make money at
London, Canterbury, Bristol, and York; and under Edward III pennies were struck only at London,
York, Durham, and perhaps Canterbury, and gold coins only at London.100
The quality of the metal of which the English penny was composed was almost uniformly good;
but in its weight there were considerable variations. In this, as in all other parts of their administration,
the English sovereigns were greatly influenced by the example of the Frank kingdom. Charles the
Great had taken for his standard a pound considerably heavier than that by which the Merovingian
moneyers had reckoned; his pennies averaged 22.5 grains troy; and the English penny, weighing at first
about 18 grains, nearly reached this standard under Egbert and Ethelwulf. But as the unity of the Frank
empire disappeared under the later Carlings, western Francia reverted to its older standaid, and the
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was not without its influence in England: the extraordinary lightness of many of Canute’s pennies,
some only weighing 12 grains troy, may be explained as due to imitation of the equally light Scandinavian
“pening;” but the Confessor’s coins were as light as those issued by his contemporaries in France, and
no improvement took place under the Norman kings. Meanwhile, however, the Caroline standard, “the
pound of Charles the Great,” had remained in use in the eastern kingdom, the later kingdom of Ger-
many; and the penny based upon it came to be known in England and France as the sterling penny, in
contradistinction especially to the French denier, based on the lighter livre Tournois. It seems to have
been Henry II who at last caused England to definitely revert to the earlier and heavier standard; 215 of
the pence issued in 1180 are said to have weighed as much as 240 of those previously in circulation.
From this time forth our whole system of weights and measures was based on the sterling penny of 22½
grains troy or 32 wheat grains. The Assize of Weights and Measures, variously assigned to Henry III and
Edward I, begins thus: “By consent of the whole realm, the king’s measure was made, so that an
English penny called sterling, round and without clipping, shall weigh 32 grains of wheat in the midst
of the ear. Twenty pence make an ounce, and twelve ounces make a pound, and eight pounds make a
gallon of wine, and eight gallons of wine make a bushel of London.”101 Not only did the Government
strive thus to maintain and improve the ancient coinage of the kingdom; it took the initiative in intro-
ducing into circulation money of other denominations than that to which the people were accustomed,
when it saw that they were called for by the new needs of the time. The round silver halfpennies and
farthings, issued in the first half of the thirteenth century, were needed, not only in the retail trade
which accompanied the multiplication of gilds and markets, but also to facilitate the commutation of
agricultural services. The gold coinage of Henry III was indeed premature; but that of Edward III was
almost at once felt to satisfy a want. Yet so strong was the prejudice in favour of the usual penny piece,
that neither of these new coinages was at first popular;102 and we can hardly doubt that if the supply had
been left to private initiative,— supposing that to have been even conceivable,—the country would
have had to wait much longer than it did for these useful instruments of exchange.103 It must, however,
be noticed that the inconvenience of possessing a coinage all of one, and that a comparatively low,
denomination was obviated, so far as the reckoning of payments and the keeping of accounts were
concerned, by the use of what is called money of account, i.e., a unit or units of reckoning not actually
existing as coins, but standing in some clear and universally accepted relation to the coins actually in
circulation. Such were in England, from a period certainly earlier than the Norman Conquest, the
pound, mark, and shilling. It was not until the reign of Henry VII, that pieces named shillings and
pounds were actually struck. The difficulties caused by the practice of clipping were also doubtless
largely overcome by the plan, frequently resorted to, of making large payments by weight and not by
tale.104
England had thus been provided with a satisfactory currency; but without the constant vigilance
of the Government it would soon have been lost. Counterfeit coin was struck abroad in great quantities,
and brought by adventurers into England. A statute, ascribed to the reign of Edward II, distinguishes
between the money “with a mitre,” of which twenty shillings weigh only sixteen shillings and fourpence
of English money; two sorts of money “with lions,” equally light; money made of copper and blanched;
money made in Germany of the same weight as the mitre money but bearing the name of Edward;
copper coin thinly plated with silver, and, finally, clipped coin. “The moneys which are made or clipt
out of England are chiefly brought by merchants, and because they know that search is made for them
at Dover, they put them into clothes or bales; then they come not to Dover or Sandwich, but they come
to London, or into Essex, or into Suffolk or into Norfolk or to Hull, or into Lindsay, or to some other
ports of England where they expect to find no hindrance. The which things, if they should be long
permitted to be so, would bring the money of England to nothing.”105
This importation of base coin, like the clipping of money within England itself, was an evil from92 / William J. Ashley
which the country to some extent suffered throughout the Middle Ages: the Government tried to meet
it by very similar measures, and especially by visiting the crime, when an offender was caught, with
loss of life and goods.106 Yet, as the danger was really greater, it called for a special organization to cope
with it. Accordingly it was ordered, by the statute De Falsa Moneta of 1299, that the commonalty of
every port should choose two wardens to enforce the prohibition. All whom they discovered bringing
false money into England they were to send to the county gaol. Merchants bringing money into Eng-
land, whatever it might be, were bound to give it up to the wardens: if, after assay, the money proved to
be good “sterlings,”—apparently whether struck in England or no,—it was to be returned, and could be
used in England; but all “money that runs in the jurisdiction of the King of France,” being, as we have
seen, of less weight and also of baser metal, was to be retained, and its value given to the merchants in
English money. A later statute entirely prohibits the circulation of any other coin in this country than
that of the King of England, Ireland, and Scotland.107 Merchants were to take to the Tables of Ex-
change, set up at Dover and other ports, all the bullion, silver plate, and silver coin they brought with
them, and were there to receive English coin wherewith to carry on their trade.108 Bat if foreign money
was not to be brought in, it was again and again enacted that English money should not be taken out
without special license of the king.109 Englishmen about to travel abroad were to take their money to
the king’s Exchange at the port of embarkation, and were there to receive its equivalent in foreign
money. But special license to take English money was certainly given in exceptional cases, where the
merchants were able to prove to the satisfaction of the Government that such permission was necessary
for their business. The prohibition went beyond the exportation of coin, and included silver in plate or
in any other form; and to this Edward III, in 1335, looking forward to his new coinage, added vessels of
gold. Such measures seem, at first sight, remarkably like those prompted by the “mercantile” theory in
the sixteenth century, when the policy of the Government was directed towards increasing the national
store of the precious metals. But throughout the legislation of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries
there is no trace of any desire to increase the amount of gold and silver in the country; its one motive is
to retain within England the currency that had with so much trouble been created.110 The only enact-
ment that seems at all of mercantilist colour is that in a statute of 1340, that exporters of wool shall give
surety to import within three months and bring to the king’s exchange for every sack of wool, silver to
the value of two marks.111 But this may be regarded as an awkward device for securing for the royal
mints the bullion necessary to replace the wear and tear of the currency, rather than as a deliberate plan
for increasing the stock of silver in the country. The later “mercantilism,” whether in the earlier form
which aimed at preventing money leaving England by direct prohibition, or in the later form which
aimed at increasing the national store of money through the “balance of trade,” regarded the trade of
England as a whole, and compared it with that of other countries. But we have seen that such a view of
English trade had scarcely yet begun to be entertained.112
We are so accustomed to the governmental monopoly of the business of coinage, that we take it as
a matter of course, as a service falling naturally within “the limit of State duty.” J. S. Mill thought that
“no one, even of those most jealous of State interference, has objected to this as an improper exercise
of the powers of Government,” though “no reason can be assigned, except the simple one that it conduces
to general convenience.”115 But there have not been altogether wanting theorists who have argued that
it would have been better for the State to have left the currency altogether alone. Let individuals, it has
been urged, issue money, if they think it profitable, and can induce people to receive it, and let us trust
to self-interest to prevent a bad currency getting into circulation. Mr. Herbert Spencer, not content with
arguing that the Government monopoly is a “breach of the law of equal freedom,” and causes society
“to pay more for its metallic currency than would otherwise be necessary,” goes so far as to say that
“the debasement of coinage, from which our forefathers suffered so much, was made possible only by
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justification, however, for the action of Government, both as to false or unauthorized moneyers in
England, and as to the money of foreign countries, rests on the circumstance noticed by Sir Thomas
Gresham in the sixteenth century, that, as a matter of fact, bad money drives out good, and good money
cannot drive out bad. This Gresham’s law or theorem is true whether the currency is depreciated in
consequence of the issue of bad money or not.115 If it is not depreciated, and the false coins pass at their
nominal value, it will become the interest of all those who have to pay considerable sums to pay in the
light or base money; the good coins will be withdrawn from circulation by coiners, melted and recoined
with alloy or of deficient weight, and reissued, or else exported as bullion to foreign markets and mints.
If it is depreciated, the good money will sink in common estimation as much as the bad; most people,
indeed, will scarcely be able to tell the difference; and it will become, in the same manner, the interest
of all those who can discern the difference, to keep back the good coins and melt them down to be
recoined into a greater amount of base money. Thus the inevitable result of free trade in coinage would
be, not that the good would be preferred to the bad, but that the bad would altogether drive out or
absorb the good, and become progressively worse. And this, in an early stage of trade, would probably
have the further result that people would become suspicious of every coin, and try to do without the use
of money altogether, falling back on barter. Thus the very purpose of a coinage, to assist trade to rise
above mere barter, would be defeated.
But, it may be further urged, why should not the Government, while taking measures to prevent
false money circulating, have permitted good money to be exported and imported according as indi-
viduals deemed it advantageous. Ricardo has argued, and most economists have agreed with him, that
if complete liberty existed in this matter, a country would nevertheless always have the amount of
currency needed for its exchanges. For if a country, under its own special conditions as to rapidity of
circulation, had less currency in proportion than other countries, it would be impossible to give as
much money for a commodity there as abroad; that is to say, commodities would be cheaper there than
elsewhere. It would then become the interest of foreign merchants to buy such commodities in that
country, and for that purpose to take money there, since they could obtain more for it there than at
home. In the opposite case, of a superfluity of currency, prices would rise, and it would be the interest
of the merchants of that country to export money to purchase goods elsewhere. So that, merely by the
fluctuation of price, a country must, as a rule, retain the amount of money necessary for its exchanges.
“Money,” says Ricardo, “can never be exported to excess;” never to such an extent “as to occasion a
void in the circulation.”116
We need not consider here whether such a proposition would be entirely true, even under modern
conditions and with complete freedom of trade. But it must be noticed that, even if such an equilibratory
movement of prices had been possible in the thirteenth and fourteenth century, it would have been
attended with serious evils. For, throughout the Middle Ages, Europe, and therefore each nation, had a
supply of the precious metals extremely small when compared with that after the discovery of America.
It has been roughly estimated that the amount in circulation from the ninth to the fifteenth century was
but a tenth of what it had become by the end of the sixteenth century.117 Thus a withdrawal of money,
small in itself, would have had a most embarrassing effect on domestic trade. Prices might easily have
gone down to an extent which would have checked production,—especially as the difficulties of com-
munication were so great that each market was practically dependent on the amount of money locally
current. In the long ran, money might have been drawn to England by low prices; but, meanwhile,
production would have been impeded, and, what is still more important, the whole economic teaching
of the Church and the whole economic policy of the State would have been rendered impracticable. For
what that teaching and policy aimed at was a fair price, which it was believed could only be found in a
stable, regulated price. And free withdrawal of currency would have made such stability and regulation
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§19. Next in importance to a trustworthy currency were trustworthy weights and measures. “Let
there be just weights and measures,” ran the decree of a council at Mainz, quoted in the Corpus Juris
Canonici. “If any one presume to alter just weights and measures for the sake of gain, let him do
penance for thirty days on bread and water.”118 We have seen that Aquinas, while laying down general
principles as to trade, carefully abstains from prescribing the authorities by whom or the means by
which these principles are to be enforced; it is all the more significant, therefore, that in this one matter
he departs from his usual practice, and distinctly assigns to the secular authorities the duty of fixing
standards of weight and quantity.119
As early as the tenth century, English kings had attempted to prevent the use of fraudulent meas-
ures; and the laws of Edgar, Ethelred, Canute, and William the Conqueror contain general precepts that
men should avoid false measures, or that they should make their measures correct.120 But there was no
definition of what true weights and measures were, except in the enactment of Edgar that weights and
measures should everywhere be the same as at London and Winchester; and it is obvious that the task
of preventing fraud would be rendered all the greater if the Government came into conflict with the
natural prejudice of every district in favour of its own standards.
Not before the end of the twelfth century was it possible to set about the work in good earnest. By
that time a strong administrative system had been created. The plan of calling upon some four or six
men in every county and town to assist the Government in enforcing its measures had been found
practicable; and these local agents of the executive were supervised and controlled by itinerant judges.
The method which had been effective in taxation and judicial procedure might, the ministers of Rich-
ard I thought, be applied to this even more difficult matter. Accordingly, in 1197, was issued the Assize
of Measures.121 It enacted that weights and measures should everywhere be the same; that four or six
lawful men in every city or borough should be assigned to carry out the assize; and that offenders
should be commited to prison and their chattels forfeited. According to a later tradition of the city of
London, all measures then in use were at the same time examined, and made to agree, and standards
were deposited in London.122 Next year the itinerant justices were ordered to inquire whether the as-
signed guardians of the assize in each town were doing their duty.123 The regulation apparently met
with general approval, for it was inserted among the articles of tha Great Charter, with the addition that
the measure of corn was to he the London quarter.124
The rule of uniformity,—not that the name measures were to be used for all articles, but that the
same measure should be used in each place for the same articles,—was frequently repeated by subse-
quent assize, writ, and statute, especially by the assize of measures ascribed to 1303, which took the
sterling penny of 32 corn grains (or 22½ grains troy) as the unit of reckoning.125 Under Edward II, the
Treasurer hit upon, the plan of having model brass ell-yards and bushels made in London, and distrib-
uted over the country.
Yet it is clear that the central executive would have been unable to enforce regulations which
could so easily be evaded, had they not been assisted by the local authorities; and whatever doubt we
may have as to the efficacy of the earlier royal enactments, there can be no doubt that in the fourteenth
century the municipal authorities in the chief towns took the matter vigorously in hand, and did suc-
ceed in compelling the use in each town of certain standards.126 But though these enactments did much
to lessen fraud, they did not secure uniformity of standard throughout the country; and local differ-
ences, as, for instance, in the number of ounces in the pound, remain until the present time.
The peculiar importance of the English cloth manufacture is shown by the fact that, while Rich-
ard’s assize of measures did not for any other commodity prescribe that it was only to be sold in certain
quantities, it did prescribe a necessary length and width for every piece of cloth offered for sale: “It is
ordained that woollen cloths, wherever they are made, shall be made of the same width, to wit, of two
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Great Charter, in spite of the opposition which merchants, especially at the Stamford fair, had offered
to its execution. Under Edward I a special officer was appointed to see that the assize was carried out,
with “the custody of aulnage and of the assize of cloth both English and foreign sold throughout Eng-
land.” The office of aulnager existed until the reign of William III, with an importance increasing for
the first century of its history, but thenceforward steadily diminishing. With the appearance of new
qualities of cloth, in consequence of the immigration of Flemish weavers in the second half of the
fourteenth century, the simple regulation as to two ells gave way to careful distinctions and numerous
standards.
And in 1353 there was a significant change. In a statute of that year it was enacted that, whereas
foreign merchants are deterred from coming to England because they forfeit their cloth if it be not of
assize, henceforth cloth shall not be forfeited, but “the king’s aulnagor shall measure the cloth and
mark the same, by which mark a man may know how much the cloth containeth, and by as much as the
cloth shall be found less than the assize, allowance or abatement shall be made to the buyer.”127 The
Government gave up the attempt to secure that all cloths offered for sale should be of a certain size; but
it did not give up the attempt to promote honest trade by enabling the customer to easily ascertain for
what he was paying. To give a public guarantee of the size and quality of certain goods, while still
leaving customers and dealers to make what bargains they pleased, is a service which the Government
could in many cases perform both safely and advantageously; as late as 1776 Adam Smith speaks with
approbation of the stamp on cloth, as affording some real security to purchasers.
§20. The public authorities were not content with having thus provided society with mere instru-
ments of exchange; with the growing trade of the thirteenth century they felt themselves bound to
regulate every sort of economic transaction in which individual self-interest seemed to lead to injus-
tice. This regulation was guided by the general principle that just or reasonable price only should be
paid, and only such articles sold as were of good quality and correct measure. Most of the enactments
and rules were aimed at preventing some particular form of fraud, usually in some particular article;
and no hard and fast line can be drawn between the action of the central authority and that of local
authorities of town or gild. Still, some of the regulations were of the nature of general rules of trade;
and some commodities were felt to be of such general importance as to make it necessary for the
Government to give special attention to them. It will be convenient to follow this division in describing
the measures in question.
The rules of most far-reaching consequence were those prohibiting the allied practices of fore-
stalling, engrossing, and regrating,—terms which came later to have each a separate meaning, but in
the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries seem to have been used almost as synonymous for any action
which prevented goods from being brought by the producer or bona fide merchant to open market,—
the forestaller or engrosser buying them wholesale, either outside the town or in the market itself, and
then securing by means of monopoly a higher price than would otherwise have been paid. How such
tricks of trade were regarded is clearly shown in the first legal definition of the offence, which occurs
in a statute or ordinance variously ascribed to 51 Henry III and 13 Edward I: “Especially be it com-
manded on the part of our lord the king, that no forestaller be suffered to dwell in any town,— a man
who is openly an oppressor of the poor, and the public enemy of the whole community and country; a
man who, seeking his own evil gain, oppressing the poor and deceiving the rich, goes to meet corn,
fish, herrings, or ether articles for sale as they are being brought by land or water, carries them off, and
contrives that they should be sold at a dearer rate. He deceives merchant strangers bringing merchan-
dise by offering to sell their wares for them, and telling them that they might be dearer sold than the
merchants expected; and so by craft and subtlety he deceives his town and his country. He that is
convict thereof, the first time shall be amerced and lose the things so bought, and that according to the
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at the third time he shall be imprisoned and make fine; the fourth time he shall abjure the town. And
this judgment shall be given upon all manner of forestallers, and likewise upon those that have given
them counsel, help, or favour.”128 Among other methods of forestalling, ordinances of the same period
especially mention those who buy wares in a town before the hour fixed for the opening of the market;
and those who in ports go out to ships laden with merchandise as they enter, and “do buy the merchan-
dise in gross and then do sell them at greater and dearer prices than the first merchants would do, to the
grievance of the common people.”129 In the later years of Edward III the prohibition of forestalling was
again and again renewed by statute.130 It was, as we have seen, during this period that greater freedom
of trade was allowed between foreign merchants and Englishmen, and with the advantages of trade
came also some of the disadvantages peculiar to its early stages.
The prohibition, it is clear from the wording of the statutes, had primary reference to those who
endeavoured to secure local and temporary monopolies of the supply of food, especially of corn; though
it was wide enough to cover all similar attempts with other wares. The records of the city of London
furnish two excellent examples, both of the offence and of the way in which the local authorities dealt
with it. The first of these is in the year 1311. Thomas Lespicer of Portsmouth had brought to London
six pots of Nantes lampreys. Instead of standing with his lampreys for four days after his arrival in the
open market, under the wall of S. Margaret’s Church in Bridge Street, he took them to the house of
Hugh Matfrey, a fishmonger; there stowed them away; and sold them a couple of days after to Matfrey,
and without bringing them to open market at all. They were both brought before the mayor and alder-
men, confessed their fault, and were forgiven; Thomas taking oath that henceforward he would always
sell lampreys at the proper place only, and Hugh that he would always tell strangers where they ought
to take their lampreys. The other is in 1364, and, as it concerns wheat, is probably even more typical.
John-at-Wood, baker, was charged before the common sergeant with the following offence: “Whereas
one Robert de Cawode had two quarters of wheat for sale in common market on the Pavement within
Newgate, he, the said John, cunningly and by secret words whispering in his ear, fraudulently withdrew
Cawode out of the common market; and then they went together into the Church of the Friars Minor,
and there John bought the two quarters at 15½d. per bushel, being 2½d. over the common selling price
at that time in that market; to the great loss and deceit of the common people, and to the increase of the
dearness of corn.” At-Wood denied the offence, and “put himself on the country.” Thereupon a jury of
the venue of Newgate was empanelled, who gave as verdict that At-Wood had not only thus bought the
corn, but had afterwards returned to the market, and boasted of his misdoing; “this he said and did to
increase the dear-ness of corn.” Accordingly he was sentenced to be put into the pillory for three hours,
and one of the sheriffs was directed to see the sentence executed and proclamation made of the cause of
his punishment.131
Such violent interference with the liberty of the subject seems to oome into hopeless collision
with all modern principles of freedom of contract. Not only does it conflict with “natural rights:” it is
apt to seem obviously futile and childish, one of the curious follies of the Dark Ages. “The popular fear
of engrossing or forestalling may be compared to the popular terrors and suspicious of witchcraft,”
says Adam Smith. “The unfortunate wretches accused of this latter crime were not more innocent of
the misfortunes imputed to them, than those who have been accused of the former.”132 He argues that
the corn merchant performs a most important service to the community by equalizing supply: it is his
interest to keep back corn until a time of scarcity, and by selling it then, even at a high price, he prevents
the price being so high as it would have been had the supply been consumed when prices were low. But
it must be noticed that these laws did not force the producer to sell at any particular time; and Mr.
Rogers, whose authority is highest on mediaeval prices, tells us that, as a matter of fact, “producers
were very acute in doling out their supplies to the market. The most critical sales of the year were those
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the prospects of the ensuing harvest could be fairly guessed.”133 An argument on which Adam Smith
lays even greater stress is that the prohibition of forestalling, by forcing the farmer to sell his corn by
retail, compelled him “to divide his capital between two different employments: to keep one part of it
in his granaries and stockyard for supplying the occasional demands of the market, and to employ the
other in the cultivation of his land.” This made corn dearer in two ways: by locking up part of the
farmer’s capital for a time, it “obstructed the improvement of the land, and therefore tended to render
corn scarcer than it would otherwise have been;” and by making the sale of corn the work of men who
had other occupations it prevented all those economies and advantages which accompany division of
employments. But it may be doubted whether this argument has much correspondence with actual fact,
even with the large farming of our own time. Whether corn is sold a month or six months after harvest,
the farmer will need barns; it would certainly not be the best way to get a profit, for the farmer always
to look forward to “selling his whole crop to a corn merchant as fast as he could thresh it out.” The oxen
or horses which draw the plough, may be used without additional expense to carry the corn to market.
If the farmer sells his corn immediately after harvest, he will indeed receive money in hand; but if the
farm is well cultivated already, he will not wish to set his men to work earlier than usual; and the bailiff
or yardling in the fourteenth century could not put his money in a bank and get interest on it.
But even if we grant that, under modern circumstances, the producer who added to the business of
production that of distribution would need to employ as much capital in the additional business as the
man who was a distributer and nothing else, it does not follow that he would require the same profit. To
suppose that he would is to assume, as most economists have assumed, that “the rate of profit tends to
be the same, not only on capitals of the same amount, but also on capitals of different amounts.” But as
Professor Sidgwick has pointed out,134 the trouble of management by no means necessarily increases in
the same proportion as the capital to be managed. Even Mill allows that a farmer “will expect the
ordinary profit” only “on the bulk of his capital. When he has cast in his lot with the farm... he will
probably be willing to expend capital on it in any manner which will afford him a surplus profit,
however small, beyond the value of the risk and the interest... he can get for his capital elsewhere.”135
So that, both because he would probably not deserve the same rate of profit on all his capital, and also
because he could probably not insist on getting it, a producer who also acts as dealer may sell his goods
even more cheaply than a man whose capital is all in trade.
The above discussion touches only on the theoretic justification of Adam Smith’s argument. A
more useful point of view perhaps is this. The forestaller or engrosser tried to get a temporary mo-
nopoly,—to create what we now call “corners.” We do not interfere with such speculation now, not
from any belief in the usefulness of such speculation, but only because we do not believe it can to any
large extent succeed. But the very attempt is still regarded with general disapprobation, and there are
signs that “corners” would not be uninterfered with by the State if they were successful with any
commodity of great social importance.136 During the Middle Ages it may be said that economic condi-
tions were such that individuals could, if unrestrained, control or get into their power the supply of
commodities. It must be remembered that the supply, in the case of corn and other food stuffs, was
necessarily a local one. Then came centuries during which supply was furnished from so many direc-
tions that individuals could not control it. At the present time, with the increasing centralization of
business and facility of communication, it seems to be again becoming possible for individuals to
control the supply, not, as in the fourteenth century, of a town only, but of the civilized world. And if
such attempts succeed, we may come to look upon mediaeval legislation with somewhat more sympa-
thy.
§21. Of all articles, bread is that in the price of which the community is most interested. Hence it
was the very first to be directly dealt with by the Government. It did not seem possible to fix an
unalterable price for corn. The men of the time might perhaps have argued that if the agriculturist gave98 / William J. Ashley
each year the same amount of labour to his land he ought to receive much the same reward, and this
could not be unless he got a higher price when the harvest was deficient. All that the legislation we
have just noticed attempted to do was to prevent any speculation in corn, and any unnecessary interfer-
ence of middlemen. There is, indeed, in the London records, circ. 1291–1307, an entry referring to
“men sworn to watch that no one sold his corn above the just price.”137 And the town magistrates were
ready to punish with pillory or imprisonment any persons fraudulently enhancing prices; as, for exam-
ple, in 1347, a man who caused two bushels of corn belonging to him to be brought to market, and then,
“to the increase of the dearness of corn, offered for a bushel of his own wheat 1½d. beyond the com-
mon selling price of the bushel of wheat in that market on the same day sold.”138 Somewhat later there
is a case in which a man was sent to the pillory merely for following a servant about in the market with
a sample of wheat in his hand, and saying that “such wheat as that he would not be able to buy at a
lower price than 21 pence per bushel; whereas, on the same day, and at that hoar, the same servant
could have bought such wheat for 18 pence.”139 But it is clear, even from these examples, that the fair
price was left to be determined by free chaffering of the market-place.
And accordingly, in limiting the price of bread, it was not attempted to establish an invariable
standard, but only a sliding scale, according to which the weight of the farthing loaf should vary with
the price of the quarter of wheat. Such an Assize of Bread was first proclaimed in 1202, coming in
natural sequence after Henry II’s reformation of the coinage and Richard I’s assize of measures.140 In
later reissues the various sorts of bread were distinguished, and the relation in which their weights
should stand to “wastel bread of a farthing, white and well baked,” was carefully fixed. The most
important of these ordinances is the Assize of Bread and Ale attributed to 51 Henry III.141 This contains
a scale fixing the change in weight of the farthing loaf for each variation of sixpence in the price of the
quarter of wheat from twelve pence to twelve shillings: it allowed, therefore, for prices considerably
lower and considerably higher than were at all usual, for during the period 1259–1400 the average was
5s. 10¾d.; it fell but once below 3s., namely in 1287, and then only to 2s. 10¼d.; only in the two years
of famine, 1315–1316, did it rise above 12s.142 The assize declared, on the authority of the king’s
bakers, that, at the appointed weights, “a baker in every quarter of wheat may gain four-pence and the
bran, together with two loaves for the furnage (for the cost of the oven, or for oven-dues?), three
halfpence for three servants (journeymen), a halfpenny for two lads (apprentices); for salt a halfpenny,
for kneading a halfpenny, for candle a farthing, for wood twopence, for the sieve three halfpence.”143 If
a baker violates the assize he is to be fined; if the deficiency of weight is great he is to be put into the
pillory. The contemporary ordinance called Judicium Pilloriae, which orders that six lawful men in
each town shall have the supervision of weights and measures, directs them to inquire into the price of
wheat last market day, and fix the weight of “wastel of a farthing” in accordance with the assize.144 The
enforcement of the assize soon became part of the work of the ordinary municipal authorities. It is
ordered by a statute of Edward II that officers in cities or boroughs who by reason of their offices ought
to keep assizes of victuals, so long as they are attendant to those offices, shall not merchandise for
victuals, neither in gross nor by retail.145 At the end of the fourteenth century the maintenance of the
assize was added to the duties of the justices of the peace.146
How it was enforced may be illustrated by a case which came before the mayor and aldermen of
London in 1321.147 A certain William le Bole, a partner with another baker in an oven in Bread Street,—
clearly the home of the London bakers,—was charged with making light or “cocket” bread of less than
the proper weight. Two “bladarii,” or corn-dealers, gave evidence that on the last Wednesday market
day the quarter of good wheat was sold for eight shillings; “to this twelve pence being added for the
wages of the bakers and other necessaries in baking, the quarter is worth nine shillings.” The halfpenny
loaf of light bread should, therefore, they say,” weigh 43s. 3½d.” William le Bole foolishly declared the
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was bidden empannel a jury of twelve men of the ward of Bread Street, and of other neighbouring
wards; and these gave verdict that the accused was a partner, and that his bread was 3s. 10½d. under
due weight. Whereupon, for the double offence of breach of the assize and denial of the co-partnership,
William le Bole was condemned to be drawn through the city on the hurdle. This penalty for baker’s
fraud is said to have been first imposed by the mayor in 1283; and it was not discontinued until the
reign of Henry VI.148
From bread the legislator naturally turned his attention to the other necessary of mediaeval life,
ale. The Judicium Pilloriae adds to its rules as to bread and as to forestalling, a short scale fixing the
number of gallons of ale to be sold for a penny, according to variations in the price of the quarter of
barley: when the quarter is at 2s., then 4 gallons for a penny; at 2s. 6d., then 3½ gallons; 3s., then 3
gallons; 3s. 6d., then 2½ gallons; 4s., then 2 gallons; and so downwards, half a gallon less for every
sixpence.149 The average price of barley during the period was 4s. 3¾d, so that the consumer had
probably to be satisfied as a rule with two gallons of ale for his penny. As the average annual price only
four times during this period fell below 2s. 6d., the legislator seems to have been unduly hopeful in his
forecast.150 Henceforward bread and ale were always associated: brewers were supervised in the same
way as bakers, and punished in the same way if they violated the assize.
There was a very considerable importation of French, especially of Gascon, wine into this coun-
try. Its average price was little more than twice the price of ale; and there is good evidence that it was
consumed pretty generally by the middle classes, and especially in the towns.151 As early as 1199 the
Government had attempted to regulate its price, both wholesale and retail; but instead of devising some
sort of sliding ecale, it adopted the less satisfactory plan of fixing rates beyond which the prices of the
various sorts,—wine of Anjou, wine of Poitou, and French wine,—were not to rise. But “the merchants
could not endure this assize,” and they were granted permission to sell wine at a price half as large
again152 Yet the same plan of fixing a maximum price was adhered to throughout the next century. A
“sextary” for twelve pence was the appointed price: if taverners demanded more than this, the mayor or
bailiff was to cause their shop doors to be shut, and prevent their carrying on trade until they gained
permission from the king;153 and the municipal authorities were urged not to wait until the arrival of the
king’s justices before they inquired into violations of the assize.154 It is apparent, however, from a
statute of 1330, that these measures were not put into execution. In that year, Parliament complained
that the increasingly large number of taverners in the realm sold unwholesome wine, and also charged
unduly high prices “because there was no punishment ordained for them as hath been for them that
have sold Bread and Ale.” It was accordingly enacted “that none be so hardy to sell wines but at a
reasonable price, having regard to the price at the ports, and the expenses, such as the carriage from the
port to the place of sale.” Twice a year the mayors or bailiffs of towns were to make assay of wines, and
pour away all that was found corrupt.155 It would seem, however, that this statute only extended to other
towns what had been ordered by royal writ for London in 1311: doubtless the men appointed by the
municipal authorities every half-year to examine the quality of wine, exercised the power which we
know they had in London, of at the same time fixing the price of wine of each sort until the next
assay.156
After the middle of the fourteenth century the price of wine at least doubled,—a rise easy to
explain by the plague and the French war.157 From that time onward it became increasingly difficult to
regulate prices; and the government tried in vain to influence the price at which wine was imported by
alternately prohibiting and encouraging English traders to export it themselves from France instead of
leaving the business in the hands of Gascogners. But these difficulties fall outside the period we are
here considering. It is interesting to notice that the great fight in the streets of Oxford in 1354, between
town and gown, arose from a dispute between a scholar and a taverner over a quart of wine, and that
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mayor entirely, the complete supervision of the assize of bread, ale, and wine, and all victuals.”158
In curious contrast with its anxiety about the price of bread, the central Government lost the
regulation of the price of meat entirely to the local authorities, contenting itself with the enactment that
butchers selling unwholesome meat should be severely punished.159 In London the butchers were under
the supervision of wardens, whose duty it was to bring unwholesome meat before the mayor and
alderman. The accused had the right of demanding “inquisition” by a jury into the character of the
meat; and if it was condemned he was punished by being put into the pillory, and having the meat burnt
before his face.160 The municipal authorities also, at least as early as the later years of Edward I, fixed
maximum prices for the carcases of oxen, cows, sheep, and pigs.161
The town magistrates, indeed, were not less anxious than were Parliament and the ministers to
keep the trade in articles of food under due control. Besides carrying out the assizes of bread, ale, and
wine, they issued ordinances regulating the prices of poultry and fish, appointing the markets at which
each sort of food was to be sold, and providing for their supervision.162 Accounts of punishments
inflicted on persons selling unwholesome food form a very considerable part of the town records.163
Among craftsmen some were more than others subject to regulation by the town magistrates.
They were such as had no fixed shops, but moved about from place to place to perform particular
pieces of work, “carpenters, masons, plasterers, daubers, tilers, and the servants of such.”164 An ordi-
nance of the mayor and aldermen of London in the reign of Edward I fixed the wages of “masters” in all
these crafts at fourpence a day between Michaelmas and Maitinmas, or three halfpence and food at the
employer’s table, whichever the employer may prefer; between Martinmas and Candlemas threepence,
or “one penny and the table;” between Candlemas and Easter fivepence, or “twopence and the table.”
Journeymen are to receive less. “Paviours” are at all seasons to receive twopence for making a piece of
pavement, 7½ feet long and 1 foot wide; carters for every cart of sand or gravel of a certain quantity,
one penny. “If any man of the city give more to any workman than is here written and commanded, let
him be amerced to the city in forty shillings, without any pardon.”
There were, however, but few other cases in which the municipal authorities attempted to regulate
wages or prices before the middle of the fourteenth century. It will be well, for the present, to confine
ourselves to the period preceding the Black Death, and to leave the question what effect that calamity
had upon industrial policy to a later section. No doubt the town magistrates claimed the right to regu-
late wages when they thought proper; and this right they occasionally exercised; e.g., in London, to
regulate blacksmiths’ charges for shoeing horses.165 This was a matter in which a traveller in a hurry
might be at the mercy of a blacksmith. So also the charges to be made by curriers166 and leather-
dressers167 were limited. But, as a rule, the price of manufactured goods seems to have been left to be
determined by the rules of the gilds; the limitation in London of the price of spurs by civic ordinance is
an almost solitary example to the contrary.168 Unfortunately we have too little evidence to be able to
speak with confidence as to how the gilds regulated prices. In many crafts the artisan did not purchase
the material himself, but received it from a customer to be made up, and received a payment for his
service: these payments in each craft were doubtless fixed by custom and common consent, and over-
charges seem to have been punished.169 The amount of remuneration when the artisan only did the
work and did not provide the material would doubtless help to determine the price to be paid for an
article when it was bought ready made. The weak point in the system was that when once the gilds
became firmly established they tended to limit their numbers and to raise prices. This was a danger
very apparent in the later years of the fourteenth century, but even as early as 1321 it had begun to show
itself in the conduct of the London weavers. The weavers’ gild had been the earliest to come into
existence: it had been forced to carry on a long struggle with the municipal authorities for the very right
of existence; and now, within twenty years after its final victory, it is found limiting the supply of cloth
and the number of men in the trade. Yet the gilds were not left altogether without check: for the wardsAn Introduction to English Economic History and Theory, volume one / 101
of Candlewick (i.e., Cannon) Street and Walbrook presented the weavers before the king’s justices, on
the charge that “by confederacy and conspiracy, in the Church of S. Margaret Pattens, they ordained
among themselves that for weaving each cloth they should take sixpence more than anciently they had
been wont;” and it would appear, though the record is imperfect, that they were obliged to return to the
old charges.170
§22. The direct action of the Government influenced the economic life of society in many other
respects, both in the way of facilitating trade, and also by limiting it in certain directions. Of these
limitations the most important was the prohibition of usury. In the compilation known as the Laws of
Edward the Confessor, drawn up probably early in the twelfth century, Edward is said to have ordained
forfeiture and outlawry as the penalty for usury: “the king used to say that he had heard, when he was
staying in the court of the king of France, that usury was the root of all vices.”171 But with the growth of
separate ecclesiastical courts, cases of usury were removed from lay jurisdiction: the author of the
Dialogue on the Exchequer, writing about 1178, is careful to point out that “against an usurious clerk or
Christian layman the royal power has no action, while he is yet alive, but he is reserved to the ecclesi-
astical jurisdiction to be condemned according to his rank;” though, upon his death, if he had not
worthily repented,—i.e., directed by will that restitution should be made to those from whom he had
obtained his unjust gains,—his chattels were forfeited to the king.172
This compromise between the two jurisdictions was confirmed by a statute of 1341: “The king
and his heirs shall have the cognisance of usurers dead, and the ordinaries of Holy Church shall have
the cognisance of usurers living, as to them pertaineth, to compel them by the censures of Holy Church
for their sin, to make restitution of the usuries they have taken against the laws of Holy Church.”173 But
so far were ecclesiastics from being in advance of public opinion, that in the later years of the four-
teenth century Parliament frequently complained of the laxity of the Church courts: and, as early as
1363, the municipality of London were specially empowered by the king to make regulations against
the evil. In a case brought before the mayor and aldermen in 1377, the usurer was sentenced to forfeit
double the interest he had demanded.174
In spite of the law of England and Christendom, a trade in money which the opinion of the time
regarded as usurious was carried on in the thirteenth century by the Caursines, and in the fourteenth
century by Lombards. The means by which they evaded the penalties of the ecclesiastical courts are of
especial interest, as showing the development of a theory which in the sequel did much to weaken the
force of the prohibition of usury, the theory namely of “interest,” in the original sense of that word.
According to Roman law, when one party to a contract, whether of sale, hiring, or of any other sort, did
not perform his part, he could be forced not only to perform the promised act or pay an equivalent, but
also to recompense the other party for any loss which might have accrued to him by the non-fulfil-
ment,—to make up id quod interest, i.e., for the difference between the man’s present position and
what it would have been if the contract had been fulfilled. Thus, suppose you had bargained to sell a
horse and did not transfer the horse to the purchaser at the appointed time, and suppose the latter were
a doctor and had lost the fee he might have earned through being unable to ride to a patient, you might
be compelled not only to restore the purchase-money but also to make up for the loss sustained.175 Early
mediaeval legists divided the cases in which such a claim could be put forward to those of damnum
emergent and lucrum cessans, loss arising, or gain prevented, by the non-fulfilment of an obligation.
And they urged that such a claim might be properly put forward by a lender if the borrower did not
repay a loan at the appointed time. The doctrine was early accepted by the schoolmen and canonists, so
far as resultant loss was concerned: and Aquinas grants that this recompense may justly be previously
bargained for: “A man who lends may, without sin, contract with the creditor [to receive] recompense
for a loss.... This is not to sell the use of money [i.e., usury] but merely to avoid loss.” But the claim to
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held that with the transfer of coins went the right to use them and make what profit was possible; and
that accordingly the lender, when he handed over the coins, gave up any such claim. “Recompense for
loss deemed to arise from the money not bringing any gain cannot be bargained for,” says Aquinas, “for
a man ought not to sell what he has not got.” 176 Accordingly it was for a long time difficult for civil
lawyers to lay stress on this ground for compensation, and consequently they turned with all the more
zest to the consideration of damnum emergent. They began by laying down the rule, “Interest is only
owing where there has been delay.”177 To have argued that the mere fact that money was lent implied in
itself a loss or inconvenience to the lender which called for reward, would have brought them into
violent conflict with the whole doctrine of usury. Only when the time for repayment had passed, and
the debtor still did not pay, did the creditor begin to gain a right to more than the bare sum lent. What
the inconveniences or losses of the waiting creditor might be were not very clearly defined: the lawyers
contented themselves with imagining oases in which the creditor might suffer loss, as, e.g., by inability
to pay taxes.178 But they came to this pregnant conclusion: since it is allowable to a man to avoid loss to
himself, he may justly bargain for a definite reward to be paid for the loss he will receive by a delay in
payment.
The proceedings of the Caursines in England show the use which could be made of such a princi-
ple. How the town of Cahors gained so evil a reputation as the home of usurers that Dante puts it by the
side of Sodom, the home of fleshly sin, in his “Inferno,” does not seem to be known; the term “Caursine”
was probably very loosely applied in England to money-merchants from southern France, and some-
times perhaps to merchants from Italy. They first came to England about 1235, as “papal merchants,”
i.e., to assist in the collection of papal revenues in England, and in sending them to Rome: and Mat-
thew Paris tells us how even the king was heavily in their debt; and how they cozened the needy,
“pretending not to know that whatever is added to the capital is usury, however it may be called.”
Roger, bishop of London, in vain admonished them to desist from their enormities. He went so far as to
excommunicate them, and to order them to withdraw from his diocese, especially from the city of
London, “which up to that time had been ignorant of such a pestilence.” But, the same chronicler tells
us, the Caursines had such influence at Rome that the bishop was summoned thither, and forced to give
up his attempt to expel them.179 In 1240, “the king’s eyes were opened,” and they were banished; but
many were able by means of bribery to conceal themselves in England.180 Most of these, however, left
in 1245, when the papal legate was ordered to withdraw.181 But in 1251 they were again numerous and
prosperous in London, and establishing themselves in great palaces; defying the prelates as merchants
of the pope, and defying the populace through the protection of the magnates, some of whom Matthew
Paris accuses of intrusting money to the Caursines to trade with. But the king’s conscience was aroused,
and many of them were in that year brought before the secular courts, and condemned to imprison-
ment.182
How it was that they were able to evade the laws both of Church and State, and so make it possible
for the popes to protect them, is seen from the form of acknowledgment of debt which they obtained
from those to whom they had lent money. A copy is preserved by Matthew Paris.
“N the Prior, and the convent of M, to all who shall see this present writing, greeting in the Lord.
Know that we have received at London... from A and B, for themselves and their partners, citizens and
merchants of the city of C, a hundred and four marks of good and lawful sterlings.... Which marks
aforesaid we promise by lawful agreement, and are bound in the name of ourselves and our Church
wholly to restore and repay, to the aforesaid merchants, or to one of them, or to an agent of theirs who
shall bring with him this letter,... on August 1, at New Temple in London, the year of Our Lord’s
Incarnation 1235: with this added condition, that if that money is not paid at the appointed place and
time, then, the appointed period being over, we promise thereafter... to pay them... every two months
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losses and expenses as they may thereby incur or suffer; so that [recompense for] losses, and expenses,
and the capital may be sued for, together with the expenses of one merchant with one horse and one
servant, wherever the merchant may be, until the full payment of all the aforesaid. The expenses also
caused or that shall be caused in the recovery of the money we will pay and restore to the merchants, or
one of them, or their agent. This recompense for losses, interest, and expenses [recompensatio damnorum,
interesse, et expensarum], we promise not to reckon as part of the principal.... To fulfil the above
promises we bind ourselves and our Church and our successors, and all our property and that of our
Church, moveables and immoveables, ecclesiastical and secular, present and to come, wherever found,
to the aforesaid merchants and their heirs, until full payment of the above, recognizing that we hold our
property at their good will. And for the aforesaid we are willing to answer anywhere and before any
tribunal [in omni foro conveniri], renouncing for ourselves and our successors any aid from either
canon or civil law, privilege of clergy and (clerical) jurisdiction,... from customs or statute, letters,
indulgences, or privileges obtained or that may be obtained on behalf of the king of England and his
subjects from the Apostolic see,... the benefit of restitution, the benefit of appeal, letters of inhibition
from the king of England, and every other objection against this instrument. In witness whereof we
have placed our seal to this present document, April 19, 1235.”183
In this example, doubtless a genuine one, a sum of money is borrowed nominally only for a little
over three months. If the convent chanced to be able to repay it on August 1, nothing would have to be
paid for the loan: but from that date onward they were to pay for the loan at the rate of sixty per cent per
annum, seventeen per cent higher than the Jews were permitted to bargain for. It is obvious that if this
were permitted, all that the money lender needed to do to make himself safe was to allow a period
during which the loan was gratuitous: but this period could be made very short, and the lender was not
likely to make loans except to those who were not likely to pay on the nominal settling day. Yet it is
interesting to notice the care the lender takes to make the borrower renounce any protection he might
receive from the canon law and from ecclesiastical courts. The terminology of the agreement is still a
little obscure: it is not quite clear whether the payment of one mark for ten every two months is the only
obligation of the borrower, beside the repayment of the capital; but it is probable that is the meaning,
and the repetition of the words “loss” and “expense” is only in order to give an apparent justification
for the monthly payment. Probably this was not the only formula used by the Caursines. Grossteste is
represented as lamenting on his deathbed over these extortions of “the merchants and exchangers of
our lord the pope:” they force a man, he says, who borrows a hundred marks from them promising to
pay a hundred pounds at the end of the year, to sign an acknowledgment that he has received a hundred
pounds; and they are harder than the Jews, for if, after a short time, the borrower offers to repay, they
will not take less than a hundred pounds, while the Jews would only ask for the interest on a hundred
marks for the time the borrower has actually kept the money.184
Just as the pressure of need led prelates and religious communities, themselves perfectly aware of
the prohibition of usury, to borrow money from usurers, so there can be little doubt that some of the
popes, engaged at this time in their struggle with the Emperor Frederick II, and anxious for all the aid
the Caursine merchants could give them in raising money, were disposed to protect them however near
they might sail to the wind, provided they did not break the letter of the canon law. It is indeed very
evident that legislation, both papal and royal, was due far more to the teaching of theologians and to a
strong public opinion than to abiding dislike of usury on the part of the legislators themselves. This is
strikingly brought out by the history of the Jews in England. Their unpopularity is not sufficiently
explained merely by the statement that, while the king pillaged them, he permitted them to pillage the
Christian population: it was rather because, to gain protection for themselves, they were obliged to
make themselves the means by which the king pillaged the nation.185 In 1194, it was ordered by Richard
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tians and two appointed Jews and two clerks: the acknowledgment of debt was to be duplicated, one
copy given to the Jew lender, the other put in a chest or coffer, under the charge of the officials before
mentioned. No change was to be made save in the presence of the wardens of the chest. When the debt
was repaid, the creditor gave the debtor a release, which he had to present to the wardens, receiving
from them thereupon the copy of the acknowledgment (carta) in the coffer. Such coffers existed in
about twenty-six towns.186 On this basis, and probably about the same time, was created the Exchequer
of the Jews at Westminster,—a branch of the great Exchequer, with its own justices and officials, and
with cognizance of all suits between Christians and Jews. At intervals the king imposed heavy tallages
on the Jews,—bringing in an amount equal on an annual average to about a thirteenth of his revenue.187
Before the order was issued it was usual to command a scrutiny or registration to be made of all the
charters contained in the chests in the various towns, and after this had been done the chests were
sealed up. A considerable number of Jews were sure not to be able to pay the tallage, whereupon their
“debts” were confiscated: the charters acknowledging debts to them were sent up to the Exchequer of
the Jews, and their creditors were forthwith called upon to pay the king or make terms with him.188 The
king’s right of tallaging the Jews was therefore an indirect right of tallaging the people: hence the
clauses of Magna Carta ordering that interest shall not accumulate during a minority, and that wives of
dead debtors should have their dower, were really directed against the king: and the expulsion of the
Jews in 1290 is to be placed by the side of “the confirmation of the charters,” as, like it, a concession to
a constitutional demand. And just as great men were accused of making usurious profit on money
which they put into the hands of the Caursines, so it was complained by the barons, in 1257, that the
Jews,—doubtless to buy protection,—sometimes transferred their debts to powerful men, who took
the opportunity thus given to them to obtain possession of lands which had been pledged to the Jews
for payment.189
The rate of “gain” that Jews were permitted to receive and usually did receive during the thir-
teenth century, was twopence per week on every pound, i.e., about 431/3 per cent per annum.190 It was to
meet the troubles caused by poor Oxford scholars borrowing at such an exorbitant rate, that Grossteste,
while chancellor, established the first “chest,” that of S. Frideswide. Out of this loans were made
gratuitously to scholars whose annual income was less than two marks, and in it were placed the
articles of clothing or books which they gave in pledge.191 This example was followed by benevolent
persons, until in the fifteenth century there were a dozen or more of such chests.192
§23. Lastly, mention must be made of the great service which the Government rendered to com-
merce and trade by the establishment of a simple procedure to enforce the payment of ordinary mercan-
tile debts. This was by the Statute of Merchants or of Acton Burnell in 1283. Merchants, the preamble
begins, have often been injured by there being “no speedy law” to have recovery of their debts, and
many merchants have consequently refrained from coming into the country. In future a merchant is to
have the power of bringing his debtor before the mayor. If he proves the debt, the debtor must affix his
seal to a “bill obligatory,” binding himself to pay on a certain day. If he does not do so, he can be
brought again before the mayor, who shall at once cause his movables to be sold tip to the amount of
the debt. If no buyer can be found, movables up to the amount are to be given over to the creditor; if the
debtor has no movables within the mayor’s jurisdiction, the mayor is to send the necessary information
to the chancellor, who shall then cause a writ to be sent to the sheriff within whose county the debtor
has movables, ordering them to be distrained upon. If the debtor has no movables, he is to be impris-
oned until he comes to terms, or his friends mate terms for him, the creditor meanwhile providing him
with bread and water, the cost of which is to be added to the debt. If the debtor has secured sureties,
they are to be proceeded against in the same way, though not unless the debtor has not sufficient
property himself to pay. Foreign merchants are empowered to add to the sums owing to them the cost
of their own maintenance while waiting for the debts to be paid.193An Introduction to English Economic History and Theory, volume one / 105
The statute was of too innovating a character not to meet with difficulties in its execution. Two
years later it was re-enacted more precisely, because “sheriffs sometimes by malice and false interpre-
tation delayed the execution of the statute.”194 In 1311, it was enacted among the ordinances that this
statute should only apply to merchants, and to debts arising from the sale of goods: at the same time the
number of places at which such suits might be heard was increased from the three (London, York,
Bristol) mentioned in the statute of the preceding king to twelve: Newcastle, York, and Nottingham,
“for the counties beyond Trent, and the merchants there coming and abiding;” Exeter, Bristol, and
Southampton, for “the parts of the south and west;” Lincoln and Northampton for merchants there;
London and Canterbury, Shrewsbury and Norwich.195 From this time onward foreign merchants would
find no great difficulty in recovering debts owing to them from native traders: especially after the Carta
Mercatoria, in 1303, had established the rule that in suits between foreigners and Englishmen the juries
should be composed half of English, half of natives of the place whence the foreigner came. But
difficulties long remained in the way of the recovery of debts by an Englishman from a foreigner no
longer residing in this country. In such cases the English municipal authorities had been wont to confis-
cate any goods they might be able to seize, belonging to any merchant from the same town. This rude
method of retaliation was but gradually given up. Henry III, in the later years of his reign, granted
letters of protection to Ghent, Bruges, Ypres, Douai, S. Omer, and Lübek, promising that their citizens
trading in England should be held responsible only for their own debts, or debts for which they had
made themselves sureties.196 But this rule was not made of universal application until 1353. In a statute
of that year it was enacted that merchants should only be sued for their own debts or those of persons
whose “pledges” they had been: but if English subjects were injured by the lord of any foreign land or
her subjects, the king threatens to exercise the right of reprisal, if the foreign prince, having been duly
warned, fail to provide that justice should be done.197 It has been shown in an earlier section that the
usual practice at the middle of the century, when a debtor residing abroad refused to pay, was for the
English municipal authorities to write to the authorities of the foreign town to which he belonged,
threatening reprisal unless the debt were paid.
“We are now, perhaps, in a position to sum up the characteristics of the period we have been
considering. It was one in which, out of and alongside of a village economy,—a condition of things in
which almost all the economic life of the country was concentrated in a number of agricultural groups,—
had grown up a town economy, where manufactures and trade were fostered and monopolized by civic
communities, becoming more and more unlike the agricultural population, yet stimulating agriculture
by providing markets. Within the manor groups, though there was little apparent change in everyday
life, the plan of commutation of services was preparing the ground for the more violent changes that
were to come: within the towns, the burgher monopoly was slowly broken down by native artisans and
foreign merchants. Dealings between man and man were influenced by principles which have almost
disappeared from modern life, but which were then, to at least a large extent, enforced by the authority
of Church and State. The royal authority secured for society trustworthy instruments of exchange; and
by helping to break down the privileges of isolated town communities, prepared the way for the idea of
a national economy to make its appearance in the sixteenth century.196
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ples of Pol. Econ., bk. ii., ch. 2) that “cost of production cannot be assumed to be independent of
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Studien, ii. 44–46. For an illustration of the practical working of this maintenance of “the common
selling price in a particular market on a particular day,” see Memorials of London, 236.
37. 8. Luke vi. 35, as quoted from the Vulgate: “Mutuum date, nihil inde sperantes.”
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Deum colentibus usuras acciperent, propter avaritiam cui dediti erant;” Secunda Secundae, quaestio
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87. Ducange defines monetagium as “praestatio quae a tenentibus et vassalis domino fit tertio quoque anno,
ea conditione ut monetam mutare ei non liceat.” See article 5 in Henry I’s Charter of Liberties (in Select
Charters, 101), and cf. Ruding, i. 163.
88. Athelstan, II. 14, §1; Ethelred, II. 8; in Schmid, 140, 216.
89. English Chronicle, s.a. 1125.
90. Ruding, i. 164.
91. Ib., i. 171,184. Of the coinage of 1180, Ralph de Diceto says (ii. 7, Rolls’ ed.), “Philippus Aymari, natione
Turonicus, mandate regis in Angliam veniens, numismatis innovandi procurationem suscepit. Hyemali
siquidem festo beati Martini moneta veteri reprobata, nummus in forma rotunda commerciis hominum
passim est per regnum expositus.”
92. Rymer, Foedera, i. 12. Henry to Samson, bishop, and Urso d’Abetot, and all barons French and English
in Worcestershire: “Sciatis quod volo et precipio quod omnes burgenses et omnes illi qui in burgis morantur,
tam Franci quam Angli, jurent tenere et servare monetam meam in Anglia, et non consentiant falsitetem
monetae meae.” This illustrates the way in which the increasing importance of the currency was due to the
growth of town life.
93. Ruding, i. 178.
94. Ib. No money was to be current wanting more than 2s. 6d.in the pound: such pennies as were more
defective were to be bored through and returned to their owners, never again to be used.
95. Macaulay, chap. xxi. The supply of coin was so small that the government of Edward I ordered, in 1300,An Introduction to English Economic History and Theory, volume one / 111
the compulsory circulation even of pollards and crockards (polled, i.e., clipped, and crooked pennies), at
the rate of two for a penny; Memorials, 42; Liber Custumarum, 563.
96. Ruding, i. 179. As to the general tendency towards uniformity of type, of. Keary, in Coins and Medals,
ed. Lane-Poole (1885), p. 107.
97. Ruding, i. 70.
98. Ib., i. 187.
99. Ib., i. 70.
100. Ib., i. 193.
101. The statements in the two preceding paragraphs are all based on E. W. Robertson, Historical Essays
(1872), 41–45, 60–67. For the Assize of Weights and Measures, see Statutes of the Realm, i. 204.
102. See Ruding, and for Edward’s gold coinage, St. of Realm, i. 301.
103. Mention must also be made of the coinage of groats and half-groats. This is assigned by the continuer
of Murimuth (p. 182), followed by Walsingham (Rolls’ ed. i., 275), to 1351: “William of Edyngdon,
bishop of Winchester, treasurer of the kingdom, and a man of great prudence, who loved the good of the
king more than that of the community, devised and caused to be coined a new money, namely, the groat
and half-groat; but these were of less weight than the like sum of sterling. This was afterwards the cause
that food and merchandise became dearer throughout the whole of England.” The chronicler does no
more than echo the popular discontent at a novelty; the great plague of two years before and its conse-
quences are quite sufficient to account for increased prices.
104. For English money of account, see Jevons, Money, 71; and Keary, Introd. to Catal., xxxiii–xxxv. As to
payments by weight, see the account of Exchequer practice in the Dialogus de Scaccario, I., ch. 7, in
Select Charters, p. 193.
105. Statutes of the Realm, i. 219.
106. Ib., 132; respite of penalty, 134; lightened, 200.
107. Ib., 219 (assigned to 12 Ed. II.).
108. Ib., 273 (1335).
109. Ib., 132, 272. As to the licences granted to individual merchants, see Ochenkowski, Englands
Wirthschaftliche Enlwickelung, 205.
110. Ochenkowski, 212, 213.
111. Stat, of Realm, i. 291.
112. The working of mediaeval legislation on the coinage is made the more easy to understand when it is
noticed that the business of exchange was a royal monopoly. Cambium is at first used for both mint and
exchange; and for a long time the work of exchanging was entrusted to the royal moneyers. The writ of
Henry I before quoted (Rymer, i. 12) adds, “Defendo ne aliquis monetarius denarios mutat nisi in comitatu
suo, et hoc coram duohus legitimis testibus.... Et nullus sit ausus camhire denarios nisi monetarius.” John
committed the “cambium totius Angliae” to one person for a large payment: probably he appointed local
exchangers. This plan of appointing an exchanger for the whole kingdom, paying usually an annual sum
to the king for the privilege, was long retained. Frequent statutes, from 1354 onward, forbade under the
severest penalties any “exchange for profit” by unauthorized persons; and this prohibition was main-
tained till 1539, when its removal was largely due to the representations of Sir Thomas Gresham. See
Ruding, ii. 138, seq.
113. Political Economy, bk. v., ch. 1, §2 (i. 387).
114. Social Statics, ch. xxix.
115. Jevons, Money, 81.
116. Ricardo, High Price of Bullion, See criticism by Walker, Money (1878), p. 48, seq.
117. These estimates, which are frequently referred to in economic literature, are derived from Jacob, In-
quiry into the Precious Metals (1831). They will be found summarized in Walker, Money, p. 124, seq.112 / William J. Ashley
118. X., lib. iii., tit. xvii., c. 2.
119. Summa, Secunda Secundae, quaestio lxxvii., artic. 2.
120. Schmid, Gesetze, and Glossar. s.v. Gemet; for Edgar’s law, p. 192.
121. Roger of Hoveden (Rolls’ Series), iv. 33.
122. Liber Custumarum, 383. The citizens of London, objecting in 14 Edward II to an ordinance that the
gallon for ale should be larger than that for wine, “dixerunt quod una mensura vini et cervisiae erit
concordans per totam Angliam, sicut continetur in Magna Charta de Libertatibus Angliae: et sicut usi sunt
semper, et maxime a tempere Regis Ricardi, ab anno regni ipsius viii.; quando omnes mensurae Angliae
examinatae fuerunt et factae concordes, et in Londonia standarda regia posits.” This reference, with much
other help in §§19, 21, is given by Schanz.
123. Hoveden, iv. 62.
124. Roger of Wendover gives an interesting piece of information, which shows how very largely the work
of government depended on the personal action of the sovereign. He tells us that Henry III, on his journey
from York to London in 1228, “menouras bladi, vini, et cervisiae falsitatis arguens, quasdam confregit, et
comburere nonnullas praecepit; et vasa substituens capaciora, pauem majoris ponderia juasit fieri, et
hujus statuti contemptores poena gravi pecuniaria multari praecepit:” in Matthew Paris, Chronica Majora
(Rolls’ ed.), iii. 148.
125. Stat. of Realm, i. 204.
126. See Schanz, 580, and references there given to Munimenta Gildhallae. See also, in Memorials of
London, 78, the oath exacted from turners not to make false measures (1310).
127. Stat. of R., i. 330. A few sentences are here taken from my Woollen Industry, 31–34.
128. Stat. of R., i. 203, 204. For later distinctions between forestallers, engrossers, and regrators, see 5 and
6, Ed. IV., c. 14; Stat. of Realm, iv. 148. But for use of regrator in the sense in which forestaller is used in
the ordinance quoted in the text, see Doomsday of Ipswich in Black Book of the Admiralty (Rolls’ Series),
ii. 101. Engross and forestall seem to be used as equivalents in 27 Ed. III, st. 1, cap. 5, in Stat. of Realm, i.
331.
129. Stat. of Realm, i. 202; Black Book of Admir., i. 71.
130. E.g., in 1350–1, 1353, 1357, Stat. of Realm, i. 315, 331, 858.
131. Memorials of London, 83, 318.
132. Wealth of Nations, ed. Rogers, ii. 103–111.
133. Six Centuries of Work and Wages, 144.
134. Principles of Pol. Economy, 205 (bk. ii. ch. 2, § 8).
135. Pol. Economy, i. 523, 524 (bk. ii, ch. 16, § 4).
136. An article in the Spectator for Dec. 31, 1887, on The Monopoly of Copper, strikingly illustrates the
impotence of the modern abstract economist in handling practical problems. The writer declares that the
French journalists who demand state interference with the syndicate are “economically” in the wrong;
because, if high prices continue, there will be an increase of production, new mines being opened, etc.,
until the excess of supply forces prices down again;—disregarding the enormous waste of capital and
labour which is involved in opening new mines which after a short time have to be shut again. He lays
down that “it is quite impossible to show that cornering or engrossing is immoral, when the article pur-
chased does not involve human life,”—a conception of morality which is probably less satisfactory than
that of mediaeval schoolmen. Yet he seems to think that if the application of the existing French laws
against engrossing could destroy the practice, this might properly be deemed satisfactory by the public,
though not by “sound economists.”
137. Liber Albus, 692.
138. Memorials of London, 286.
139. Ib., 314 (1363). Mention ought to have been made in the text of the action of the Government in theAn Introduction to English Economic History and Theory, volume one / 113
matter of the export of corn. The general rule, certainly from 1177, probably from a much earlier date, was
that export was entirely forbidden except by royal licence. Dr. Faber, in his Entstehung des Agrarschutzes
in England (Strassburg, 1888), p. 65, argues that the policy of the executive was influenced in the thir-
teenth century chiefly by a wish to secure cheap food, in the fourteenth century to increase the royal
revenue. The Carta Mercatoria gave permission to foreign merchants to export corn on paying a duty of
3s. in the pound; a privilege which shared the history of the rest of the provisions of that charter. Vide
supra, 197, 108, and Faber, 75–77.
140. Matthew Paris, Chronica Majora (Rolls’ Series), ii. 480. The earliest extant enactment on the subject
occurs among the regulations drawn up for the crusaders by Richard and Philip Augustus, at Messina, in
1190: “Statutum est a domino rege anglorum et constabulariis et justitiis et marescallis exercitus regia
Angliae, quod mercator de quacunque mercatione sit non potest emere panem ad revendendum in exercitu,
nec farinam [i.e., to forestall]... Si autem aliquis bladum emerit et de eo panem fecerit, tenetur lucrari in
ualma [a seam, or quarter of grain], unum terrim [the Sicilian coin called tarenus, weighing 20 grains of
gold] tantum, et brennon [the bran]. Alii vero mercatores, de quaeunque mercatione sint mercatores, in
decem denarios tenentur lucrari unum denarium.... Et ne aliquis carnem mortuam emat ad revendendum,
nec bestiam vivam, nisi eam occiderit in exercitn. Nullus vinum suum post primam conclamationem
carius vendat. Nullus panem faciat nisi ad unum denarium; “ Benedictus, Gesta Henrici II et Ricardi I, ii
181 (ed. Stubbs, Rolls’ Series).
141. Stat. of Realm, i. 199.
142. Rogers, Hist. of Agric., i. 217.
143. As the translation ia not altogether certain, it will be well to give the text here: “Sciendum est quod
pistor potest lucrari in quolibet quarterio frumenti, ut probatum est per pistores domini regis, quatuor
denarios et furfur [et duos panes] ad furnagium, tribus servientibus denarium et obolum, duobus garcionibus
obolum. In sale obolum. In gesto obolum; in candela quadrantem. In bosco [ii. denarios]. In bultello
habendo [denarium et obolum].” The amounts given within brackets differ in the copy preserved in the
London Liber Horn.
144. Stat. of Realm, i. 201.
145. Statute of York, c. 6, 12 Ed. II. in Stat. of Realm, i. 178. The prohibition includes the sale of wine.
146. Cf. Schanz, 637, 638. For the office of Justice of the Peace, see Gneist, Self-Government, (1871), §11.
147. In the London archives is a folio volume of 164 leaves (34 blank), marked Assisa Panis, containing a
register of the weights of bread as fixed from time to time, and of many of the cases of violation of assize
that were brought before the mayor. Extracts are printed in the Appendix to Munimenta Gildhallae, iii.
For William le Bole’s case, see p. 411. The plan of reckoning the price of the quarter at the market price of
the wheat plus the cost of baking, seems to be different from that prescribed in the copy of the assize
printed in the Statute Book.
148. Glossary to Mun. Gildh., iii. 304, s.v. “Claie.”
149. Stat. of Realm., i. 202. An article in the Assize of Bread (ib., 200), makes a distinction between town and
country prices: “When a quarter of wheat is sold for 3s. or 3s. 4d., and a quarter of barley for 20d. or 2s.,
and a quarter of oats for 16d., then brewers in cities ought and may well afford to sell two gallons of ale for
a penny, and out of cities to sell three gallons for a penny. And when in a town three gallons are sold for a
penny, out of a town they ought and may well afford to sell four.”
150. Rogers, Hist. of Agric., i. 219.
151. Ib., 618, 623.
152. Hoveden, iv. 99. See Schanz, i. 642, seq.
153. Statute of Bakers, in Stat. of Realm, i. 208.
154. Statute of Gloucester, ib., i. 50.
155. Ib., 264.114 / William J. Ashley
156. The king’s writ of 1311 orders that “the mayor and aldermen shall cause eight or twelve good and
lawful men to be chosen, who are the most skilled in wines, and shall make them swear well and lawfully
to assay the wines in all the taverns of London, and in the suburbs of the liberties thereof; and they shall
cause the tuns to be marked, each at its value, with the mark that shall be thereunto ordained, that is to say:
The gallon of the best wine to be sold at five pence, the next best at four pence, and the rest at three pence
per gallon, for this year. And let every wine be set at its value without mixture; and let each tun be marked
at the end in front, that so the buyer may readily see the value of the wine. And let every buyer see his wine
drawn, that so he may not be deceived;” Memorials, 82; cf. 182.
157. Rogers, Hist, of Agric., i. 622.
158. Rob. of Avesbury, de miribilibus gestis Edwardi tertii (ed. Hearne, 1720), 197.
159. In Stat. of Bakers, Stat. of Realm, i. 208.
160. Memorials, 138, 139.
161. Liber Custumarum, 304; Liber Albus, 713.
162. The Assize of Poultry of 14 Ed. II is given in the Liber Custumarum, 304: “Et a ceste assise gardier,
soient ordonez par les Meire, Aldermans, et Viscountes, vi. prodeahommes de la cite, qe ne soient pat du
mettier; issint qe les iii. soient assignez a garder lassise a la Sale de Plom [i.e., Leadenhall], entre les
foreinz [i.e., non-burghers], et les autre iii. soient a la Poletrie [i.e., the Poultry], pur garder laasise entre les
denzeina.” As to the Leadenhall market, see Memorials, 220, 221.
163. E.g., Memorials, 90, 119, 121, 132,139.
164. Liber Albus, 728. For conditions of labour in rural districts, see Rogers, Hist. of Agric., i. 253.
165. Liber Albus. liii., 733.
166. 16., 719.
167. Memorials, 234.
168. Liber Albus, Introd. liii.
169. To judge from §24 of the ordinances of the weavers, 28 Ed. I, in Liber Custumarum, 126: see translation
in Mun. Gildh. ii. pt. 2, p. 550.
170. Liber Custumarum, 416, seq. Cf. Engl. Woollen Industry, 45–47.
171. Schmid, Gesetze, 518.
172. Dialogus, II, ch. 10, in Select Charters, 229. The writer draws a distinction between “public” and
“private” usury. “Publicas igitur et usitatas usuras dicimus quando, mora Judaeorum, in eadem specie ex
conventione quia amplius percepturus est quam commodavit; sicut libram pro marca, vel pro libra argenti
duos denarios in septimaua de lucro praeter sortem [the rate permitted to the Jews]; non publicas autem
sed tamen damnabiles cum quis fundum aliquem vel ecolesiam pro commodato suscipit, et manente
sortis integritate, fructus ejus, donec sors ipsa soluta fuerit, sibi peroipt. Hoc genus propter laborem et
sumptum qui in agriculturia soient impendi licentius visum est; sed procul dubio sordidum est et inter
usuras computandum merito.” We have seen that it was expressly forbidden by Alexander III.
173. Stat. of Realm, i. 296. Madox, Exchequer, 237, gives five examples, from the Pipe Rolls of the later
years of Henry II, of the forfeiture of the “pecunia” and “catalla” of usurers.
174. See Cunningham, in Journal of Institute of Bankers, Feb. 1887.
175. Endemann, Studien, ii. 243, seq. The most important passage in Roman law on this matter is Codex, vii.
47: “Cum pro eo quod interest dubitationes antiquae in infinitum productae sunt, melius nobis visum est
hujusmodi prolixitatem prout possibile est in augustum coartare. Sancimus itaque in omnibus casibus,
qui certain habent quantitatem vel naturam, veluti in venditionibus, et locationibus et omnibus contractibus,
hoc quod interest dupli quantitatem minima excedere: in aliia autem casibus, qui incerti esse videntur,
judices, qui causas dirimendas suscipiunt, per suam subtilitatem requirere, ut quod re vera inducitur
damnum, hoc reddatur et non ex quibusdam machinationibus... in circuitus inextricablies redigatur... Et
hoc non solum in damno sed etiam in lucro nostra amplectitur constitutio.”An Introduction to English Economic History and Theory, volume one / 115
176. Summa, Secunda Secundae, quaestio lxxviii., artio. 2.
177. “Interesse non debetur nisi ex mora;” Endemann, u.s. 253, 254.
178. Ib., 272. [On the whole subject now see bk. ii. ch. 6, §65.]
179. Chronica Majora, (Rolls’ Series), iii. 328, 831.
180. Ib., iv. 8.
181. Ib., iv. 422.
182. Ib., iv. 245. Here the phrase occurs “Transalpini quos Causinos appellamus.”
183. Ib., iii. 329.
184. Ib., v. 404.
185. Hitherto the best available sources of information concerning the position of the Jews in England
before the expulsion were Prynne’s Demurrer, and the chapter on the Exchequer of the Jews in Madox’s
Exchequer, from which all later accounts, such as Tovey’s Anglia Judaica were drawn. But these are now
superseded by the valuable paper of Dr. Gross, The Exchequer of the Jews in England (London, Jewish
Chronicle Office, 1887), based largely on the manuscript and hitherto unused Rotuli Judaeorum in the
Public Reoord Office.
186. For the Capitula de Judaeis of 1194, see Select Charters, 262. The list of towns possessing chests is
given by Gross, Exchequer of the Jews, 20: they were Bedford, Berkhamstead, Bristol, Cambridge, Can-
terbury, Colchester, Devizes, Exeter, Gloucester, Hereford, Huntingdon, Lincoln, London, Marlborough,
Northampton, Nottingham, Norwich, Oxford, Stamford, Sudbury, Wallingford, Warwick, Wilton, Win-
chester, Worcester, and York. The following towns obtained grants from Henry III and Edward I, prohib-
iting Jews to settle there:—Derby, Leicester (grant from Simon de Montfort), Newbury in Berks, New-
castle, Bomsey, Southampton, Winchelsea, Windsor, Wycombe, and the following Welsh boroughs, Bala,
Beaumaria, Carnarvon, Conway, Criccieth, Flint, Harlech, Newborough, and Rhuddlan (ib., 23). Mr.
Gross points out (p. 4) that “in Germany the authorities of a town frequently besought the king to allow
Jews among them;” the explanation of this contrast lying in the fact that the central power was so much
weaker in Germany that the townsmen were able to reap the advantages from the presence of the Jews,
which in England the monarch kept to himself.
187. Ib., 28.
188. Ib., 30–34.
189. Select Charters, 385, §25.
190. Gross, 40. Cf. supra, n. 172. Hence it appears that Lyte, Hist. of Oxford, 44, is mistaken in supposing
that the order to this effect in 1248 imposed a new restriction.
191. Lyte, 40.
192. Ib., 101.
193. Stat. of Realm, i. 54.
194. Ib., i 99.
195. Ib., i. 165.
196. Ochenkowski, Englands wirthschaftliche Entwickelung, 179.
197. 37 Ed. III, stat. 2, 17, Stat. of Realm, i. 339. A statute two years earlier (25 Ed. III., stat. 5, c. 23, Stat. of
Realm, i. 324), enacted that the companies of Lombard merchants should be answerable for the debts of
their members: “so that another merchant which is not of the company shall not be thereby grieved
or impeached.”
198. As to the general course of development, of Schmoller, Studien über die wirthschaftliche Politik
Friedrichs des Grossen, ii. (in Jahrbuch für Gesetzgebung, etc., im Deutschen Reich., Jahrg. viii.,
Hft. 1, 1884); translated by the present writer under the title The Mercantile System (1896).